National Air Space (NAS) Data Exchange Environment Through 2060 by Roy, Aloke
Aloke Roy
Honeywell, Columbia, Maryland
National Air Space (NAS) Data Exchange
Environment Through 2060
NASA/CR—2015-218842
August 2015
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20150018068 2019-08-31T06:34:48+00:00Z
NASA STI Program . . . in Profi le
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated 
to the advancement of aeronautics and space science. 
The NASA Scientifi c and Technical Information (STI) 
Program plays a key part in helping NASA maintain 
this important role.
The NASA STI Program operates under the auspices 
of the Agency Chief Information Offi cer. It collects, 
organizes, provides for archiving, and disseminates 
NASA’s STI. The NASA STI Program provides access 
to the NASA Technical Report Server—Registered 
(NTRS Reg) and NASA Technical Report Server—
Public (NTRS)  thus providing one of the largest 
collections of aeronautical and space science STI in 
the world. Results are published in both non-NASA 
channels and by NASA in the NASA STI Report 
Series, which includes the following report types:
 
• TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 
completed research or a major signifi cant phase 
of research that present the results of NASA 
programs and include extensive data or theoretical 
analysis. Includes compilations of signifi cant 
scientifi c and technical data and information 
deemed to be of continuing reference value. 
NASA counter-part of peer-reviewed formal 
professional papers, but has less stringent 
limitations on manuscript length and extent of 
graphic presentations.
 
• TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientifi c 
and technical fi ndings that are preliminary or of 
specialized interest, e.g., “quick-release” reports, 
working papers, and bibliographies that contain 
minimal annotation. Does not contain extensive 
analysis.
 
• CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientifi c and 
technical fi ndings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees.
• CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. Collected 
papers from scientifi c and technical 
conferences, symposia, seminars, or other 
meetings sponsored or co-sponsored by NASA.
 
• SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientifi c, 
technical, or historical information from 
NASA programs, projects, and missions, often 
concerned with subjects having substantial 
public interest.
 
• TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. English-
language translations of foreign scientifi c and 
technical material pertinent to NASA’s mission.
For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following:
• Access the NASA STI program home page at 
http://www.sti.nasa.gov
 
• E-mail your question to help@sti.nasa.gov
 
• Fax your question to the NASA STI 
Information Desk at 757-864-6500
• Telephone the NASA STI Information Desk at
 757-864-9658
 
• Write to:
NASA STI Program
 Mail Stop 148
 NASA Langley Research Center
 Hampton, VA 23681-2199
 
Aloke Roy
Honeywell, Columbia, Maryland
National Air Space (NAS) Data Exchange
Environment Through 2060
NASA/CR—2015-218842
August 2015
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Glenn Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio 44135
Prepared under Contract NNA12AB80C
Available from
Trade names and trademarks are used in this report for identifi cation 
only. Their usage does not constitute an offi cial endorsement, 
either expressed or implied, by the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration.
Level of Review: This material has been technically reviewed by NASA technical management.
NASA STI Program
Mail Stop 148
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23681-2199
National Technical Information Service
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfi eld, VA 22161
703-605-6000
This report is available in electronic form at http://www.sti.nasa.gov/ and http://ntrs.nasa.gov/
DOCUMENT REVISION LOG 
 
Revision Description Date 
01 Initial release 4 August 2014 
 
  
NASA/CR—2015-218842 iii
National Air Space (NAS) Data Exchange Environment 
Through 2060 
Aloke Roy 
Honeywell 
Columbia, Maryland 41046 
 Table of Contents 
 
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. Purpose ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Scope .............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.3. Document Overview ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.3.1. Organization ............................................................................................................ 1 
1.3.2. Conventions ............................................................................................................ 2 
1.3.3. Document Relationships ......................................................................................... 2 
1.3.4. Word Processing Algorithm ................................................................................... 3 
1.4. Terminology ................................................................................................................... 4 
1.4.1. Acronyms ................................................................................................................ 4 
1.5. Applicable Reference Documents .................................................................................. 6 
1.5.1. Government/Regulatory .......................................................................................... 7 
1.5.2. Industry ................................................................................................................... 7 
1.5.3. Honeywell ............................................................................................................... 7 
2. Background ............................................................................................................................. 8 
2.1. Summary of Previous Task Analyses and Assessments ................................................ 8 
2.2. Summary of Architecture Options using the Technologies ........................................... 8 
3. Approach for Best Alternatives Assessment......................................................................... 10 
3.1. Operational Assessment ............................................................................................... 10 
3.2. Security Assessment ..................................................................................................... 11 
4. Operational Assessment ........................................................................................................ 12 
4.1. Operational View Analysis .......................................................................................... 12 
4.1.1. Overview of the ATM Concept of Operations in 2060 ........................................ 12 
4.1.2. System Context for the Operational View Analysis ............................................. 14 
4.1.3. Data Traffic Estimates .......................................................................................... 19 
4.2. Simulation Modeling Analysis ..................................................................................... 25 
4.2.1. Simulation Concept and Objectives ...................................................................... 26 
4.2.2. Scope of Simulation .............................................................................................. 26 
4.2.3. Air Traffic Model .................................................................................................. 27 
4.2.4. Data Traffic Model ............................................................................................... 29 
4.2.5. Queuing Model ..................................................................................................... 30 
4.2.6. Network Models.................................................................................................... 33 
4.2.7. NAS Network Simulation and Visualization ........................................................ 69 
4.2.8. Summary Analysis of Simulation Results ............................................................ 80 
5. Security Assessment ............................................................................................................. 82 
5.1. Approach for security Assessment ............................................................................... 82 
5.2. scope of Assessment ..................................................................................................... 86 
5.3. Assumptions about network ......................................................................................... 88 
5.4. Architecture Option 1 – Cellular network .................................................................... 90 
5.4.1. Threat Analysis ..................................................................................................... 91 
5.4.2. Risk Assessment ................................................................................................... 95 
5.5. Architecture Option 2 – Satellite network .................................................................. 100 
5.5.1. Threat Analysis ................................................................................................... 101 
5.5.2. Capability Assessment for Jamming ................................................................... 108 
5.5.3. Risk Assessment ................................................................................................. 108 
NASA/CR—2015-218842 iv
5.6. Architecture Option 3 – SO-OFDMA Network ......................................................... 113 
5.6.1. Threat Analysis ................................................................................................... 114 
5.6.2. Risk Assessment ................................................................................................. 114 
5.7. Mitigation Techniques ................................................................................................ 120 
5.7.1. Decentralized network ........................................................................................ 120 
5.7.2. Allocation of Network resources ........................................................................ 122 
5.7.3. Configurations of Security Parameters ............................................................... 122 
5.7.4. Configurable Radios ........................................................................................... 123 
5.7.5. Network Configuration Management ................................................................. 124 
5.7.6. Safety Considerations ......................................................................................... 125 
5.7.7. Strategy for Cellular Network ............................................................................. 126 
5.7.8. Strategy for Satellite Network ............................................................................ 126 
5.7.9. Jammer Localization ........................................................................................... 127 
5.7.10. Hacker monitoring .............................................................................................. 128 
5.8. Summary of Security Assessment .............................................................................. 129 
6. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 131 
6.1. Summary .................................................................................................................... 131 
6.2. Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 134 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 3-1  Approach for Best Alternatives Assessment .............................................................. 10 
Figure 4-1 System Context for Operational Scenarios ................................................................. 15 
Figure 4-2 SWIM Operations ....................................................................................................... 17 
Figure 4-3 Services per Airspace Domain .................................................................................... 18 
Figure 4-4 UAS Services .............................................................................................................. 23 
Figure 4-5 Simulation Model ........................................................................................................ 26 
Figure 4-6 Aircraft Traffic Calculation ......................................................................................... 27 
Figure 4-7 Current Schedule Vs Extrapolated Schedule with Growth ......................................... 28 
Figure 4-8 UAS Traffic Estimate .................................................................................................. 29 
Figure 4-9 Priority Queuing .......................................................................................................... 30 
Figure 4-10 Packet Preemption ..................................................................................................... 33 
Figure 4-11 Hexagonal Grid Cellular Coverage ........................................................................... 34 
Figure 4-12 Single Cell Service Volume ...................................................................................... 34 
Figure 4-13 Cellular Network Model ........................................................................................... 35 
Figure 4-14 Cellular Single Tower Simulation Model ................................................................. 36 
Figure 4-15 Packet Scheduling Scheme ....................................................................................... 37 
Figure 4-16 Flowchart of Data Traffic Scheduler Module ........................................................... 38 
Figure 4-17 Queue Latency for Cellular Link .............................................................................. 39 
Figure 4-18 Mean Latency in Cellular Network ........................................................................... 40 
Figure 4-19 Latency Components in Cellular Network, 200 AC/Cell ......................................... 41 
Figure 4-20 Channel Bandwidth Utilization of Cellular Link ...................................................... 42 
Figure 4-21 Packet Loss on Cellular Link .................................................................................... 43 
Figure 4-22 Integrated terrestrial-HAP Network .......................................................................... 44 
Figure 4-23 HAP Cell Service Volume ........................................................................................ 45 
NASA/CR—2015-218842 v
 Figure 4-24 HAP Network Model ................................................................................................ 45 
Figure 4-25 Single HAP Simulation Model.................................................................................. 47 
Figure 4-26 Queue Latency, Feeder Cellular Link ....................................................................... 48 
Figure 4-27 Queue Latency, Feeder FSO Link ............................................................................. 49 
Figure 4-28 Mean Latency, Feeder Cellular Link ........................................................................ 50 
Figure 4-29 Mean Latency, Feeder FSO Link .............................................................................. 50 
Figure 4-30 Latency Components, 400AC/HAP-Cell .................................................................. 51 
Figure 4-31  Channel Bandwidth Utilization of HAP Links ........................................................ 52 
Figure 4-32  Packet Loss on HAP Links ...................................................................................... 53 
Figure 4-33  Satellite Network Model .......................................................................................... 55 
Figure 4-34  Satellite Network Analysis Model ........................................................................... 56 
Figure 4-35  Cascaded Queue Model for Latency Estimation ...................................................... 57 
Figure 4-36 Queue Latency on Satellite Links ............................................................................. 58 
Figure 4-37 Mean Latency with Satellite Network ....................................................................... 59 
Figure 4-38 Latency Components in Satellite Network with 100 AC/Spot Beam ....................... 60 
Figure 4-39 AC ↔ SAT link Channel Bandwidth Utilization ..................................................... 61 
Figure 4-40   SAT ↔ GW Link Channel Bandwidth Utilization ................................................. 61 
Figure 4-41   Packet Loss over AC ↔ SAT Link ......................................................................... 62 
Figure 4-42   Packet Loss over SAT ↔ GW Link ........................................................................ 63 
Figure 4-43  Aircraft-to-Aircraft Communication Network Model ............................................. 64 
Figure 4-44  Aircraft-to-Aircraft Communication Connectivity Report ...................................... 66 
Figure 4-45  Cell Arrangement in Aircraft-to-Aircraft Communication Network ....................... 68 
Figure 4-46 Overlay of Aircraft Display on Map ......................................................................... 70 
Figure 4-47 Configuration Network Dialog - Cellular, HAP and Satellite .................................. 71 
Figure 4-48 Air-to-Air Network Configuration Dialog ................................................................ 71 
Figure 4-49  Extrapolate Dialog ................................................................................................... 72 
Figure 4-50  Single Network Performance Report Input Dialog .................................................. 74 
Figure 4-51  Grid Wise Cellular Network Report Dialog ............................................................. 74 
Figure 4-52  Ground-based Cellular Network Performance Statistics Display for Selected Day 75 
Figure 4-53  HAP Network Performance Statistics Display for Selected Time Instance ............ 76 
Figure 4-54  Satellite Network Performance Statistics Display for Selected Time Instance ....... 76 
Figure 4-55  Air-to-Air Communication....................................................................................... 77 
Figure 4-56  Air-to-Air Communication Generated Paths ........................................................... 78 
Figure 4-57  Air-to-Air Communication (VHF Air-to-Air Link) ................................................. 79 
Figure 4-58 Air-to-Air Communication (L-band Air-to-Air link) ................................................ 79 
Figure 4-59 Air-to-Air Communication (FSO Air-to-Air Link)................................................... 80 
Figure 5-1  Approach for Security Assessment ............................................................................ 82 
Figure 5-2  COCR Hazard Categorization .................................................................................... 84 
Figure 5-3  Context of Security Assessment................................................................................. 87 
Figure 5-4  NAS Data Communication Environment................................................................... 88 
Figure 5-5  Network Domains ...................................................................................................... 89 
Figure 5-6  Security Threats to Cellular Network ........................................................................ 90 
Figure 5-7  Security Threats to Satellite Network ...................................................................... 101 
Figure 5-8  Jamming at Satellites................................................................................................ 103 
Figure 5-9  Jamming at Aircraft .................................................................................................. 105 
Figure 5-10  Jamming at Earth Station ....................................................................................... 107 
Figure 5-11  Security Threats to SO-OFDMA network ............................................................. 114 
NASA/CR—2015-218842 vi
 Figure 5-12  Space Time Frequency Resource Allocation Scheme ........................................... 121 
Figure 5-13  AC Resource Allocation Mechanism ..................................................................... 122 
Figure 5-14  Security Plan configuration .................................................................................... 123 
Figure 5-15  Radio Parameter Configuration.............................................................................. 124 
Figure 5-16  Network Configuration Management .................................................................... 124 
Figure 5-17  Safety Considerations............................................................................................. 125 
Figure 5-18  Cellular Network .................................................................................................... 126 
Figure 5-19  Satellite Network without Feeder Links ................................................................ 127 
Figure 5-20  Multilateration Technique to Locate Jammers ....................................................... 128 
Figure 5-21  Hacker Monitoring ................................................................................................. 129 
 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 4-1 ATM Operational Concepts Envisaged in the Year 2060 ............................................ 13 
Table 4-2 Phase 2 Traffic Estimates (kbps) – Single Aircraft, 2030 Timeframe ......................... 19 
Table 4-3 Traffic Estimates (kbps) – Single Commercial Large Aircraft, 2060 Timeframe ....... 19 
Table 4-4 Traffic Estimates (kbps) – Single Microjet, 2060 Timeframe ..................................... 20 
Table 4-5 Traffic Estimates (kbps) – Single BGA Aircraft, 2060 Timeframe ............................. 22 
Table 4-6 Worst Case Non-payload Comm. Throughput for UAS, 2030 Timeframe ................. 24 
Table 4-7 Traffic Estimates (kbps) – Single UAS, 2060 timeframe............................................. 24 
Table 4-8 Data Traffic Estimates (kbps) – Summary, 2060 timeframe ........................................ 25 
Table 4-9 Data Traffic Estimates (kbps) – 2060 Timeframe ........................................................ 30 
Table 4-10 Priority Queue Latency Example ............................................................................... 32 
Table 4-11 Ground Stations’ Positions ......................................................................................... 65 
Table 4-12 COCR Phase 2 Broadcast Traffic Rate within a 100 nm Cell Service Domain ......... 67 
Table 4-13 Broadcast Traffic Rate Estimates within a 100 nm Cell Service Domain for 2060 
Timeframe ............................................................................................................................. 67 
Table 4-14 Simulation Analysis Observations ............................................................................. 81 
Table 5-1 COCR Operational Safety Assessment and Safety Objectives for Datalink Services . 83 
Table 5-2 Safety Hazard Level Classification .............................................................................. 85 
Table 5-3 Format of Threat Assessment for a Network ............................................................... 86 
Table 5-4 Hazard Assessment for Loss of Communications in Cellular Network ....................... 96 
Table 5-5 Hazard Assessment for Loss of Data Integrity in Cellular Networks .......................... 97 
Table 5-6 Risk Assessment for Loss of Communication in Cellular Network............................. 98 
Table 5-7 Risk Assessment for Loss of Data Integrity in Cellular Network ................................ 99 
Table 5-8 Impact of Jamming on Receivers at Satellites ............................................................ 103 
Table 5-9 Impact of Jamming on Receivers at Aircraft .............................................................. 106 
Table 5-10 Impact of Jamming on Receivers at Ground Earth Stations ..................................... 107 
Table 5-11 Capability Assessment for Satellite Network Jamming ........................................... 108 
Table 5-12 Hazard Assessment for Loss of Communication in Satellite Networks ................... 109 
Table 5-13 Hazard Assessment for Loss of Data Integrity in Satellite Networks ...................... 110 
Table 5-14 Risk Assessment on Loss of Communications in satellite Networks....................... 111 
Table 5-15 Risk Assessment on Loss of Data Integrity in satellite Networks............................ 112 
Table 5-16 Hazard Assessment on Loss of communications in SO-OFDMA Networks ........... 115 
Table 5-17 Hazard Assessment on Loss of Data Integrity in SO-OFDMA Networks ............... 116 
NASA/CR—2015-218842 vii
 Table 5-18 Risk Assessment on Loss of communications in SO-OFDMA Networks ............... 117 
Table 5-19 Risk Assessment on Loss of Data Integrity in SO-OFDMA Networks ................... 118 
 
  
NASA/CR—2015-218842 viii
 Best Alternatives Assessment Report 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
NASA’s NextGen Concepts and Technology Development (CTD) Project focuses on capabilities to 
improve safety, capacity and efficiency of the National Air Space (NAS).  In order to achieve those 
objectives, NASA sought industry-Government partnerships to research and identify solutions for traffic 
flow management, dynamic airspace configuration, separation assurance, super density operations, airport 
surface operations and similar forward-looking air-traffic modernization (ATM) concepts.  Data exchanges 
over NAS being the key enabler for most of these ATM concepts, the Sub-Topic area 3 of the CTD project 
sought to identify technology candidates that can satisfy air-to-air and air/ground communications needs of 
the NAS in the year 2060 timeframe.  Honeywell, under a two-year contract with NASA, is working on this 
communications technology research initiative.  This report summarizes Honeywell’s research conducted 
during the second year of the study task. 
 
In the first year of the performance period, Honeywell conducted a systematic survey of the public domain 
literature to identify current, emerging and embryonic communication technologies, which included a wide 
range, starting with the existing, narrow bandwidth, low data rate, ACARS to the very futuristic optical and 
X-ray communications. Characterization of those technologies was done in an Excel-based workbook using 
a common set of key attributes and characteristics, which were derived from performance requirements 
defined in aviation standards.  Subsequently, a Quality Function Deployment (QFD) analysis tool was used 
to map critical needs of key ATM applications to the capabilities of the candidate technologies to prioritize 
the technology candidates that can meet air-to-air and air/ground ATM application needs.  A common 
architectural framework was established to define the data exchange environment and the context of the 
air-to-air and air/ground networks in that environment.  Three architectures were analyzed using future 
cellular, next generation Ku/Ka band SATCOM and Self-Organizing Orthogonal Frequency Division 
Multiple Access (SO-OFDMA) technologies.  Architecture options included cellular base stations located 
on High Altitude Platforms (HAP) and Free Space Optical (FSO) communications for cross-connects.  
Finally, overall system expenditure against benefits were compared for the proposed architectures to choose 
the right architecture for NAS environment with minimum cost outflows.  The first year of study concluded 
that a hybrid communications architecture consisting of cellular technology for terrestrial, satellite for 
Oceanic, polar and remote regions and SO-OFDMA for air-to-air networking will be best suited to meet 
the future communication needs of the NAS. 
 
The second year of study started from the architecture recommendations of the first year deliverables.  The 
research involved two focus areas:  operational and security analyses of the terrestrial and HAP-based 
cellular, satellite and air-to-air architectures.  The operational analysis consisted of two steps: a operational 
view analysis and simulation modeling of the communication technologies. 
 
The operational view analysis started with the ATM operational concepts and their communication services 
enablers.  The required information flows for those services were estimated by aircraft type, airspace 
domain and the phase of flight.  The information flows were based on the Version 2 of Communications 
Operating Concept and Requirements for the Future Radio System (COCR) jointly developed by FAA and 
EUROCONTROL.  The data traffic estimated in the COCR was escalated by 2.5% per year to derive the 
data communication demand for most of the services and aircraft classes.    The 2.5% per year escalation 
factor was recommended in the COCR.  Aircraft distribution and movement over National Air Space (NAS) 
was based on actual aircraft flight data reported by FAA for January 23, 2014.  The aircraft data was 
escalated by a factor of 0.5% per year, which was used by FAA in a recent report to estimate air traffic in 
the year 2033.  To estimate UAS distribution over NAS, it was assumed that UAS operation will be 
concentrated around major urban areas.  Top two hundred and fifty urban areas in the NAS were selected 
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based on their population density and the UAS platforms were distributed to those areas based on their 
population ranking.  Aircraft movement was simulated at five minute interval over a 24-hour period using 
a visual tool that permitted computation and display of aircraft concentration at national and regional levels. 
 
For the simulation, a set of priority-based queuing models were developed to estimate the throughput, 
latency, and dropped packets by information service flows for the communication technologies identified 
in the first year of this study. The queuing models were combined with the visual simulation tool to evaluate 
the performance of the three network architectures: cellular, satellite and SO-OFDMA air-to-air. 
 
The operational analysis concluded that the cellular architectures could support up to 400 aircraft in a cell 
without any significant degradation of the desired services. On the other hand, satellite architecture 
experienced significant loss of passenger data traffic even with five aircraft per spot beam and had loss of 
SWIM services when the number of aircraft exceeded fifty per spot beam.  In addition, satellite networks 
had much higher latency compared to cellular networks due to higher propagation delays.  The SO-OFDMA 
air-to-air network using VHF media could support basic surveillance, air traffic and airline operational 
services but did not have adequate capacity to support SWIM or passenger data. 
 
For the security analysis, a security perimeter was defined between the regulated aeronautical network and 
the unregulated public network.  All classes of devices on the perimeter that would be exposed to the public 
domain were identified at the first step of the analysis. Subsequently, high-level threat vectors for these 
classes of devices were identified.  The safety objectives and the hazard severity categories for datalink 
services from the COCR were analyzed in the second step and mapped against the threat vectors to develop 
a hazard score for each of the threats identified in the first step.  In the third step of the security analysis, 
vulnerability of the three recommended architectures were assessed against the probability of attaining 
certain hazard score for a given datalink service.  If the assessed safety hazard probability of a threat was 
below the required safety objective for the datalink service, then that particular threat was classified to have 
no impact on the communication architecture to offer the datalink service.  Conversely, if the hazard 
probability of a threat was higher than the safety objective, that threat was deemed have security impact on 
the recommended architecture.  At the final step of the security analysis, some high level mitigation 
strategies were recommended for the threats having security impact on the proposed architectures.  In 
summary, RF jamming and man-in-the-middle attacks are major concerns for cellular architectures whereas 
jamming of the feeder links from a UAS would have serious impact on satellite communications.  Lack of 
link and media access control security in the SO-OFDMA air-to-air network makes it very vulnerable to 
many security threats.  The dynamic nature of the broadcast mode SO-ODFMA makes it difficult to 
implement cost-effective security measures for this architecture.  
 
This study concludes that all three technology elements, cellular, satellite and SO-OFDMA air-to-air would 
have a role in the future communications supporting air traffic management beyond NextGen.  To mitigate 
some of the security risks associated with a technology architecture and to provide added capacity, 
flexibility, reliability and quality of service for future ATM, a hybrid communication architecture utilizing 
cellular, satellite and air-to-air networking is recommended.  In addition, technology elements to seamlessly 
and simultaneously utilize all available air/ground connectivity options should be employed. 
 
History of technology evolution over the last fifty years is indicative of the challenges to predict the 
communication technologies and ATM environment fifty years in the future.  This Honeywell study 
captures a high-level view of the future based on current knowledge.  It is possible that some game changing 
technology such as the personal computers, the Internet and the cell phones will materialize within the near 
future.  Therefore, it is strongly recommended that this study be updated at a periodic interval to include 
future research and developments.   
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 Free Space Optics (FSO), one of the technologies identified in this study, has the potential to become a 
game changer for future ATM communications.  One of the key challenges for applying FSO to 
aeronautical communications is the acquisition and tracking of aircraft moving at very high relative 
speeds.  Although this study included a preliminary assessment of the FSO technology, it is recommended 
that a future study should develop technical approach and system design for aircraft acquisition and 
tracking to support FSO communications.  
Similar to FSO, operation of UAS in the NAS is in the infancy today.  However, UASs may have 
a far-reaching impact on future ATM.  Therefore, it is recommended that a detailed study be 
initiated as soon as possible to assess the impact of low-altitude UAS on future NAS 
communications.  That study should also address harmonization strategies for UAS command and 
control links with traditional ATC communications as well as general integration of UAS 
information for situational awareness of the pilots and controllers. 
In addition to the studies recommended above, Honeywell suggests the following items for future 
work: 
 Develop high fidelity simulation models of the proposed architectures to perform tradeoff 
analyses and operational scenario-based simulations.  By integrating these simulation 
models with other pre-existing NASA models, higher fidelity system models can be 
developed to aid future system design. 
 Security analysis presented in this paper provides a high level assessment of the security 
threats, risks and their potential mitigation approaches.  A future study should specifically 
expand this analysis to fully address the security vulnerabilities of the proposed 
architectures and develop mitigation approaches. 
 RF spectrum is a very limited resource and its demand is increasing exponentially with 
time. Therefore, a future study should analyze the availability of effective spectrum for 
aeronautical communications and develop a technical approach for reuse and dynamic, on 
demand, allocation of spectrum. 
 The aviation network of the future needs to be very dynamic with multiple air/ground 
connectivity options supporting simultaneous traffic flows with varied quality of service 
requirements and ad-hoc, self-configuring air-to-air networks.  To maintain robust data 
flows and to assure low latency and jitter, future aeronautical networks must support 
sophisticated routing algorithms that can converge very quickly and impose very little 
system overhead.  It is essential to research and design this routing algorithm soon such 
that it would be ready for standardization within the next ten years.  This research should 
include management of multiple links for seamless inter-technology handovers and 
leverage currently evolving IP mobility standards. 
 Similar to the routing challenges, aircraft architecture may also need to be investigated to 
facilitate such a dynamic network operation while ensuring security of the flight critical 
services and safety of flight.  
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 Best Alternatives Assessment Report 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this document is to provide the results of the Best Alternatives Assessment in Task 
6 (Best Alternatives Assessment and Recommendation) of the Next Generation (NextGen) 
Concepts and Technology Development Project (CTD1), Sub-topic 3, under NASA contract 
NNA12AB80C.  This document is Deliverable 9, to report the details of the Best Alternatives 
Assessment.  Task 6 is part of Phase 2 of the CTD1 project to conduct further analyses and 
simulation modeling on the best technology alternatives and recommend the best technology for 
air-to-air and air/ground data communications over the National Air Space (NAS) through the year 
2060.   
 
1.2. SCOPE 
The scope of this document is to report on the results of the Best Alternatives Assessment of Task 
6.  The Best Alternatives Assessment further assesses the best communication technology 
alternatives in operational and security assessments.  The operational assessment includes an 
operational view analysis and simulation modeling analysis.  In the simulation modeling analysis, 
data traffic corresponding to the predicted air traffic environment is simulated and assessed against 
the best technology alternatives and architecture options using these technology alternatives.  
 
The best communication technology alternatives assessed in Task 6 of Phase 2 and as documented 
in this report include Cellular, Ku/Ka band SATCOM and Self-Organized Orthogonal Frequency 
Division Multiple Access (SO-OFDMA) communication technologies.  In addition, Free Space 
Optical (FSO) was found to be a good supplemental technology for the alternatives in an 
aeronautical telecommunications network.  Previous Task 2 in Phase 1 of the NASA CTD1 project 
identified, characterized and assessed an initial set of candidate communication technologies.  The 
Task 2 assessment resulted in a down-selected list of leading candidates.  Task 3 in Phase 1 
conducted an architectural analysis of the leading technologies.  The task developed 
communication architectures based on the selected technologies and using platforms such as 
ground towers, High Altitude Platforms (HAP), and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geosynchronous 
Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites to achieve an aeronautical network for the future NAS environment.  
Task 4 of Phase 1 conducted a cost analysis of the leading technologies and architectures to identify 
the combination of the network architectures to achieve safety critical communication in a cost 
effective manner without compromising Required Communication Performances (RCPs).  The 
results of the Phase 1 tasks are the three best technology alternatives and architectures, including 
FSO as a supplemental technology, which are further analyzed and assessed in Task 6 of Phase 2. 
 
 
1.3. DOCUMENT OVERVIEW 
1.3.1. Organization 
This document is organized into the following sections: 
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  Section 1 – Introduction 
Identifies the purpose and scope of the document, summarizes document 
organization and document conventions, defines terminology and acronyms used 
throughout the document, and provides references to applicable documents. 
 
 Section 2 – Background 
This section summarizes the activities done in previous tasks of the project.  It 
briefly explains the results of the tasks leading up to the subject of this report, task 
6 best alternatives assessment.  It also provides summaries of the best technology 
alternatives and architectures.     
 
 Section 3 – Approach for Best Alternatives Assessment 
This section describes the approach followed for the best technology alternatives 
assessment. It explains the approach of the operational assessment and security 
assessment.  It identifies the constraints and assumptions of the assessments. 
 
 Section 4 – Operational Assessment 
This section explains the Operational Assessment consisting of Operational View 
Analysis and a Simulation Modeling Analysis. It evaluates the best alternative 
technologies based on the operational assessment. 
 
 Section 5 – Security Assessment 
This section describes the security assessment of the best technology alternatives 
and architectures.  It describes the security assessment consisting of threat analysis 
and risk assessment.  It provides the results of the assessment and recommends 
technical mitigations of the risks.  It evaluates the best alternative technologies 
based on the security assessment. 
 
 Section 6 – Conclusions 
This section provides the summary of the operational and security assessments 
conducted in Task 6.  It summarizes the assessment of the best alternative 
technologies based on the operational and security assessments.  It makes 
recommendations for future work.  
 
1.3.2. Conventions 
The following conventions are used throughout this document: 
 Use of the notation [REF-XXX] refers to an applicable reference document, where 
XXX is the shorthand notation. 
 
1.3.3. Document Relationships 
This document reports on the assessment of the best technology alternatives down-selected in 
previous tasks in Phase 1 of the project.  The initial Task 2 in the project identified, characterized 
and assessed candidate communication technologies.  The task generated an initial list of the top 
technologies from the candidates.  Task 3 analyzed architectures using the leading candidate 
technologies and down-selected the candidates to the best technology alternatives based on 
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 architectural analysis.  Task 4 analyzed the cost effectiveness of the technologies and architectures 
from Task 3.   
 
In the Task 2 analysis, candidate communications technologies were identified, characterized and 
assessed for meeting the communications requirements of Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
applications in the year 2060 timeframe.  A comparative analysis of the candidate technologies 
was conducted and summarized, and an initial list of down-selected technologies was generated.   
The Task 2 document is the Report on Task 2 of the National Air Space (NAS) Data Exchange 
Environment Through 2060 project - Identification, Characterization and Mapping of Candidate 
Technologies [TASK2RPT].   
 
In Task 3, the architectures were developed using the top candidate communication technologies 
selected in Task 2 and as reported in the Task 2 report document. The best technologies were 
down-selected from the list of candidate technologies based on the architectural analysis.  The 
architectures were assessed for air-to-air communication and air/ground communications and the 
results were summarized in the Report on Task 3 of the National Air Space (NAS) Data Exchange 
Environment Through 2060 project – Architecture Analysis [TASK3RPT]  
 
In Task 4, the architectures analyzed in Task 3 were assessed for cost effectiveness to support air-
to-air and air/ground communications.  The results were summarized in the Report on Task 4 of 
the National Air Space (NAS) Data Exchange Environment Through 2060 project – Cost Analysis 
[TASK4RPT] 
 
These documents and other reference documents providing input to the Task 6 analysis are listed 
in section 1.5. 
 
1.3.4. Word Processing Algorithm 
This document was prepared using Microsoft® Office Word 2007. 
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 1.4. TERMINOLOGY 
1.4.1. Acronyms 
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 Acronym Definition 
ASDI Aircraft Situation Display to Industry 
AAC Airline Administrative Communications  
ATS Air Traffic Services  
AOC Aeronautical Operational Control 
APC Airline Passenger Communication 
ATR Avions de Transport Regional (larger commercial air transport aircraft) 
AC Aircraft 
AC ↔ BS link Aircraft-to-ground base station link 
AC ↔ HAP link Aircraft-to-HAP base station link 
AC ↔ SAT link Aircraft-to-satellite link 
APT Airport  
ANSPs Air Navigation Service Providers  
ATC Air Traffic Control  
AOA Autonomous Operations Areas 
Arv arrival 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
ATSP Air Traffic Service Providers 
Auth. authentication 
AVS Advisory Services  
BGA Business and General Aviation  
BS Base station  
CTD Concepts and Technology Development  
CSV  comma separated values 
CIS Clearance/ Instruction Services  
Dep departure 
DSS Delegated Separation Services 
DL downlink  
DCM Data Communications Management  
DAG-TM Distributed Air/Ground Traffic Management  
EIS Emergency Information Services  
ENR En-route  
FSO Free Space Optical  
FPS Flight Position/ Intent / Preferences Services  
FMS Flight Management System  
FD flight deck  
FAA Federal Aviation Administration  
FSS Flight Support Services 
FIFO First In, First Out 
FSO Free Space Optical 
GDC Global Data Center  
GEO Geostationary Earth Orbit 
GES Gateway Earth Station  
Gbps Giga-bits per second 
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 . 
Acronym Definition 
GUI Graphical User Interface  
GW Gateway 
HAP High Altitude Platforms  
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
km kilometer 
LEO  Low Earth Orbit 
MAC Media Access Control 
MMS Multimedia Messaging Service  
ms millisecond 
MSP Mobile Service Provider 
NETCONN Network Connection  
NETKEEP Network Keep-alive  
NAS National Air Space  
NMS Network Management System 
nm Nautical mile 
NW network 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
ORP Oceanic/Remote/Polar  
QOS Quality of Service 
RCP Required Communication Performance  
SATCOM Satellite Communication 
SAT ↔ GW link Satellite-to-ground gateway link 
SO-OFDMA Self-Organized Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access  
SMS Short Message Service  
SAT Satellite 
SWIM System Wide Information Management 
TMA Terminal Maneuvering Area 
TBO Trajectory-Based Operations  
TS Time Sample 
TU Transmission Unit 
UTC Universal Time Coordinated  
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UAS Unmanned Aircraft Systems  
UL uplink  
UACS Unmanned Aircraft Control Station  
VPN Virtual Private Network 
 
1.5. APPLICABLE REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
The following documents, of the exact issue shown with the latest amendments and notes, form a 
part of this document to the extent specified herein. 
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 1.5.1. Government/Regulatory 
Shorthand Document Number Document Description 
COCR COCR Version 2.0 
Communications Operating Concept and Requirements for the 
Future Radio System,  2006, version 2.0, EUROCONTROL/FAA 
FAA2033  http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14
374 
 
1.5.2. Industry 
Shorthand Document Number Document Description / Link 
ITUR Report ITU-R M.2171 
Characteristics of unmanned aircraft systems and spectrum 
requirements to support their safe operation in non-segregated 
airspace, ITU, December 2009 
QUEUES  http://iew3.technion.ac.il/serveng2012S/Recitations/R
ec13.pdf 
 
1.5.3. Honeywell 
Shorthand Document 
Number 
Document Description / Link 
TASK2RPT NNA12AB80C-D03-
01-01 
Report on Task 2 of the National Air Space (NAS) Data Exchange 
Environment Through 2060 project - Identification, 
Characterization and Mapping of Candidate Technologies, 1 May 
2013, revision 01, Honeywell. 
TASK3RPT NNA12AB80C-D04-
01-01 
Report on Task 3 of the National Air Space (NAS) Data Exchange 
Environment Through 2060 project – Architecture Analysis, 1 
August 2013, revision 01, Honeywell. 
TASK4RPT NNA12AB80C-D05-
01-01 
Report on Task 4 of the National Air Space (NAS) Data Exchange 
Environment Through 2060 project – Cost Analysis, 1 September 
2013, revision 01, Honeywell. 
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 2. BACKGROUND 
This section provides background on the previous Phase 1 tasks and a summary of architectures 
using the best technology alternatives.  The best technology alternatives will be further analyzed 
and assessed in context of the architectures. 
 
2.1. SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS TASK ANALYSES AND ASSESSMENTS 
The primary objective of NASA’s Concept and Technology Development (CTD) project is to 
identify and assess the data exchange environment using air-to-air and air/ground communications 
to support Air Traffic Management (ATM) applications over National Air Space (NAS) through 
the year 2060.   
 
In Task 2 of the project, high potential communication technologies to support NextGen air-to-air 
and air/ground datalinks were identified, characterized and evaluated. Top candidate were down-
selected from the original list of 15 technologies from current, emerging and embryonic categories, 
in a comparative assessment against the requirements of critical ATM applications.  See Task 2 
report [TASK2RPT]. 
 
In Task 3, communication system architectures were developed using the top three candidate 
technologies, namely Cellular, Ku/Ka band SATCOM and SO-OFDMA, and platforms including 
HAP, Satellite and terrestrial platforms to achieve the data exchange environment for NAS.  An 
architectural analysis was performed to identify the technical pros and cons of the three 
architecture options using the technologies.  A hybrid architecture consisting of all three 
architectures was analyzed and shown to be an effective way to meet the communication 
requirements in the future NAS. FSO was identified as a supplemental technology in the 
architectures as a high throughput pipe for certain links in the architectures. The results were 
summarized in Task 3 report [TASK3RPT]. 
 
In Task 4, a cost analysis was performed on the architectures of the top three candidate 
technologies analyzed in Task 3 to identify the most cost effective solution to facilitate the future 
NAS requirements. The results of the cost analysis found all three technologies to be cost effective 
for meeting requirements specific to air-to-air and air/ground configurations for future ATM 
communications.   
 
The three technologies are recommended as the best technology alternatives for further 
assessment.  In Task 6, the best technology alternatives and architectures are assessed in 
operational and security assessments, which is the subject of this report. 
 
2.2. SUMMARY OF ARCHITECTURE OPTIONS USING THE TECHNOLOGIES 
The three architectures and the hybrid architecture that were analyzed in Tasks 3 and 4 are 
considered for the best alternatives assessment.   
 
Architecture Option 1 is based on the future cellular technology (5G+ cellular) combined with 
the HAP platform. In this architecture, the terrestrial segment is supported by cellular network, 
while the airborne segment is supported by a HAP network. The HAP segment includes oceanic 
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 regions and terrain-challenged terrestrial regions where it is difficult or expensive to install and 
maintain towers. The combination of both the terrestrial cellular network and the HAP based 
network will be able to support services in all airspaces. FSO link supplements this architecture 
for backend HAP-to-HAP or HAP-to-Ground communications. 
 
Architecture Option 2 is based on the Ku/Ka band SATCOM technology for providing access to 
aircraft in both terrestrial and oceanic regions for their communication with ground network. 
Aircraft makes use of satellite network installed in space for both the air/ground and air-to-air 
services. The satellite terrestrial network that provides connectivity to the ground network 
comprises of Gateway Earth Station (GES) and Network Management System (NMS).  FSO link 
is considered as a possible secondary link for inter-satellite and satellite-ground to address some 
of the challenges and issues inherent in satellite communications.   
 
Architecture Option 3 is based on broadband SO-OFDMA technology that uses VHF spectrum 
allocated for aeronautical purposes. SO-OFDMA is expected to provide air-to-air communication 
without any service cost for aircraft in all airspaces. Air-to-ground communication over terrestrial 
regions can be accomplished by having at least one SO-OFDMA node per cell installed on the 
ground. In oceanic regions, where it is not possible to have ground infrastructure, the packets are 
routed to the nearest ground SO-OFDMA node through a network of aircraft flying in the region. 
Hence the combination of both airborne and ground segment will be able to provide air/ground 
communication needed for an aircraft.  FSO is a possible supplemental technology as a secondary 
air/ground link.  In addition, FSO may be combined with SO-OFDMA as a point-to-point system 
for air-to-air relaying of data traffic in support high air traffic corridors.  FSO provides a possible 
high throughput pipe between aircraft for message relaying. 
 
Hybrid Architecture is a hybrid of all three architectures including HAPs, satellite and terrestrial 
networks.  SO-OFDMA is the most suitable architecture for air-to-air service, while the 
combination of satellites and HAPs provide a solution for air/ground communications.  Cellular 
network covers the terrestrial regions similar to the HAP-Cellular architecture. Most of the oceanic 
regions are covered by GEO systems and the high traffic oceanic and terrain challenged terrestrial 
regions are covered by HAPs.  FSO may serve as a supplementary link or may be aimed as a 
primary technology for air/ground traffic. In terrestrial regions for altitudes below 10,000 ft, where 
FSO availability may become an issue, cellular technology may be used to provide a 
supplementary link.  FSO may also provide a high throughput pipe between aircraft. 
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3. APPROACH FOR BEST ALTERNATIVES ASSESSMENT 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the approach for the best alternatives assessment activities of Task 6.  The 
high-level activities are highlighted in the figure and include operational assessment, security 
assessment, comparative analysis and report on the assessments and comparative analysis as 
reported in this Deliverable 9 document.  
 
 
3.1. OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT 
The operational assessment consists of an operational view analysis and simulation modeling 
analysis.  The operational view analysis begins with a high level concept of operations of ATM 
operational services and the communication services that enable the operational services in the 
2060 timeframe.  It identifies the information flows of the communication services in the air-to-
air and air/ground networks and analyzes the volume of data traffic in the information flows based 
on aircraft type, airspace domain and phase of flight.  The data traffic results are input to the 
simulation modeling analysis.   
 
The simulation modeling analysis begins by modeling the data flows in the architectures that 
utilize the best alternative technologies.  The models evaluate the performance of the technologies 
in meeting latency and data throughput requirements of the communication service types.  The 
requirements for data throughput were established by the data traffic results from the operation 
view analysis.  The architecture models then provide the basic modeling concepts and parameters 
for an aircraft and data traffic simulation and visualization covering the NAS in the 2060 
timeframe. The simulation generates latency and data throughput performance results, which are 
compared to the results of the architecture and data flow models to help validate the models.  
Performance is measured in terms of latency, data packet loss, achievable throughput and 
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Note: The figure highlights the activities conducted as reported in this document, Deliverable 9. 
Figure 3-1  Approach for Best Alternatives Assessment 
 scalability.  The simulation is configurable to change parameters and conduct sensitivity analyses. 
The best alternative technologies are evaluated based on the results of the operational assessment. 
 
3.2. SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
The security perimeter boundary is first established and described to set the context of the security 
assessment.  The contexts of the assessment are the access network architectures that utilize the 
best communication technology alternatives. The security assessment then conducts a threat 
analysis and risk assessment within the security perimeters.  Security assessment outside of the 
perimeters is outside the scope of the assessment.  The threat analysis identifies and defines threat 
agents and the threat vectors used by the agents to attack the access networks.  It determines the 
impact and likelihood of each threat.  The vulnerability assessment considers and evaluates the 
weaknesses and exploitability of the access networks to threats.  The risk assessment determines 
the risk of each threat based on the impact and likelihood of the threat and the vulnerability of the 
access network to the threat.  The acceptability of each risk is evaluated to determine the need for 
mitigations of the risks.  The security assessment determines technical mitigations of the 
unacceptable risks.  Only technical mitigations are considered as security policy and operational 
mitigations are outside the scope of the assessment.  The best alternative technologies are evaluated 
based on the results of the security assessment. 
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 4. OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT  
The three technology candidates chosen as best technology alternatives are analyzed and assessed 
in an operational assessment.  The operational assessment is conducted as an operational view 
analysis and simulation modeling analysis.   
4.1. OPERATIONAL VIEW ANALYSIS 
The operational view analysis provides a high-level concept of ATM operations in the 2060 
timeframe to understand the required information flows of the communication services that enable 
the ATM operations.   The operational view analysis identifies and characterizes the information 
flows based on type of aircraft traffic that utilize the communication services, airspace domain and 
phase of flight.  It provides estimates of data traffic loads in the flows, which are then used in the 
simulation modeling.     
4.1.1. Overview of the ATM Concept of Operations in 2060  
The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) aims to make air travel more 
convenient while ensuring flight operations to be safe, secure and efficient. Advancements in the 
technologies enable more efficient operations and thus aid in transformation to NextGen. The role 
of future ATM environment is envisaged as a paradigm shift from controlling aircraft movement 
to managing air-space. The paradigm shift is seen to be manifested in the following aspects:   
 Use of less voice to use of mostly data communications 
 Shift to trajectory-based management 
 More cooperative management between aircraft and between aircraft and air traffic 
controllers 
 Sharing of more information across NAS information sources. 
Communication services to enable the operational services are envisaged as undergoing a 
paradigm shift as well, to sharing of common broadband IP-based aeronautical communications 
networks by different types of communications traffic.  The traffic congestion problems will be 
solved by advancements in the technology, new applications, accuracy, and automation of systems.  
The ATM paradigm shifts from less voice to more data communications. Data link is expected to 
play an important role for transmission of routine exchanges. The data link will change the 
workload distribution of air traffic controller and aircrew. However, it is expected that data 
communications will not normally be used for transmission of urgent, safety critical messages in 
tactical traffic situations. Real time voice channels will remain primary mean of communications 
for certain communications (non-routine, failure recovery and emergency). 
 
The ATM Concept of Operations for 2060 will have a paradigm shift from a tactical control by air 
traffic controllers to strategic management by controllers and more autonomous operations 
handled by aircrew and automation. In en-route airspace, trajectory-based operations (TBO) will 
be used.  Strategic and trajectory-based management enabled by data links will be the standard 
mode of operation in the future system. The data link exchange of trajectories between the flight 
deck and the ground-side automation might involve down linking the active aircraft trajectory from 
the Flight Management System (FMS) to the ground automation or uplinking a trajectory clearance 
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from the controller workstation to the flight deck. The concept of dynamic management of airspace 
will permit suitably equipped aircraft to select the most advantageous route to its destination. A 
structured routing system will continue to exist in managed airspace, in particular around major 
traffic centers with Air Traffic Control (ATC) in charge of managing the routes taken by aircraft. 
At the same time, total flexibility will exist in areas with autonomous aircraft operations in so 
called Autonomous Operations Areas (AOA) segregated from the managed airspace.  
 
Higher level of cooperation between the flight crew and ATC for air traffic management is 
envisaged to achieve capacity and efficiency benefits. Cooperative air traffic management shall 
provide airspace users with increased flexibility in managing their operations through improved 
information exchange between the aircraft and ATC. Airborne devices will provide aircrew with 
enhanced situational awareness and allow a more co-operative ATM between controllers and 
aircrew. Flight crews of properly equipped aircraft can share flight path changes automatically as 
4D trajectories for traffic flow constraints with the area controller or operate at higher levels of 
autonomy. Routine tasks like handoffs and transfer of communication can be conducted by the 
automation. Tasks like aircraft-to-aircraft spacing may be delegated to the flight crews by the 
controller. ATM operations are envisioned to rely on end-to-end strategic traffic flow 
management, data link communication and information sharing to facilitate fuel efficient flight 
profiles coordinated between ground automation and airborne flight management systems while 
minimizing adverse weather effects. Distribution of Air/Ground traffic management between flight 
crew, air traffic service providers (ATSP) and aeronautical operational control (AOC) personnel 
shall increase system capacity, while meeting air traffic management (ATM) requirements. The 
distributed air traffic management may solve a series of key ATM problems (or inefficiencies) in 
the gate-to-gate operations of the current NAS by utilizing distributed decision-making between 
the user (flight crew and/or AOC) and the ATSP. 
 
The System Wide Information Management (SWIM) framework shall provide efficient air-ground 
mechanism for the data management, exchange, and sharing of information available from the 
various NAS information systems among flight crews, air traffic controllers, airline dispatchers, 
the military, government agencies, and other users of the NAS. The aircraft data that may be 
provided by SWIM includes, but is not limited to, video surveillance, aircraft sensor information, 
and Pilot Reports. SWIM based services will help create a shared common situational awareness 
among the flight crew, AOC personnel, air traffic controllers, and worldwide Air Navigation 
Service Providers (ANSPs) throughout the entire flight. 
 
The future network in the 2060 timeframe is envisaged to be a collection of interconnected IP-
based networks. Multiple access networks will use different wireless link technologies with 
significantly different characteristics (ground based, satellite-based, aircraft-to-aircraft).  ATM 
traffic will share common IP-based access networks with other types of data traffic and compete 
for resources such as data bandwidth.  Usage by end users will be seamless across the different 
access networks during flight phases. 
 
A brief summary of operational concepts envisaged in the 2060 timeframe accommodating 
significantly increased traffic levels with broader aircraft performance envelopes and with more 
operators in the same airspace is provided in Table 4-1. 
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 Operation Description 
Collaborative Traffic Management 
Co-operation between controllers and flight crews in decision 
making using the availability of advanced technologies, tools and 
procedures to improve aircraft movements, reduce spacing and 
separation requirements, while improving arrival and departure 
sequencing. 
Net-Centric Operations 
Network enabled secured information access in real time to improve 
operational decision making. Timely access to information increases 
situational awareness while providing consistency of information 
among decision makers. 
Weather Operations 
Weather data incorporated in Decision Support Systems (DSS), 
bypassing the need for manual interpretation, to improve forecast 
accuracy and minimize the effects of weather on operations. 
Standardized set of weather sensors/algorithms on board to provide 
wind, temperature, water vapor, turbulence, and icing data to other 
users via network 
Layered security 
A multi-layered security system to mitigate threats. A security 
system consisting of layers of defense (including techniques, tools, 
sensors, processes) to help reduce the overall risk of a threat. 
Trajectory-Based Operations 
Exchange of 4D trajectories between controllers and aircraft to 
dynamically adjust a flight path in space (longitude, latitude, 
altitude) more accurately allowing the decrease in separation and 
increase in airspace capacity 
 
 
4.1.2. System Context for the Operational View Analysis 
The operational view analysis considers communication services as enablers for ATM.  
Communication services are provided via air/ground communications between aircraft and ground 
systems, air-to-air communications between two aircraft and ground/ground communications.  
Ground/ground communications for example include communications between two ATC centers.  
Both data and voice links will be used for air/ground and air-to-air communications. Data link will 
be the primary means of communications for most services except some real-time scenarios. Voice 
links will be used as primary means for non-routine, failure recovery and emergency 
communications.  
This analysis considers data link communication services in air-to-air and air/ground scenarios, as 
highlighted in the notional communication systems architecture shown in Figure 4-1.  Ground-
ground network and onboard aircraft networks are not included in the analysis.  The analysis 
considers communicators services used by different aircraft types across the various airspace 
domains during the phases of flight of an aircraft.   
Table 4-1 ATM Operational Concepts Envisaged in the Year 2060 
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 4.1.2.1. TYPES OF COMMUNICATION SERVICES 
The different types of communication services that will be supported by the 2060 network include 
Air Traffic Services (ATS) communications, AOC communications, Airline Administrative 
Communications (AAC), Aeronautical Passenger Communications (APC) and SWIM 
communications. Only data links shall exist for SWIM information exchange whereas both data 
and voice links will be available for other services (ATS, AOC, AAC, and APC). ATS 
communication services will always have priority over all other services, and AOC communication 
services will always have priority over AAC and APC services. Communication management shall 
have mechanisms to prioritize the different service types and also shall be able to prioritize 
different message types within each service type. For a given service (ATS, AOC, AAC or APC), 
the system shall provide higher priority for voice services over data services. Also communication 
management shall prioritize the different services depending on the phase of the flight (e.g. 
temporary shutdown of APC in TMA/Airport if bandwidth unavailable).  
ATS communications are communications related to air traffic services including air traffic 
control, aeronautical and meteorological information, position reporting and services related to 
safety and regularity of flight. These communications involve one or more air traffic service 
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   Figure 4-1 System Context for Operational Scenarios 
administrations. AOC communications are communications required for the exercise of authority 
over the initiation, continuation, diversion and termination of flight for safety, regularity and 
efficiency reasons. AAC is communications are used by airlines related to the business aspects of 
operating their flights and transport services. These communications are used for a variety of 
purposes, such as flight and ground transportation, bookings, deployment of crew and aircraft or 
any other logistical purposes that maintain or enhance the efficiency of operation over-all flight. 
APC communications are related to the non-safety voice and data services to passengers and crew 
members for personal communications. SWIM   communications are related to the simultaneous 
sharing of information available from various NAS information systems among flight crews, air 
traffic controllers, airline dispatchers, military, government agencies, and other users of the NAS.  
4.1.2.1.1. Safety Related Services (ATS and AOC) 
Air Traffic Services include ATS Voice Services and ATS Data Services. The major ATS Data 
Services are Data Communications Management Services (DCM), Clearance/ Instruction Services 
(CIS), Flight Information Services (FIS), Advisory Services (AVS), Emergency Information 
Services (EIS), Delegated Separation Services (DSS), Common Trajectory Coordination Services, 
Flight Position/ Intent / Preferences Services (FPS). Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) 
services include AOC Voice Services and AOC Data Services. 
A class of network management services identified to support operational ATS and AOC services 
are Network Connection (NETCONN) and Network Keep-alive (NETKEEP). 
4.1.2.1.2. Non- safety Related Services (AAC and APC) 
The potential AAC services include Passenger Manifest, Aircraft Catering, Baggage Handling, 
and In-flight Assistance. The APC services identified are Web browsing, E-mail services, Short 
Message Service (SMS) and Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS), Virtual Private Networks 
(VPNs), Internet access, video conference services, voice services (telephony), fax services, audio 
and video streaming, live radio and live television. 
4.1.2.1.3. SWIM Enabled Services 
Services under the SWIM framework, as illustrated in  
 
 
Figure 4-2, include Trajectory Information Exchange, Weather Information, Automated Flight 
Conditions Reports, Airport Diversion Planning, Surface Management with Trajectory Based 
Operations, and En-route Strategic Planning. 
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4.1.2.2. AIRSPACE DOMAINS AND FLIGHT PHASES 
The operational scenarios for aeronautical communications are defined in relation to aircraft 
position in airspace domains and aircraft phase of flight.  The airspace domains are Airport (APT), 
Terminal Maneuvering Area (TMA), En-route (ENR), Oceanic/Remote/Polar (ORP), and a new 
domain known as an Autonomous Operations Area (AOA) where the aircraft would be delegated 
self separation. The different phases of flight are identified below along with the domains in which 
the phases occur: 
 Pre-Departure Phase in the APT Domain 
 Departure Taxi in the APT Domain 
 Departure in the TMA Domain 
 Operations in the ENR, ORP and AOA Domains 
 Arrival in the TMA Domain 
 Arrival in the APT Domain 
 Arrival Taxi in the APT Domain 
For the various operational scenarios and different flight phases under each airspace domain, a 
wide range communication services are required and are discussed in the following sections.  
 
4.1.2.3. SERVICES IN AIRSPACE DOMAINS  
Figure 4-3 shows the various types of services that are available in different airspace domains.  
ATS, AOC and AAC services shall be available in all domains. APC services shall be available 
for passenger communications in ENR, ORP and AOA regions. However APC services may be 
available in APT and TMA based on remaining bandwidth availability after considering ATS, 
AOC and AAC usage. SWIM data exchange is expected in APT, TMA, ENR and ORP airspaces. 
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    Figure 4-2 SWIM Operations 
 It is assumed that in AOA regions where AC operation is autonomous, there may be no SWIM 
data exchange.  
 
 
Figure 4-3 Services per Airspace Domain 
 
4.1.2.4. INTEGRATION OF SERVICES AND TECHNOLOGIES  
The future system shall be capable of allocating any available link that is suitable to a required 
service by taking into account the regulatory constraints, data bandwidth availability, etc., for the 
mapping of services onto the different links. Assuming relaxation in Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA) rules, links deployed for APC communications could be certified for use as backup for 
ATS and AOC communications. ATS message sizes and volume are relatively small compared to 
typical APC data traffic.  AOC and AAC volume may be similar and may be larger than ATS 
messages, but it is anticipated that APC traffic data will have much higher volume.  SWIM traffic 
data can also have higher volume compared to ATS, AOC and AAC but maybe less than APC.  
The point is that APC could use the capacity that is not used for other communications, provided 
that this does not jeopardize safety related issues. Hence the same link can be used for different 
purposes, depending on the policy, priorities, airspace domain and the flight phase.  
Moreover the system shall enable an aircraft to be simultaneously connected to and seamlessly 
roam between multiple independent access networks. This allows for make-before-break handover 
strategies ensuring the continuity and availability requirements of ATM applications. 
 
4.1.2.5. AICRAFT TYPES 
The future system shall support mixed aircraft population with varying capabilities and operating 
envelopes. Through 2060 there will be integration of new airspace users into the system. Microjets 
(typically 6 to 12 passengers), GA aircraft, military aircrafts (flying under civil rules) and 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) may share the same airspace along with the commercial air 
lines, resulting in substantial increase of air traffic. The effect of new airspace users on NAS 
capacity depends on several factors including aircraft use in the airspace, the trip length and 
altitude, the implementation of new air traffic control technologies and equipment, and the 
performance capabilities and the rate of integration of the equipment.  
Flight Phase
Service
APT TMA ENR ORP AOA
ATS
    
AOC
    
AAC
    
APC
? ?   
SWIM
    NA
 Available
? Available based on 
link availability, in low 
density regions
NA Not available
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4.1.3. Data Traffic Estimates  
The following subsections provide the data traffic estimates based on the information flows 
identified and described above in section 4.1.2.   
 
4.1.3.1. COMMERCIAL LARGE AIRCRAFT 
Table 4-2 provides data from the Communications Operating Concept and Requirements for the 
Future Radio System (COCR) document [REF- COCR] on the estimated Phase 2 traffic for a single 
aircraft.  Traffic estimates are provided for uplink (UL) and downlink (DL) traffic in each service 
volume (SV) – APT (departures and arrivals), TMA (departures and arrivals), ENR, ORP and 
AOA. To arrive at ATC and AOC traffic for a single aircraft  during 2060 timeframe, the Phase 2 
COCR traffic is extrapolated at an annual growth rate of 2.5% over 30 years and is provided in 
Table 4-3. The estimated data traffic requirement for the AAC service is expected to be similar to 
that of AOC. The estimated data traffic requirement for APC service per passenger is 2 Mbps DL 
and 1Mbps UL, based on consideration of applications like fax, voice, internet, video, etc., today. 
With an assumption of up to 150 passengers per large aircraft and with 20% of the passengers 
simultaneously using communication service, the total APC data requirement is 60 Mbps DL and 
30 Mbps UL. The SWIM data requirements are expected to be around 1 Mbps each for DL and 
UL, for exchange of aircraft sensors data, graphical weather information, etc. 
 
 
Table 4-2 Phase 2 Traffic Estimates (kbps) – Single Aircraft, 2030 Timeframe 
PHASE 2 – 2030 
Data Traffic in kbps 
APT SV TMA SV ENR SV ORP 
SV 
AOA 
Dep Arv Dep Arv 
Separate 
ATS  
UL  20 3 20 20 20 15 20 
DL  30 10 30 30 30 20 30 
UL&DL  30 10 30 30 30 20 30 
Separate 
AOC  
UL  40 0.3 0.3 2 40 20 20 
DL  1 1 1 1 1 0.4 0.4 
UL&DL  40 1 1 2 40 20 20 
Combined 
ATS&AOC  
UL  40 3 20 20 40 20 30 
DL  30 10 30 30 30 20 30 
UL&DL  40 10 30 30 40 20 40 
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 Table 4-3 Traffic Estimates (kbps) – Single Commercial Large Aircraft, 2060 Timeframe 
Estimated traffic - 2060 
(Data Traffic in kbps) 
APT SV TMA SV ENR 
SV 
ORP 
SV 
AOA 
Dep Arv Dep Arv 
ATS  
UL  45 10 45 45 45 35 45 
DL  65 25 65 65 65 45 65 
UL&DL  65 25 65 65 65 45 65 
AOC  
UL  85 5 5 5 85 45 45 
DL  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
UL&DL  85 5 5 5 85 45 45 
AAC  
UL  85 5 5 5 85 45 45 
DL  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
UL&DL  85 5 5 5 85 45 45 
APC  
UL  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
DL  5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
UL&DL  5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
SWIM  
UL  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0 
DL  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0 
UL&DL  2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 0 
 
 
4.1.3.2. MICROJETS 
Microjets are an emerging population of commercial aircraft for small distances, flying with 
reduced flight plan. They are expected to represent up to 40% of daily traffic (REF-COCR) and 
will impact the aeronautical landscape. They have the same needs (for ATS/AOC/AAC/SWIM 
communications) as large commercial aircraft with less demanding in terms of APC 
communications. The estimated data traffic requirement for APC service per passenger is 2 Mbps 
DL and 1Mbps UL, based on the applications like fax, voice, internet, video. With an assumption 
of 12 passengers per microjet worst case and with 50% of the passengers simultaneously using 
communications, the total APC data requirement is 12 Mbps DL and 6 Mbps UL. Table 4-4, which 
is derived from Table 4-3, provides the estimated 2060 traffic for a single microjet. 
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 Estimated traffic - 2060 
(Data Traffic in kbps) 
APT SV TMA SV ENR 
SV 
ORP 
SV 
AOA 
Dep Arv Dep Arv 
ATS 
UL  45 10 45 45 45 35 45 
DL  65 25 65 65 65 45 65 
UL&DL  65 25 65 65 65 45 65 
AOC 
UL  85 5 5 5 85 45 45 
DL  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
UL&DL  85 5 5 5 85 45 45 
AAC 
UL  85 5 5 5 85 45 45 
DL  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
UL&DL  85 5 5 5 85 45 45 
APC 
UL  6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
DL  12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 
 
SWIM 
UL  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0 
DL  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0 
Total 
UL  7,500 7,500 7,500 7,500 7,500 7,500 6,500 
DL  13,500 13,500 13,500 13,500 13,500 13,500 12,500 
 
4.1.3.3. BUSINESS AND GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT 
Business and General Aviation (BGA) aircraft are considered as non-commercial aircraft and 
include training flights, business jets, rescue flights and government-operated aircraft. BGA 
presents a higher increase in aircraft traffic than the rest of the aircraft types and is expected to 
grow about 0.5% per year in number from 220,670 aircraft in 2012 to 280,359 aircraft in 2060 
[REF- FAA2033]. ATS communications for BGA are supposed to be the same as for any other 
aircraft. There will be less need for AOC as these are not commercial airlines with needs to 
optimize the fleet and flight schedules. Therefore, 50% of AOC traffic of large aircraft is assumed 
for BGA.  On the other hand, there is a high demand for APC services. The estimated APC traffic 
requirement per passenger is 5 Mbps DL and 2 Mbps UL considering applications like telephony, 
VPN, video conferencing, etc., with high capacity needs during the entire flight.  With an 
assumption of up to 10 passengers per BGA flight on average and with 90% of the passengers 
simultaneously using communications, the estimated data traffic requirement for APC service is 
45 Mbps DL and 18 Mbps UL. Table 4-5 provides the estimated 2060 traffic for a single BGA 
aircraft derived using the data traffic requirements for large aircraft (see Table 4-3) to arrive at the 
traffic requirement for ATS, AOC, AAC, APC and SWIM, services. 
Table 4-4 Traffic Estimates (kbps) – Single Microjet, 2060 Timeframe 
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 Table 4-5 Traffic Estimates (kbps) – Single BGA Aircraft, 2060 Timeframe 
Estimated traffic - 2060 
(Data Traffic in kbps) 
APT SV TMA SV ENR 
SV 
ORP 
SV 
AOA 
Dep Arv Dep Arv 
ATS 
UL  45 10 45 45 45 35 45 
DL  65 25 65 65 65 45 65 
UL&DL  65 25 65 65 65 45 65 
AOC 
UL  45 5 5 5 45 25 25 
DL  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
UL&DL  45 5 5 5 45 25 25 
AAC 
UL  45 5 5 5 45 25 25 
DL  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
UL&DL  45 5 5 5 45 25 25 
APC 
UL  18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 
DL  45,000 45,000 45,000 45,000 45,000 45,000 45,000 
SWIM 
UL  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0 
DL  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0 
Total 
UL  20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 19,000 
DL  46,500 46,500 46,500 46,500 46,500 46,500 4,5500 
 
 
4.1.3.4. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
The Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) are emerging as a new aircraft type, with a UAS flights 
expected to outnumber passenger flights in the year 2060 timeframe. Currently most UAS 
operations around the world are for military purposes. It is anticipated that new standards, 
regulations and procedures will be formulated to govern the safe integration of civil-use UAS into 
civilian air space for civil applications ranging from surveillance, scientific data gathering or 
delivery of services (crop dusting, parcel delivery, etc).  
The safe operation of UAS relies on different communications, which represents a critical step in 
enabling UAS operations in non-segregated airspaces. The required radio communications for safe 
operation of UAS as illustrated in Figure 4-4 are: 
 Radio communications for UAS command and control between the Unmanned Aircraft 
Control Station (UACS) and the UAS (tele-commands from UACS to the UAS, and 
telemetry, such as flight status, from the UAS to the UACS). 
 Radio communications for air traffic services (voice and data) relay between ATC and the 
UACS via the UAS. 
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  Radio communications in support of “sense and avoid”, between the UACS and the UAS 
for ensuring separation from nearby aircraft, terrain and obstacles (e.g. weather data video 
streams from UAS to UACS). 
 Radio communications in support for navigation aids (ADS-B, etc). 
 
 
Figure 4-4 UAS Services 
The main challenge is integration of Control and Non-Payload Communication (CNPC) and ATS 
communications to ensure safe and efficient operation of UAS in the civilian air space with no 
impact on ATS communication, system delays, capacity, safety, and security of passenger-carrying 
aircraft.  For UAS systems, the estimated non-payload CNPC communications throughput for 
2030 timeframe is provided in the task-2 report [REF-TASK2RPT], and is provided in Table 4-6. 
To determine the traffic requirements for the 2060 timeframe, the ATC, Sense and Avoid, 
Command/control traffic requirements are derived using Table 4-6 considering 2.5% growth every 
year. The AAC and SWIM traffic requirements for UAS are considered to be similar to that of the 
commercial aircraft. However the AAC and SWIM communications are expected to be exchanged 
through a ground link between UAS control station and ATC controller. Hence, over-the-air traffic 
is zero for these services. The use of UAS in commercial applications is expected to expand in a 
number of areas. Some of the expected civil and commercial applications of UAS include aerial 
video surveillance, commercial photography, news/sporting event coverage, infrastructure 
monitoring, including power facilities, shipping ports, pipelines, etc. The estimated APC traffic 
requirement for these services is up to 5 Mbps DL. The various data traffic estimates for the 2060 
timeframe are provided in Table 4-7. 
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 Table 4-6 Worst Case Non-payload Comm. Throughput for UAS, 2030 Timeframe 
Worst Case Non-payload Communications Throughput (bits/sec) for the Year 2030 
Command and Control ATS Relay Send and Avoid 
Control NavAids 
ATS 
Voice 
Relay 
ATS 
Data 
Relay 
Target 
Tracks 
Airborne 
Weather 
Radar 
Video 
UL DL UL DL  UL DL DL 
4,606 7,615 669 1,140 4,800 113 173 9,170 27, 771 270,000 
 
 
Table 4-7 Traffic Estimates (kbps) – Single UAS, 2060 timeframe 
Worst Case Non-payload Communications Throughput (kbps) for the Year 2060 
(extrapolated  2.5% growth Year-over-Year, YOY) 
Command and 
Control 
ATS Relay AAC APC 
SWI
M 
Sense and Avoid 
Control NavAids 
ATS 
Voice 
Relay 
ATS Data 
Relay 
   
Target 
Tracks 
Airborne 
Weather 
Radar 
Video 
UL DL UL DL  UL DL 
U
L 
D
L 
U
L 
D 
L 
U
L 
D
L 
DL 
10 15 5 5 10 5 5 0 0 0 5,000 0 0 20 60 570 
 
4.1.3.5. MILITARY AIRCRAFT 
Military aircraft (when flying under civil rules) shall be considered as any other BGA aircraft to 
exchange data such as radar pictures, flight plan and direct voice communications. However the 
traffic requirement for military aircraft is not considered in this study because sufficient 
information is not available at this point of time about military aircraft traffic and their data 
requirement. 
 
4.1.3.6. DATA FLOW SUMMARY 
This section is a summary of the data traffic estimates.  The data traffic requirements for safety 
critical traffic (ATS and AOC services) is approximately 300Kbps and contributes only up to 1% 
of the overall traffic requirement. High traffic requirement is expected in APC services to cater for 
various passenger needs. The various traffic requirements for different kinds of aircraft are 
summarized in the Table 4-8. Per aircraft throughput requirement is up to 100Mbps for large 
aircraft, 20Mbps for microjets, 70Mbps for BGA and 6Mbps for UAS (irrespective of flight phase 
and airspace domain). 
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 Table 4-8 Data Traffic Estimates (kbps) – Summary, 2060 timeframe 
Estimated Traffic 
2060 in kbps 
ATS AOC AAC SWIM APC Total 
Commercial 
AC (large) 
UL 45 85 85 1,000 30,000 31,500 
DL 65 5 5 1,000 60,000 61,500 
UL&DL 100 100 100 2,000 90,000 100,000 
Microjet 
UL 45 85 85 1,000 6,000 75,00 
DL 65 5 5 1,000 12,000 13,500 
UL&DL 100 100 100 2,000 18,000 20,000 
BGA 
UL 45 45 45 1,000 20,000 21,500 
DL 65 5 5 1,000 45,000 46,500 
UL&DL 100 100 100 2,000 65,000 70,000 
UAS 
UL 10 10 0 0 0 100 
DL 10 700 0 0 5,000 6,000 
UL&DL 20 700 0 0 5,000 6,000 
 
 
 
 
4.2. SIMULATION MODELING ANALYSIS 
A simulation tool is developed to assess the operational performance of the aeronautical network 
for the future NAS environment through the year 2060. The three network architecture options 
identified in the Architecture Analysis report [REF-TASK3RPT] are considered for simulation 
modeling. For each network topology considered, an appropriate model is created, by carrying out 
network planning based on the estimated air traffic and data traffic requirements.  The simulation 
model reflects the aeronautical environment as realistically as possible. This includes realistic 
flight patterns for the air traffic, a realistic model of the data traffic that is transmitted over the 
network, and a realistic representation of the ground network, including base stations for the 
air/ground links. Since the scenario considered is targeting the 2060 timeframe, a number of 
assumptions have to be made regarding, for example, the increase in air traffic during the 
upcoming years, the deployment of future wireless access technologies, the possibility of different 
kinds of aircraft flying in the same airspace with different flight phases and the amount of data 
traffic that will be generated in the network.  
Security functionalities are not included in the definition of simulation scenarios, since the ability 
to cope with security threats and attacks cannot be verified by means of simulations. However, the 
security assessment for different architecture options identified in Architecture Analysis report 
[REF-TASK3RPT] is conducted under a separate subtask as reported in section 5.  
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 4.2.1. Simulation Concept and Objectives 
The overall concept of the simulation model is shown in Figure 4-5. The tool provides the 
operational performance reports for the identified three network architectures, with data traffic 
estimates and air traffic estimates input to the model. The operational scenarios provide a basis for 
estimating the data traffic needed for a single aircraft. These scenarios include all operations 
related to different kinds of services and for different kinds of aircraft envisaged through 2060. 
Another input for the tool, the air traffic model, is provided in section 4.2.3. 
 
 
Figure 4-5 Simulation Model 
 
4.2.2. Scope of Simulation  
The scope of the simulation work is limited to the following: 
 Air traffic across the Continental United States (CONUS) will be simulated.  
 The best alternative technologies and architectures that were selected in the Architecture 
Analysis report [REF-TASK3RPT] are modeled for analysis.  
 The simulation is limited to the macro level traffic generation based on the rates as 
estimated in section 4.1 on operational scenarios. The simulation is not intended to create 
actual message transfers across the layers of protocols and end applications.  
 The ground network and ground systems are considered as a single cloud entity that sinks 
the downlink data traffic. Constant delays are accounted in the delay model for these 
entities. Internal network elements are not simulated. 
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 4.2.3. Air Traffic Model 
Figure 4-6 shows the steps in calculating aircraft traffic.  The air traffic forecasting model requires 
information about current air traffic across the CONUS.  Honeywell Global Data Center (GDC) 
has the capability to monitor air traffic across the globe in real time.  The current air traffic 
information called Aircraft Situation Display to Industry (ASDI) is provided by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) to industry.  The data obtained from the GDC database includes 
the location, altitude, airspeed, destination, estimated time-of-arrival and designated identifier of 
air carrier. The air traffic considered in the simulation model is based on the air traffic records on 
23rd January 2014. Figure 4-7 (a) shows the sample air traffic ASDI table. 
 
 
Figure 4-6 Aircraft Traffic Calculation 
 
4.2.3.1. EXTRAPOLATION OF AIR TRAFFIC 
The COCR document [REF-COCR] predicts a growth of 2.5% increase in the Peak Instantaneous 
Aircraft Count for every year. However a more recent report from the FAA [REF-FAA2033] 
predicts the U.S. mainline air carrier passenger jet fleet will increase at 0.5% for every year over 
the period 2013-2033. An average growth of 0.5% YOY is applied over the captured air traffic 
information to arrive at the air traffic estimates in 2060. New rows are added in the current ASDI 
table assigning arbitrary call signs to the newly added aircraft, as shown in the Figure 4-7 (b). The 
number of newly added rows is based on the air traffic growth considered and is configurable by 
the simulation user from the Graphical User Interface (GUI) front end. 
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   (a)                                   (b) 
Figure 4-7 Current Schedule Vs Extrapolated Schedule with Growth  
 
4.2.3.2. UAS TRAFFIC ADDITION IN SIMULATION MODEL 
The future use of UAS is expected to become more prominent in all the three major market 
segments: military, civilian and commercial. However, the current ASDI data does not have UAS 
traffic information. Hence, UAS traffic is added to the simulation model over the entire CONUS 
region, based on the human population. The urban areas and major cities in the CONUS (up to 
250) are ranked according to population.  The most populous city is assigned with a configurable 
UAS aircraft and the UAS in the remaining cities are derived based on the UAS in the most 
populous city, as shown in Figure 4-8. 
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Figure 4-8 UAS Traffic Estimate 
 
4.2.4. Data Traffic Model 
The data traffic estimates are provided in section 4.1 for the different categories of services that 
will be supported by the network: ATS, AOC, AAC, APC and SWIM. For ATS and AOC services, 
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 the estimate is based on those services that are defined in the COCR. The AAC services estimate 
is assumed to be equal to that of the AOC estimate. For APC services, the traffic that is generated 
by a single passenger is characterized statistically. This traffic per passenger is then scaled 
according to the number of passengers in different kinds of aircraft in order to estimate the total 
amount of APC traffic that is generated on board an aircraft. Table 4-9 is based on the data traffic 
estimates arrived in the section 4.1.3.6  and is used to generate the data traffic in the network 
simulation.   
Table 4-9 Data Traffic Estimates (kbps) – 2060 Timeframe 
Estimated 
Traffic 2060 
in kbps 
ATC AOC AAC SWIM APC 
ATR  100 100 100 2,000 90,000 
Microjet 100 100 100 2,000 18,000 
BGA 100 100 100 2,000 65,000 
UAV  100 700 0 0 5,000 
 
 
4.2.5. Queuing Model 
The data traffic packets from each of the aircraft within the service volume of the access network 
tower are divided into 5 priority classes as ATC, AOC, AAC, SWIM, and APC.   ATC is Class 1 
highest priority, AOC is class 2 second highest priority, up to APC as class 5, which is the lowest 
priority class. Different classes of traffic have different Quality of Service (QOS) requirements. 
Hence the aircraft network is considered as an M/M/1 system with separate queues for packets 
with different priority classes, as shown in Figure 4-9. 
 
In this Priority Queue model, the packets of lower priority start transmission only if no higher 
priority packet is waiting.  The service rate of the channel ‘µ’ is assumed to be the same for 
different classes. With the arrival rates of different classes given as λ1, . . . λk, the mean results for 
latency in the queue , system latency and loss probability are derived. 
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Figure 4-9 Priority Queuing 
 The average queuing delay of the kth class is given by Equation 4-1 [REF- QUEUES]. 
 
Wkq = ∑kj=1(ρj/ µj) / ( (1- ρ1 – ρ2 – ρ3 – …– ρk)* (1- ρ1 – ρ2 – ρ3 – …– ρk-1) ) 
Equation 4-1 
where ρk  = λk / µk ; is the fraction of time allocated by server to class k. 
 
The system latency for a given packet is defined as the total time period a tagged packet spends 
in the system, i.e., the number of time slots between the end of the packet’s arrival slot and the 
end of its departure slot. The average system latency of the kth class is given by Equation 4-2. 
 
Sk = W
k
q + 1/ µk         Equation 4-2 
 
 
 
Table 4-10 gives the theoretical latency calculations for different traffic classes over a single cell 
channel.  
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Table 4-10 Priority Queue Latency Example 
 
Incoming rate ATC AOC AAC SWIM APC Total 
λ per ATR AC (Kbps) 100 100 100 2,000 90,000  
λ per BGA AC (Kbps) 100 100 100 2,000 65,000  
λ per MJET AC (Kbps) 100 200 200 2,000 1,8000  
λ per UAV AC (Kbps) 100 700 0 0 5,000  
λ per CARGO AC (Kbps) 100 100 100 2,000 0  
Total  λ actual (Kbps) 1,000 1,000 1,000 20,000 900,000 923,000 
Available Ch Capacity 
(Kbps) 
1,000,000 999,000 99,8000 997,000 977,000  
Max. Ch Capacity K 
(packets/sec) 
1,250,000 1,248,750 1,247,500 1,246,250 1,221,250  
λ packet/sec 1,250 1,250 1,250 25,000 1,125,000 1,153,750 
µpacket/sec 1,262,626.26 1,262,626.26 1,262,626.26 1,262,626.263 1,262,626.263 1,262,626 
ρ 0.00099 0.00099 0.00099 0.0198 0.891 0.91377 
wQ (micro sec) 0.000785 0.001573 0.002364 0.018509 8.588294  
ws(micro sec) 0.792785 0.793573 0.794364 0.810509 9.380294  
ws (micro sec)  
percentile 
90 1.826 1.828 1.829 1.867 21.603  
95 2.375 2.378 2.380 2.428 28.103  
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4.2.5.1. PREEMPTION SCENARIO 
Figure 4-10 shows how the different classes of packets are prioritized and sent over the channel.  
The highest priority packets (darker shade, red in color, no diagonal lines, as shown in Figure 
4-10) preempt the lower priority packets ( lighter shade, gold, no diagonal lines, and darker 
shade, green in color, with diagonal lines as shown in the figure) and are transmitted prior to the 
lower priority packets. 
 
 
Figure 4-10 Packet Preemption 
 
4.2.6. Network Models 
The network modeling and simulation is carried out for the networks and combination of networks 
that were identified in the NASA CDTI Project Phase 1 reports. Air/-Ground Network models are 
developed based on the selected technologies and platforms such as Cellular ground towers, HAP 
and GEO satellites for the operational assessment of future NAS environment.  Air-to-Air Network 
model is developed and load analysis is carried out for the NAS environment considering VHF, 
FSO and L-band for the air-to-air communication link. 
 
4.2.6.1. GROUND-BASED CELLULAR NETWORK MODEL AND SIMULATION 
In the cellular network architecture it is assumed that the ground base stations distributed across 
the entire CONUS region provide connectivity to the ground network for all the aircraft flying 
over the CONUS region.  The coverage of the CONUS region by cellular towers, each tower 
represented as covering one hexagonal grid area is shown in the Figure 4-11. 
 
C
h
a
n
n
e
ltime
t0 t1         t2          t3      t4       t5
NPDU :  Network level Protocol Data 
Unit (PDU) comprises multiple TU
TU : Transmission Unit at the PHY 
level. Smallest data unit  sent without            
Preemption.
NPDUs preempted at TU level
TU not preempted during 
transmission 
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Figure 4-11 Hexagonal Grid Cellular Coverage 
 
 
4.2.6.1.1. Single Cell Service Volume 
Figure 4-12 shows the service volume for a single cell tower with hexagonal grid coverage. The 
aircraft flying over a particular hexagonal grid is assumed to be serviced by the tower in that grid. 
 
Figure 4-12 Single Cell Service Volume 
 
4.2.6.1.2. Cellular Tower Simulation Model 
 shows the network model considered for communication 
performance analysis using air/round cellular data links. It is broadly divided into three networks 
viz. airborne network (NW), commercial (communication service provider) network and 
aeronautical ground network. The airborne network comprises of the aircraft that are 
communicating with their respective cellular base station towers for both the cabin and cockpit 
services through the same data link. For a single cellular ground tower, the airborne network 
service coverage range is assumed to be approximately 100 Nm. All the aircraft within the service 
coverage of the tower communicate directly with the tower, which offers a total bandwidth up to 
1Gbps.   
link 
link 
link 
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Figure 4–12 
  
  
Figure 4-13 Cellular Network Model 
 
The commercial network comprises of different network elements like base station controller, 
cellular gateways, routers and other network elements, etc., that provide communication between 
aircraft and the core aeronautical ground network. The commercial network could be a shared 
network, the infrastructure and the spectrum of which could be shared to offer the different services 
(aeronautical specific and other mobile communications services).  However, the cellular network 
service provider may lease dedicated spectrum carriers for aeronautical specific services, to satisfy 
the specifications of Required Communications Performance needed for NextGen ATM 
applications. The mobility framework within the commercial cellular network is expected to 
seamlessly support both vertical and horizontal mobility so that end-to-end communications are 
not interrupted by the network transitions. 
 
The aeronautical ground network in the model represents the interconnection of various service 
providers such as Flight Support Service (FSS) centers, Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
support centers, weather information centers, ATC centers, airline operations centers, etc. ANSP 
gateways are interconnected in order to share information across ANSP networks. The aeronautical 
ground network is a common requirement for all of the technology candidates that were considered 
in the operation view analysis.  Hence the entire ground network is treated as a single cloud for 
the purpose of this analysis and the details are not covered in this report.  
 
 
4.2.6.1.3. Simulation Assumptions  
The following are the assumptions made with respect to the cellular network model simulation. 
 Pre-provisioned connections are assumed between the aircraft and the cellular tower.  
Access NW (Cellular) 
BSC
Aeronautical 
Ground 
Network 
(Core NW)
 
 
 
ATC
Airline
OEM
FSS
commercial networkAirborne network
Range 200 km
Aero specific
Traffic pattern
MS
Delay
BS 
Delay
Aeronautical 
Ground Network
RCP Scope
Prop, 
Delay
Beyond BS Delay
5 ms (f ixed BW) – 20 ms (dynamic BW)0.6 ms
Core network  
Delay
1 ms + W 1 ms
Q
Analysis Scope
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 Media Access Control (MAC) Layer processing latency at aircraft and service tower is 
assumed to be 1 ms. 
 The signal propagation latency between the aircraft and the tower is up to 0.6 ms, 
considering the aircraft flying at a maximum distance of 200Km from the service tower. 
 The commercial network beyond the base station may introduce latency up to 5 ms in 
case of fixed leased bandwidth allocation and latency up to 20 ms in case of dynamic 
bandwidth for the aircraft services. High priority traffic (ATC, AOC, AAC, and SWIM) 
is assumed to have fixed bandwidth allocation with 5 ms latency and lower priority 
APC traffic type to have dynamic bandwidth allocations with up to 20 ms latency. 
 Cellular link channel throughput assumed is 1 Gbps  
 
4.2.6.1.4. Simulation Model 
The simulation model as shown in the Figure 4-14 consists of the following modules 
 Aircraft Data Traffic Generator 
 Data Traffic Scheduler  
 Performance Report Generator 
 
 
 
4.2.6.1.4.1. Aircraft Data Traffic Generator 
This module generates all types of traffic namely, ATC, AOC, AAC SWIM and APC. Per-aircraft 
traffic considered in the simulation is:  
 ATC - 100 Kbps, with packet size of 100 bytes 
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Figure 4-14 Cellular Single Tower Simulation Model 
  AOC- 100 Kbps, with packet size of 500 bytes 
 AAC- 100 Kbps, with packet size of 500 bytes 
 SWIM- 2 Mbps, with packet size of 2000 bytes 
 APC- 90 Mbps, with packet size of 2000 bytes 
 
The packets are generated for different classes of traffic based on the estimated rates and sizes. 
These packets from all the aircraft are time stamped and channelized into five First In, First Out 
(FIFO) buffers with ATC traffic FIFO having highest schedule priority and APC traffic FIFO 
having lowest schedule priority. Packets are dropped if the respective FIFO is full. 
 
This module also maintains the various statistics viz. number of packets generated, number of 
packets dropped and the number of packets which are scheduled for transmission.  
 
4.2.6.1.4.2. Data Traffic Scheduler  
The data traffic scheduler module simulates the packet transmissions between the aircraft and the 
tower based on priority queuing scheme. As shown in the Figure 4-15, at a given scheduler time 
instant, the highest priority packets are transmitted first and lower priority packets are scheduled 
only when there are no higher priority packets to be transmitted.  One Transmission Unit (TU) is 
the smallest data unit at physical layer level that is sent without preemption and scheduler Time 
Sample (TS) is the time taken to transmit one TU.  
 
 
Figure 4-15 Packet Scheduling Scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An example calculation is provided below. 
Example: 
Output Channel Throughput  = 1Gbps 
TU size   = 100 bytes 
TS = (100 x 8)/ 1e9 sec  = 0.8 µsec 
 
Scheduler  Time Sample (TS)  
NPDU 
Transmission 
Unit 
NASA/CR—2015-218842 37
 AOC data rate   = 100 kbps per aircraft 
AOC packet Size   = 500 bytes. 
AOC arrival interval   = (8 x 500)/(100 x 1e3) 
= 40 ms 
= 50,000 TS per aircraft 
 
Hence on an average, for every 50,000 TS one AOC packet will be sent and one 
AOC NPDU contains 5 TUs. 
 
Figure 4-16 gives the flowchart of the Data Traffic Scheduler module showing logic and 
processing for ATC, AOC and AAC traffic. Processing for SWIM and APC traffic (not shown) 
are similar, in priority order.  The module checks the availability of packets in different FIFOs 
based on the FIFO priority and schedules a packet transmission. The packet is time stamped again 
at the time of transmission to calculate the queue latency for the packet. 
 
 
4.2.6.1.5. Performance Report Generator 
This module generates reports of various network performance parameters viz. number of packets 
transmitted, queue latency for each packet, mean latency, network utilization for all classes of 
traffic simulated in the network model. The following subsections provide the network 
performance statistics for a single cell domain. 
 
4.2.6.1.5.1. Latency 
The overall latency of the cellular network is the summation of various delay components like 
MAC Layer Delay (at aircraft), propagation delay between the aircraft and the cellular tower, 
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   Figure 4-16 Flowchart of Data Traffic Scheduler Module 
 queue delay and the delay inherent in the network beyond the base station (BS) delay (access 
network).The queue delays involved in the transmission of packets with different traffic classes on 
the link between the aircraft in the cell and the cellular base station are simulated. The trend in the 
queue latency experienced by various traffic classes as the aircraft count increases in the single 
cell domain is shown the Figure 4-17. 
 
  
  
  
 
 
Figure 4-17 Queue Latency for Cellular Link 
The overall latency of the cellular network with increasing number of aircraft in a given base 
station coverage for various traffic types is shown in Figure 4-18. There is no significant 
degradation observed in latency for supporting aircraft traffic up to 400 aircraft per cell (AC/cell).  
Beyond 400 AC/cell, there is no bandwidth available to transmit APC traffic. Hence beyond 400 
AC/cell, the latency of APC traffic becomes noticeably greater but the latencies of higher priority 
traffic classes do not increase significantly. 
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 Figure 4-18 Mean Latency in Cellular Network 
 
The measure of the various delay components in the overall latency for transmission of packets in 
the cellular network in the scenario of 200 AC/cell is shown in Figure 4-19. 
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Figure 4-19 Latency Components in Cellular Network, 200 AC/Cell 
 
4.2.6.1.5.2. Channel Bandwidth Utilization  
Figure 4-20 gives the channel bandwidth utilization for different traffic classes on the link between 
the aircraft in the cell and the cellular base station for different aircraft density levels in the cell. 
As depicted in the Figure 4-20, in low dense aircraft conditions, non-safety traffic classes (AAC 
and APC) and SWIM will get channel share along with the safety critical traffic (ATC and AOC). 
However in high dense aircraft conditions, major portion of the link is used for the safety critical 
traffic and the non-safety traffic class may experience higher packet loss and latency. 
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Figure 4-20 Channel Bandwidth Utilization of Cellular Link 
 
4.2.6.1.5.3. Packet Loss (Theoretical analysis) 
Figure 4-21 gives the packet loss percentage for different traffic classes on the aircraft-to-ground 
base station (AC ↔ BS) link for different aircraft density levels in the tower coverage area. In the 
simulation implementation, the packet loss was arrived considering limited buffer size in the 
system. The packet loss shall differ from one system to other system based on the FIFO size 
considered for each traffic type. Hence in theoretical analysis, no limitation in queue size is 
considered and, packet loss estimates loss due to channel unavailability is provided as shown in 
Figure 4-21.  The packet loss is given by Equation 4-3.  
 
Packet Loss % = (Arrival rate – available Channel Capacity)*100/ Arrival rate     Equation 4-3 
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Figure 4-21 Packet Loss on Cellular Link 
 
4.2.6.1.6. Observations and Conclusions 
The following are observations and conclusions based on cellular network analysis and 
simulation, assuming cellular tower channel link capacity up to 1 Gbps and the tower coverage 
range up to 200Km. 
 No significant degradation observed in latency for supporting aircraft traffic up to 400 
AC/Cell. The 95th percentile latency with up to 400 AC/Cell is ATC: 22.96 ms;  AOC: 
22.98 ms;  AAC: 22.981ms;  SWIM: 23.3 ms; APC: 97.8 ms 
 For 300 to 400 AC/Cell, the network should be able to support the offered load up to 
SWIM Services. Beyond 400 aircraft, no bandwidth will be available for low priority 
APC traffic.  
 No Loss of safety critical traffic in the network with up to 400 AC/Cell.   
 However, significant APC traffic loss will be experienced beyond 50 AC/Cell. 
 
With adequate placement of cellular towers across the whole COUNUS region, it may be 
possible for aircraft to manage the entire safety critical air/ground communication. 
 
4.2.6.2. HAP-BASED CELLULAR NETWORK MODEL AND SIMULATION 
In the HAP network architecture it is assumed that multiple airborne HAP platforms optimally 
placed over the CONUS region together provide coverage for the aircraft flying over the whole 
CONUS. Each HAP platform relays traffic from the aircraft flying in its coverage region to the 
ground gateway station, which in turn carries the traffic to the backend aeronautical network, as 
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 shown in Figure 4-22. The HAP platforms may also be interconnected by FSO links to offer 
uninterrupted communication to aircraft. In the simulation it is assumed that the each HAP 
platform can communicate directly to one of the ground gateway station. 
  
Figure 4-22 Integrated terrestrial-HAP Network 
 
4.2.6.2.1. Single HAP Platform service volume 
The coverage of an airborne HAP platform is represented as covering one hexagonal grid area as 
shown in Figure 4-23. 
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Figure 4-23 HAP Cell Service Volume 
  
The maximum range for a HAP node can be calculated using Equation 4-4. 
 
𝐷 = √(𝑅 + 𝐻)2 − 𝑅2)                                       Equation 4-4 
Where  
  D is the maximum range of a HAP node 
  R is the radius of the earth and 
  H is the altitude of the HAP  
 
Considering a HAP altitude between 17 and 22 km, the maximum range of the HAP will be roughly 
between 465 and 530 km. With the assumption that a single HAP providing service up to 30,000 
square miles, around 125 HAP platforms will provide coverage across the entire CONUS region.  
 
4.2.6.2.2. HAP Platform Simulation Model 
Figure 4-24 shows the network model considered for communication performance analysis using 
a HAP platform.  For a single HAP, the airborne network service coverage range is assumed to be 
470Km approximately. All the aircraft falling in the service coverage of the HAP communicate 
directly with the HAP which offers a total bandwidth up to 1Gbps, similar to Cellular link 
bandwidth.  The data link for the communication between the HAP and ground gateway (GW) 
could be either a cellular link with up to 1Gbps bandwidth or could be a FSO link with up to 
10Gbps bandwidth. The rest of the ground network beyond gateway i.e. the access network and 
the aeronautical ground network is considered to be same as that in the Cellular network simulation 
model. 
   
 
Figure 4-24 HAP Network Model 
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 4.2.6.2.3. Simulation Assumptions  
The following are the assumptions made with respect to HAP network model simulation. 
 Pre-provisioned connections are assumed between the aircraft and the HAP.  
 MAC Layer processing latency at aircraft and the HAP is assumed to be 1 ms 
 The signal propagation latency between the aircraft and the HAP is up to 1.6 ms, 
considering the aircraft flying at a maximum distance of 470Km from the HAP. 
 The commercial network beyond the base station may introduce latency up to 5 ms in 
case of fixed leased bandwidth allocation and latency up to 20 ms in case of dynamic 
bandwidth for the aircraft services. High priority traffic (ATC, AOC, AAC, and SWIM) 
is assumed to have fixed bandwidth allocation with 5 ms latency and lower priority 
APC traffic type to have dynamic bandwidth allocations with up to 20 ms latency. 
 Aircraft-to-HAP (Aircraft ↔ HAP) link channel throughput assumed is 1 Gbps  
 The feeder link between the HAP and ground gateway could be a cellular data link with 
1Gbps channel throughput or it could be an FSO link with up to 10 Gbps channel 
throughput. Simulations are carried out for both scenarios. 
 
4.2.6.2.4. Simulation Model 
The simulation model as shown in the Figure 4-25 consists of the following modules 
 Aircraft Data Traffic Generator 
 Aircraft Data Traffic Scheduler  
 HAP Data Traffic Scheduler  
 Performance Report Generator 
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Figure 4-25 Single HAP Simulation Model 
 
4.2.6.2.4.1. Aircraft Data Traffic Generator 
The Aircraft Data Generator is the same as the one used for ground-based cellular network.  
Refer to section 4.2.6.1.4.1 
 
4.2.6.2.4.2. Aircraft Data Traffic Scheduler  
The Aircraft Data Traffic Scheduler is the same as the one used for ground-based cellular 
network.  Refer to section 4.2.6.1.4.2 
 
4.2.6.2.4.3. HAP Data Traffic Scheduler  
The HAP Data Traffic Scheduler module simulates the relay of the aircraft data traffic to the 
ground gateway. The HAP data traffic scheduler priority scheme between HAP platform and the 
ground gateway is similar to that in the aircraft traffic scheduler module. The relay link between 
the HAP platform and the ground gateway could be a cellular data link of 1 Gbps bandwidth or it 
could be a FSO data link of 10 Gbps. Hence the performance analysis is carried out for these two 
feeder link cases. 
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4.2.6.2.5. Performance Report Generator 
The performance report generator provides the link statistics for both links (Aircraft ↔ HAP link 
and HAP-to-Ground Gateway, HAP ↔ Ground Gateway, link) involved in the transmission of a 
packet from an aircraft to the ground gateway via the HAP platform. 
 
4.2.6.2.5.1. Latency 
The overall latency of the HAP network is the summation of various delay components like MAC 
layer delay (at aircraft), Aircraft Data Traffic Scheduler delay , propagation delay between the 
aircraft and the HAP, MAC layer delay (at HAP),  propagation delay between the HAP and the 
ground gateway and the delay inherent in the network beyond the gateway (Access NW). The 
queue delay involved in transmission of packets on Aircraft ↔ HAP link and HAP ↔ Ground 
Gateway link is simulated. The trend in the queue latency experienced by various traffic classes as 
the aircraft count increases in the HAP coverage domain on the two links (Aircraft ↔ HAP link, 
HAP ↔ Ground Gateway link) is shown in the Figure 4-26 and Figure 4-27. 
 
Figure 4-26 Queue Latency, Feeder Cellular Link 
 
NASA/CR—2015-218842 48
  
Figure 4-27 Queue Latency, Feeder FSO Link 
 
The overall latency with increasing number of aircraft in a given HAP coverage for various 
traffic types is shown in Figure 4-28 and Figure 4-29. 
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Figure 4-28 Mean Latency, Feeder Cellular Link 
 
 
Figure 4-29 Mean Latency, Feeder FSO Link 
 
The measure of the various delay components in transmission of packets on the Aircraft ↔ HAP 
link and on the HAP ↔ Ground Gateway link for the scenario of 400 AC/ HAP cell is shown in 
the Figure 4-30. There is no significant degradation observed in latency for supporting aircraft 
traffic up to 400 AC per HAP Cell. Beyond 400 AC/cell, there is no bandwidth available to 
transmit APC traffic. Hence, beyond 400 AC/cell, the latency of APC traffic becomes noticeably 
greater but the latencies of higher priority traffic classes do not increase significantly. 
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(a) With HAP ↔ Ground Gateway Cellular Link   (b) With HAP ↔ Ground Gateway Feeder FSO Link 
Figure 4-30 Latency Components, 400AC/HAP-Cell 
 
 
4.2.6.2.5.2. Channel Bandwidth Utilization  
Figure 4-31  (a), (b), (c) gives the Channel Bandwidth utilization for different traffic classes on the 
links involved in the transmission of a packet from aircraft to the ground gateway via the HAP, for 
different aircraft density levels in the HAP coverage area. As depicted in the Figure 4-31 (c), the 
feeder link channel utilization is limited by the traffic on the other link (Aircraft ↔ HAP link). 
The Aircraft ↔ HAP link being the bottle-neck, the HAP ↔ GW link is not utilized fully in case 
of FSO feeder link. 
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(a)                                                                      (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 4-31  Channel Bandwidth Utilization of HAP Links 
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 4.2.6.2.5.3. Packet Loss (Theoretical analysis) 
Figure 4-32 gives the packet loss percentage for different traffic classes on the links (AC ↔ HAP 
link and HAP ↔ GW link) involved in the transmission of a packet from aircraft to the ground 
gateway via the HAP, for different aircraft density levels in the HAP coverage area. Majority of 
the packet loss can be observed on AC ↔ HAP bottleneck link. There is no loss on FSO feeder 
link as incoming traffic rate on the link is less than the FSO link capacity. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-32  Packet Loss on HAP Links 
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4.2.6.2.6. Observations and Conclusions 
The following are observations and conclusions based on HAP network analysis and simulation, 
assuming HAP tower channel link capacity up to 1 Gbps and the HAP coverage range up to 500 
Km 
 No significant degradation observed in latency for supporting aircraft traffic up to 400 
AC per HAP Cell. The 95th percentile latency for 400 AC/Cell is ATC: 8.635  ms;  
AOC: 8.656 ms;  AAC: 8.657 ms;  SWIM: 9.038 ms; APC: 54.31 ms  
 For 300 to 400 AC/Cell, the HAP network should be able to support the offered safety 
critical load. 
 The aircraft-to-HAP link is found to be the bottleneck, with a greater number of aircraft 
per HAP cell as compared to that of the ground-based cellular base station cell. Majority 
of the packet loss can be observed on AC-to-HAP bottleneck link. 
 
The HAP network is expected to provide performance similar to that of the ground-based cellular 
network, but with fewer HAP-based stations deployed across the whole CONUS region than the 
number of ground-based stations. However, as HAP-based coverage is higher than the coverage 
of a ground-based tower, higher link capacity is required between aircraft and HAP to support the 
larger aircraft count per HAP cell. 
 
4.2.6.3. SATELLITE NETWORK MODEL AND SIMULATION 
In the satellite network architecture analysis, a GEO satellite system with spot beam coverage is 
considered. A single GEO satellite with the ability to generate 100 narrow spot beams may be 
sufficient to provide services for all the aircraft flying over the whole CONUS region. The single 
spot beam footprint would have an area of 38,000 square miles and the 100 spot beams together 
would cover the entire CONUS of 3.71 million square miles. Figure 4-33 shows the network model 
considered for communication performance analysis using a GEO satellite platform.   
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Figure 4-33  Satellite Network Model 
 
The satellite with multiple transponders performs like a system which forms multiple towers in the 
sky providing coverage for data communication between the aircraft and the core aeronautical 
ground network. For the network analysis, assuming the total user capacity offered by a single 
satellite with up to 100 spot beams is 40 Gbps, the per-spot beam link capacity would be 400 Mbps. 
The feeder link channel bandwidth between the satellite and the ground gateway is assumed to be 
10 Gbps. 
 
4.2.6.3.1. Performance Analysis 
For a satellite network with up to 100 spot beams per satellite, a theoretical approach and not 
simulation is conducted for analysis due to limitation in computer processing power to execute the 
simulation for such a large number of spot beams. The simulation runtime is very high to simulate 
the communications with the number of spot beams greater than 5.  
 
As shown in the Figure 4-34, the cascaded queue model analysis is carried out, as essentially the 
traffic from each queue per spot beam is multiplexed over the single queue between the satellite 
and the gateway. The channel capacity per spot beam considered is 400 Mbps to derive the network 
performance statistics for the messages between aircraft and satellite. The channel capacity 
between the satellite and the ground gateway considered is 10 Gbps to derive the network 
performance statistics for the messages between satellite and gateway.  
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 Figure 4-34  Satellite Network Analysis Model 
 
4.2.6.3.1.1. Assumptions  
The following are the assumptions made with respect to satellite network model analysis. 
 Per Aircraft Traffic 
o ATC data rate:  100 kbps 
o AOC data rate:  100 kbps 
o AAC data rate:  100 kbps 
o SWIM data rate:   2 Mbps 
o APC data rate:  90 Mbps 
 Packet size is 100 bytes , for each traffic type  
 Per spot beam channel capacity: 400 Mbps 
 Satellite-to-access network channel capacity: 10 Gbps  
 Aircraft–to-satellite range:  36,000 Km 
 Pre-provisioned connections are assumed between the aircraft and the satellite.  
 MAC layer processing latency at aircraft and the satellite is assumed to be 1 ms 
 The signal propagation latency between the aircraft and the satellite and  between the 
satellite and the GW is up to 120 ms. 
 The commercial network beyond the base station may introduce latency up to 5 ms in case 
of fixed leased bandwidth allocation and latency up to 20 ms in case of dynamic bandwidth 
for the aircraft services. High priority traffic (ATC, AOC, AAC, and SWIM) is assumed 
to have fixed bandwidth allocation with 5 ms latency and lower priority APC traffic type 
to have dynamic bandwidth allocations with up to 20 ms latency. 
  
10 Gbps Link 
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4.2.6.3.1.2. Latency 
The overall latency of the satellite network is the summation of various delay components like 
MAC layer delay (at aircraft), queue delays in the aircraft-to-satellite link (Aircraft ↔ SAT link) 
and in the satellite-to-ground gateway link (SAT ↔ GW link), signal propagation delay between 
the aircraft and the satellite, MAC layer delay (at satellite), signal propagation delay between the 
satellite and the ground gateway and finally the delay inherent in the network beyond the gateway 
(Access NW). The queue delay involved in transmission of packets on Aircraft ↔ SAT link and 
SAT ↔ GW link is arrived using the Equation 4-5 [REF- QUEUES]. This equation is used for 
different classes of traffic with common packet size. The theoretical equation used for arriving at 
the latency for different traffic classes assume bit level preemption with common packet size for 
all the traffic classes. In actual simulation, preemption is considered at a basic TU level and 
different traffic classes have different packet sizes. Hence to arrive at the actual latency estimates 
with different packet sizes for different traffic classes, a correction factor, C, is applied as shown 
in Figure 4-35 for the theoretical traffic latency estimates. The Correction factor C is derived based 
on the latency result from cellular network’s simulation and theoretical analysis as given in 
Equation 4-6.  
 
 Equation 4-5 
Where  
K traffic classes are indexed by k = 1…K. 
Class k arrivals are Poisson distributed with arrival rate of λk. 
Class k service times is Sk  
µ is outgoing rate (Channel Capacity)  
ρ is system utilization such that ρ = λ/ µ  
 
Correction factor for latency = (Latency from Simulation)/ [(Latency from Theory)*(packet size)] 
Equation 4-6 
For ATC traffic packet size = 1 TU 
For AOC traffic, packet size = 5 TUs 
For AAC traffic, packet size = 5 TUs 
For SWIM traffic, packet size = 20 TUs 
For APC traffic, packet size = 20 TUs 
 
Figure 4-35  Cascaded Queue Model for Latency Estimation 
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The trend in the queue latency experienced by various traffic classes as the aircraft count increases 
in the satellite spot beam coverage domain on the two links (Aircraft ↔ SAT link, SAT ↔ GW 
link) is shown in the Figure 4-36. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4-36 Queue Latency on Satellite Links 
 
 
The overall latency with increasing number of aircraft in a given satellite coverage for various 
traffic types is shown in Figure 4-37. Beyond 100 aircraft per spot beam the APC traffic 
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experiences 100% loss on the AC ↔ SAT link, hence no latency estimates for APC traffic on that 
link beyond 100 aircraft load per spot beam. 
  
 
 
Figure 4-37 Mean Latency with Satellite Network 
 
The measure of the various delay components for transmission of packets in a satellite network for 
the scenario of 100 aircraft per spot beam (AC/spot beam) is shown in Figure 4-38. The overall 
latency of the satellite network is: ATC - 247.0021 ms; AOC - 247.0022 ms; AAC - 247.0023 ms; 
SWIM - 247.0146 ms; APC - 262.237 ms, as shown in the Figure 4-38. The 95th percentile latency 
estimates are: ATC - 247.0064 ms; AOC - 247.0066 ms; AAC - 247.0069 ms; SWIM - 247.043 
ms; APC - 262.71 ms.   
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Figure 4-38 Latency Components in Satellite Network with 100 AC/Spot Beam 
 
4.2.6.3.1.3. Channel Bandwidth Utilization  
Figure 4-39 and Figure 4-40  give the channel bandwidth utilization for different traffic classes on 
the links (AC ↔ SAT link and SAT ↔ GW link, respectively) involved in the transmission of a 
packet from aircraft to the ground gateway via the satellite, for different aircraft density levels in 
the spot beam coverage area. With up to 100 AC in a spot beam, sufficient link data bandwidth is 
available for safety critical ATC and AOC, AAC, SWIM and up to 41% remaining for non-safety 
critical APC traffic. Under heavy traffic conditions (more than 100 AC in all the 100 spot beams) 
the SAT ↔ GW link becomes a bottleneck. The SAT ↔ GW link is the bottleneck as traffic from 
all the spot beams aggregate on this link. It is observed that no bandwidth is available for low 
priority APC traffic on SAT ↔ GW link beyond 10 aircraft per spot beam. 
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Figure 4-39 AC ↔ SAT link Channel Bandwidth Utilization 
 
Figure 4-40   SAT ↔ GW Link Channel Bandwidth Utilization 
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 4.2.6.3.1.4. Packet Loss 
Figure 4-41 and Figure 4-42 give the packet loss percentage for different traffic classes on the two 
links (AC ↔ SAT link and SAT ↔ GW link) for varying number of aircrafts per spot beam. 
Beyond 100 AC per spot beam, SWIM and APC traffic loss occur on the AC ↔ SAT link. 
However besides APC traffic loss, SWIM traffic loss (16%) can be observed on the SAT ↔ GW 
link even with 50 AC/spot beam. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-41   Packet Loss over AC ↔ SAT Link 
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Figure 4-42   Packet Loss over SAT ↔ GW Link 
 
4.2.6.3.2. Observations and Conclusions 
The following are observations and conclusions based on satellite network analysis. 
 Latency is higher on a satellite link owing to the inherently higher propagation delay, and 
hence not suitable for latency critical real-time applications. The 95th percentile latency 
with up to100 AC  per spot beam is: ATC - 247.0064431 ms;  AOC - 247.0066738 ms;  
AAC - 47.0069925 ms;  SWIM - 247.0439507 ms; APC - 262.71018 ms 
 Optimum channel utilization can be observed on the satellite spot beam network, owing to 
higher satellite coverage and higher number of aircraft served by the satellite. 
 The network is able to support all of the safety critical traffic (ATS and AOC) and AAC 
with up to 300 aircraft per spot beam. However, SWIM and APC traffic Loss can be 
observed even with as low as 5 AC/spot beam.  
 With cellular and HAP networks, the majority of packet loss can be observed on uplink 
(AC ↔ BS and AC ↔ HAP, respectively), whereas SAT ↔ GW link is the bottleneck in 
the satellite network. Significant cabin and crew service degradation can be observed as 
the aircraft count per spot beam increases. An APC traffic loss of 77% occurs even with as 
low as 5 aircraft per spot beam. Hence, a high bandwidth FSO link may be good alternative 
link between satellite and GW. 
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 4.2.6.4. AIRCRAFT-TO-AIRCRAFT NETWORK MODEL AND SIMULATION 
The aircraft-to-aircraft communication network has the potential to capture the benefits associated 
with short-range links while at the same time offering high-capacity and good scalability. 
Specifically, this communication system could be used to improve the efficiency of air traffic 
control. Air-to-air communications may an enabler for relaxation of spacing requirements and 
provision of more energy-efficient paths. 
 
4.2.6.4.1. Communication Model 
Figure 4-43 shows the network model considered for communication performance analysis for 
aircraft-to-aircraft communication. The major components of the aircraft-to-aircraft 
communication model comprises of air segment and ground segment. 
 
 
Figure 4-43  Aircraft-to-Aircraft Communication Network Model 
 
4.2.6.4.1.1. Air Segment 
The air segment essentially comprises of aircraft flying routes in accordance with the airline 
schedules. In the analysis, aircraft traffic in the air segment is characterized by the airline data 
obtained in the form of ADSI data from Honeywell GDC. The data includes flight number, the 
location and time of departure and arrival, latitude position, longitude position, etc. 
 
4.2.6.4.1.2. Ground Segment 
In addition to mobile aircraft nodes, the model includes a network of ground stations. These 
stations serve as the gateways between the airborne network and ground infrastructure such as the 
aeronautical ground network. The ground stations are considered to be placed at major centers 
across the CONUS such that at any given point of time all the aircraft can get connectivity to at 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T5 T6 T7 T8 
T9 T10 T11 
T12 
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least one ground station.  An area comprising a group of pseudo cells is assumed to be serviced by 
the nearest ground station.  The actual position of the ground stations considered in the analysis is 
provided in the Table 4-11. Any pseudo cell as depicted in Figure 4-43 is assumed to be serviced 
by the nearest tower based on distance proximity. 
 
Table 4-11 Ground Stations’ Positions 
airport_ident latitude longitude 
KMWH 47.20858 -119.319 
KHLN 46.60681 -111.983 
KGCC 44.34892 -105.539 
KMIC 45.06199 -93.3539 
KRNO 39.49911 -119.768 
KSLC 40.78839 -111.978 
KLNK 40.85089 -96.7591 
KCMI 40.03883 -88.2778 
KMHV 35.05864 -118.151 
KPHX 33.43428 -112.012 
KDEN 39.86167 -104.673 
KMEM 35.04242 -89.9767 
KBOW 27.94336 -81.7834 
KSJT 31.35776 -100.496 
KNEW 30.04242 -90.0283 
KPIT 40.49147 -80.2329 
KBTV 44.47186 -73.1533 
KATL 33.6367 -84.4279 
KGFK 47.94728 -97.1738 
KEWR 40.6925 -74.1687 
KSAW 46.35364 -87.3954 
 
 
4.2.6.4.2. Aircraft Connectivity Analysis 
Air-to-air network communication is essentially relay communication from aircraft to the base 
station.  
 
In the air-to-air connectivity analysis algorithm, each base station and aircraft is referred as a node. 
Each node maintains the list of adjacent nodes. It starts with the list of base stations available in 
the CONUS region. For this analysis, 21 base stations (see Table 4-11) are used across the CONUS 
region. 
 
The aircraft nodes traverse along their flight paths past other aircraft and base stations and use the 
air-to-air and air/ground communication networks to capture information on the list of adjacent 
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nodes (connected aircrafts) for connectivity to the base stations. They update the connection status 
of adjacent nodes in the list. 
 
Each node recursively looks at its list of adjacent nodes and searches for the number of nodes 
connected to the each connected node.  
 
Each aircraft has a range of 120 nm (range circle with 2 degree radius) and an aircraft is said to 
be connected if it satisfies anyone of the below criteria: 
1. If the aircraft falls in the range of another aircraft which falls in the range of a ground 
station  
2. If the aircraft falls in the range of another aircraft which is subsequently connected to a 
ground station through other aircraft 
 
An aircraft that is isolated and does not fall within range of any aircraft or ground station is 
disconnected as shown in Figure 4-44.  This figure shows a snapshot of a simulated air-to-air 
communication network, taken from the NAS Network Simulation and Visualization program, 
which is presented in section 4.2.7.  The aircraft nodes are represented as circles proportional to 
the radio range of the aircraft.  A blue circle indicates connectivity to a ground base station.  A 
red circle indicates the aircraft does not have connectivity to a ground base station. 
 
 
Figure 4-44  Aircraft-to-Aircraft Communication Connectivity Report 
 
4.2.6.4.3. Air-to-Air Data Traffic Estimates 
The estimated data traffic for aircraft-to-aircraft communication is similar to that provided in the 
Table 4-9 for ATC, AOC and AAC traffic. The high bandwidth requirement traffic types viz.; 
SWIM and APC traffic are not considered in aircraft-to-aircraft communication as the aircraft-to-
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 aircraft communication may not be able to, and maybe should not, handle this traffic. Besides the 
unicast traffic from the aircraft, broadcast traffic in a 100 nm Cell service domain is also considered 
in the aircraft-to-aircraft communication. However, only the unicast traffic is considered to be 
relayed between aircraft towards the ground station. The broadcast traffic is not relayed beyond 
the Cell domain.  Table 4-12 gives the broadcast traffic rate within a 100 nm Cell service domain 
as provided in the COCR document for COCR Phase 2 [REF_COCR]. The APT domain COCR 
Phase 2 broadcast traffic rate is extrapolated at 2.5% YoY to obtain the estimates for the year 2060.  
Table 4-13 gives the broadcast traffic estimates for 2060, within a 100 nm Cell service domain. 
 
Table 4-12 COCR Phase 2 Broadcast Traffic Rate within a 100 nm Cell Service Domain 
Information 
Transfer Rate 
(kbps) - 100 
NM Range 
APT TMA ENR ORP AOA 
816 544 145 NA NA 
 
 
Table 4-13 Broadcast Traffic Rate Estimates within a 100 nm Cell Service Domain for 2060 Timeframe 
Estimated traffic in 2060 
(Kbps) – Broadcast Traffic  
in a 100 nm Service Domain 
Broadcast 
ATR  1,712 
Microjet  1,712 
Business Jets  1,712 
UAS 1,712 
 
 
4.2.6.4.4. Performance Requirement Analysis 
The aircraft-to-aircraft communication performance analysis is carried out at the cellular level. All 
the aircraft traffic in a given Cell is assumed to be relayed to one of its adjacent Cells towards the 
nearest ground station, as shown in Figure 4-45.  Hence the area serviced by a ground station is a 
group of Cells belonging to different levels, where the traffic in a higher level Cell is directed 
towards the lower level Cells. The number of Cells in each level is given below. 
 Level 0 – 1 Cell,  (Level 0 has one cell, the ground station located in the Cell) 
 Level 1 – 6 Cells 
 Level 2 – 12 Cells 
 Level 3 – 18 Cells 
 Level 4 – 24 Cells  
 And so on…  
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 Figure 4-45  Cell Arrangement in Aircraft-to-Aircraft Communication Network 
 
The total traffic in a Cell is the sum of the Cell’s Self-Traffic and relay unicast traffic from higher 
level Cells. The Cell’s Self -Traffic is given by the Equation 4-7. 
 
Cell’s Self -Traffic = (No. of aircraft in the Cell)* (Per aircraft unicast traffic) + Broadcast traffic 
Equation 4-7 
 
Three technology links viz. VHF, L-band and FSO are considered for the aircraft-to-aircraft 
communication performance measurement in a Cell. The channel bandwidth assumed for the 
different links are 
 VHF band: 14 Mbps 
 L-band: 150Mbps 
 FSO: 10 Gbps  
 
The air-to-air network load and Cell-wise communication performance is determined using the 
NAS Network Simulation and Visualization program described in section 4.2.7.  The performance 
of the aircraft-to-aircraft communication network is presented in section 4.2.7.3. 
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 4.2.7. NAS Network Simulation and Visualization 
The Air Traffic Simulation Model Tool is a NAS network simulation and visualization tool that 
generates the statistics characterizing the performance of the simulated network architectures. The 
key requirement that is considered to be fulfilled by the network architectures is the provision of 
guaranteed network bandwidth at least for safety critical services. The criterion which are defined 
for the assessment of network performance are the one-way packet latency, total achieved 
throughput and packet loss rate for the different kinds of services. 
The tool is developed using C++ and the Qt toolkit. The Qt toolkit is a cross-platform application 
framework that is used for developing application software with a graphical user interface (GUI) 
and it supports C++. All the configuration data is stored and processed in memory only to do the 
analysis and generate reports, i.e., no database is used for data storage in this simulation tool. 
 
Honeywell GDC organization has the capability to monitor all air traffic across the globe in real-
time.  Current air traffic information called Aircraft Situation Display to Industry (ASDI) is 
obtained from the Honeywell GDC database and is used by the Air Traffic Simulation Model Tool. 
ASDI data covers only the North America region.  
 
4.2.7.1. SIMULATION SCHEDULER 
The simulation scheduler module reads the aircraft, airport and single cellular network tower data 
from the CSV (comma separated values) files either explicitly or can be selected using the browse 
option provided. It takes files as inputs which are placed in the default configured folder path. 
 
The user can overlay the aircraft display on the world map using Configuration  ASDI data menu 
item.  See Figure 4-46. ASDI data is categorized and plotted based on the call sign of an aircraft.  
The simulation executes and displays the aircraft position at every 5 minute simulated time 
interval.   
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Figure 4-46 Overlay of Aircraft Display on Map 
 
Display and Run Simulation options are provided to display and simulate aircraft position data on 
the map to analyze the air traffic congestion zones in the CONUS region. The user can select the 
time (UTC time zone) and display the air traffic data for that instance of time. Run Simulation 
option runs the simulation up to 2 hours at 2 seconds screen refresh rate and displays the aircraft 
position data for every 5 minute simulated time interval.  
 
For the Single Cellular Network performance analysis, the tool provides the aircraft count and 
network performance report to analyze the network performance at a particular instance of time. 
The data is classified for different categories of aircraft such as ATR, General Aviation, military 
aircraft, microjets, cargo aircraft and UAVs and data service types, including ATC, AOC, AAC, 
SWIM and APC. 
 
4.2.7.2. USER INTERFACE 
The main menu of the tool includes the menus, namely Configuration, Simulation, World map 
options, Network Reports – Selected Day, Network Reports – Time Instance and Extrapolate. 
 
The Configuration menu consists of the options to load the ASDI data, Airport Information, 
Communication Information, Network Configuration (Cellular, HAP, Satellite) and Air-to-Air 
Network Configuration. Selecting the ASDI data will open up a browse option to select a CSV file 
to render the aircraft position data present in the file. Likewise, options are available for the Airport 
Information to render the airports and Communication Information to render the Communication 
Towers.  
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 Network Configuration (Cellular, HAP, Satellite) opens a pop-up window in which channel 
bandwidth can be input, as shown in Figure 4-47. A user can also modify and save the data traffic 
rate for different aircraft and different network users. 
 
Figure 4-47 Configuration Network Dialog - Cellular, HAP and Satellite  
 
Air-to-Air Network Configuration opens a similar network configuration window with Broadcast 
and Unicast data traffic options as shown in Figure 4-48. A user can also select the type of air-to-
air link and can also input the corresponding data traffic in Kbps. The user can also modify the 
Broadcast and Unicast data traffic and can save the data traffic rate for different aircraft and 
different data service types.  
 
 
Figure 4-48 Air-to-Air Network Configuration Dialog 
The tool menu consists of the Start Simulation and Stop Simulation options, which enables and 
disables the run simulation feature, respectively. 
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 The World Options menu has the zooming and pan options for effective viewing. This menu also 
has options to load the ASDI data, communication towers and airport information and uses as 
inputs files placed in the default configured folder. The display grid option displays a dotted line 
for every 5 degrees and a plain line for each degree, so the plain line grid indicates a 1 degree by 
1 degree grid. Display Airport Identifiers option lists the ICAO identifiers for all the airports in 
the CONUS and the “find ident” option takes a particular ICAO identifier as input and locates it 
on the map. 
The Network Reports menu provides the options to see the summary report on the map and 
generates the network coordinate information. This network report lists different aircraft category 
counts for all grids available in the CONUS region. 
There is an option in the menu called Extrapolate which takes the estimated percentage growth for 
every year and extrapolate year as inputs, as shown in Figure 4-49. It instantly displays the 
increased density of aircraft over the map upon clicking the “Extrapolate and Display” button.  
 
Figure 4-49  Extrapolate Dialog 
Extrapolate displays the aircraft density based on the time period to increase the number of aircraft 
in the CONUS region and to analyze the network demand for a future time frame such as 2060. 
Note that UAVs are added only to the 2060 timeframe based on the population in major cities as 
explained in section 4.2.3.2.  
Left click with a mouse device over the map displays a menu called context menu which has 
frequently used options like network performance statistics per grid, ASDI, airports, 
communication, zooming and display grid.  The tool provides a context menu option to move the 
map between world map and CONUS region only. 
A toolbar is available at the top of the tool’s window where Date and Time selection is provided 
in UTC time zone. The Date field is populated automatically by reading data from the input ASDI 
data file. Time can be input by selecting values from the drop-down box and clicking on the display 
button to render the aircraft traffic data on the map at that selected time instant. 
NASA/CR—2015-218842 72
                                                                    
 
The bar below the map is called the status bar which shows the Lat-Lon position of the cursor and 
also displays the number of aircraft in a particular hexagonal grid. 
4.2.7.3. PERFORMANCE STATISTICS REPORTS AND DISPLAYS 
The user can select the network type using a combo box available with the network types – 
Cellular, HAP, Satellite and Air-to-Air networks. The corresponding links in the Network Reports 
(selected day and time) menu are enabled when the user selects the network. 
The tool has the capability to extract the following four network summary reports for the three 
networks, namely Cellular, HAP and Satellite networks:  
1. Network Performance Statistics Report for the selected time instance for the North 
American region network grids 
2. Network Report for the Aircraft Count for the selected time instance for the North 
American region network grids 
3. Network Performance Statistics Report for the selected day for the North American region 
network grids 
4. Network Report for the Maximum Aircraft count for the selected day for the North 
American region network grids  
A Network Performance Statistics Report provides all the air traffic data over the network grids 
(Cellular, HAP and Satellite), which are overlaid in the North America region map. The traffic 
demand, generated traffic, system delay percentile and loss probability are listed for each grid for 
all the types of data service types, namely ATC, AOC, AAC, SWIM and APC. This data is saved 
in a CSV file which serves as input to a Microsoft ® Excel ® spreadsheet in which all the graphs 
are displayed. 
Network Report for the Aircraft Count gives the grid-wise air traffic data with latitude and 
longitude positions, different aircraft types and also the total number of aircraft per grid. 
Network Report for the Maximum Aircraft count for the selected day gives the maximum aircraft 
count along with the time instant in the selected day. For all the communication networks, 
performance statistics per grid reports can be generated for the desired time period. The user 
navigates to the specific grid and clicks on the network performance per grid option. It pops up the 
single grid report input dialog to enter the start time and end time to analyze the reports for that 
grid. See Figure 4-50. 
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Figure 4-50  Single Network Performance Report Input Dialog 
 
Once the user clicks on View Report option, the network performance data is displayed in a tabular 
format in grid wise network report dialog, as shown in Figure 4-51. This report provides the traffic 
demand, generated traffic, system delay percentile and loss probability for the selected grid for all 
the data service types, namely ATC, AOC, AAC, SWIM and APC, from the selected start time to 
the selected end time 5 minute time intervals.  
Export to Excel button exports the tabular data to a CSV file to generate graphs using the Microsoft 
® Excel ® graph template functionality.  
 
Figure 4-51  Grid Wise Cellular Network Report Dialog 
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 4.2.7.3.1. Ground-based Cellular Network Display 
Figure 4-52 provides an example of the Ground-based Cellular Network performance statistics 
display.  It shows the display for the selected day on the CONUS map and includes all categories 
of aircraft and data service types. A hexagonal cellular grid covers about 2 degree by 2 degree grid 
with a channel capacity of 1Gbps and around 360 grids cover the entire CONUS region.  The user 
can configure the channel capacity and data traffic of different sources and aircraft types. A legend 
showing the different hex grid colors for different traffic options like Traffic but NO Loss, All 
Category Traffic Loss, AOC+AAC+SWIM+CABIN Loss, SWIM+CABIN Loss, Only Cabin Loss 
and No Traffic gives effective display for understanding the summary report on the map. The 
maximum aircraft count in that particular grid at the particular time in the selected day is displayed 
in the center of each grid. 
 
Figure 4-52  Ground-based Cellular Network Performance Statistics Display for Selected Day 
 
 
4.2.7.3.2. HAP-based Cellular Network Display 
Similarly, the HAP-based Cellular Network is shown in Figure 4-53.  The display has around 100 
HAP platforms covering the CONUS region, Figure 4-53 which is depicted as 4 degree by 4 degree 
HAP cell with a channel capacity of 1 Gbps. The same legend of the data traffic loss is depicted 
for all the communication networks.  
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Figure 4-53  HAP Network Performance Statistics Display for Selected Time Instance 
 
4.2.7.3.3. Satellite Network Display 
In the Satellite Network display, about 100 spot beams covers the entire CONUS region as shown 
in Figure 4-54 the network is depicted as 4 degree by 4 degree spot beams, each with a channel 
capacity of 400 Mbps.  
 
 
Figure 4-54  Satellite Network Performance Statistics Display for Selected Time Instance 
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 4.2.7.3.4. Air-to-Air Network Display 
In the Air-to-Air network, the CONUS region is covered with the 21 ground stations located at 
larger airports where air traffic control towers are present. Each aircraft has a range of 120 nm 
(range circle with 2 degree radius). The number of connected aircraft is dependent on the data 
traffic of the aircraft at each time instance. The connected aircraft are displayed in the color blue 
and the disconnected aircraft are displayed in the color red as shown in Figure 4-55. 
 
 
Figure 4-55  Air-to-Air Communication 
The user can view the connected aircraft by selecting the Air to Air network connectivity under 
the Network Reports – Time Instance menu. It displays a window in which the total connected and 
disconnected aircraft counts are displayed. The paths can be generated from any aircraft to any 
airport with intended Maximum Hop count and Maximum number of paths. The aircraft call sign 
and one airport or all airports can be selected to generate the paths. The paths generated are 
displayed in a table as shown in the Figure 4-56. 
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Figure 4-56  Air-to-Air Communication Generated Paths 
 
Figure 4-57, Figure 4-58, and Figure 4-59 provide the displays of air-to-air network performance 
using the following types of links: 
 VHF (Figure 4-57) 
 L-band (Figure 4-58) 
 FSO (Figure 4-59) 
 
The number inside a Cell indicates the aircraft count and the number in braces in a Cell indicates 
the relay count of the grid. Relay count is the summation of the air traffic of the adjacent cells that 
are relaying traffic towards the cell. A legend showing different hex grid colors for different traffic 
options like Traffic but NO Loss, All Category Traffic Loss, AOC+AAC+SWIM+BROADCAST 
Loss, SWIM+ BROADCAST Loss, Only BROADCAST Loss and No Traffic Loss provides 
effective display for understanding the traffic load in different regions. 
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Figure 4-57  Air-to-Air Communication (VHF Air-to-Air Link) 
 
 
Figure 4-58 Air-to-Air Communication (L-band Air-to-Air link) 
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Figure 4-59 Air-to-Air Communication (FSO Air-to-Air Link) 
 
 
 
 
4.2.8. Summary Analysis of Simulation Results 
Table 4-14 gives a summary of the observations based on the simulation modeling analysis and 
results.  Results explained above in section 4.2 are again summarized below. 
 For Ground-based Cellular and HAP-based Cellular networks, no significant degradation 
is observed in latency for supporting aircraft traffic of up to 400 aircraft in a Cell. 
 Latency is higher for geostationary satellite link owing to higher propagation delay, and 
may not be suitable for latency critical real-time applications.  
 As HAP coverage is higher than ground-based coverage, higher link capacity is required 
between aircraft and HAP to support the larger aircraft count per cell. 
 Optimum channel usage can be observed on the satellite spot beam network, owing to 
higher satellite coverage and higher number of aircraft served by the satellite. 
 With ground-based cellular and HAP-based cellular networks, the majority of packet loss 
is observed on the AC ↔ BS link and AC ↔ HAP link, respectively, whereas SAT ↔ GW 
link is the bottleneck in the satellite network. 
 Significant cabin and crew service degradation can be observed as the aircraft count per 
spot beam increases. APC traffic loss of 77% was estimated with as low as 5  aircraft per 
spot beam 
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 Table 4-14 Simulation Analysis Observations 
 
Latency Packet Loss 
Ground-
based 
Cellular  
Low  
No Loss of safety critical traffic in the network with up to 400 
aircraft per Cell  
HAP-based 
Cellular  
Low 
No Loss of safety critical traffic in the network with up to 400 
aircraft per Cell  
Satellite  
Latency is higher owing to 
higher propagation delay  
77% APC traffic loss even with as low as 5  aircraft per spot 
beam and SWIM traffic loss is observed with 50 aircraft per 
spot beam  
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5. SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
Phase 1 activities in the NASA CDTI Project concluded that it might not be possible for a single 
technology or a platform to support the requirements of all airspaces and applications in a cost 
effective manner. For instance, the cost of deploying network platforms like Terrestrial towers, 
HAPs and Satellites would differ widely across airspaces such as oceanic, en-route, airport 
surfaces, etc, to achieve the required NAS datalink environment capabilities. Hence hybrid 
networks were recommended in phase 1 reports comprising multiple technologies and platforms. 
It is also envisaged that adapting some of the Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) technologies for 
aeronautical commutations may become inevitable in the future, considering the merits of these 
technologies such as low cost systems, additional spectrum utilization, broader infrastructure 
support, etc. However, these adaptations may necessitate major security precautions for safety 
critical aeronautical applications. Hence, in phase 2 of the Project, security assessment was 
performed to identify and assess the safety threats to the communication infrastructure and make 
recommendations to address safety concerns. 
 
5.1. APPROACH FOR SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
Phase 1 reports predicted that the overall aeronautical network may span over both public and 
dedicated networks seamlessly and the boundaries between the networks will eventually disappear 
through 2060 timeframe. Aircraft will be using hybrid networks for safety critical applications 
such as air navigation, surveillance, Air Traffic Control (ATC) etc., which would demand higher 
levels of robustness and integrity from these networks, compared to requirements of regular 
commercial applications. The extended connectivity to public networks may also expose aircraft 
to all kinds of security threats in an open environment and hence, it becomes necessary to assess 
all security risks of aircraft in various architectures and recognize mechanisms to ensure their 
safety against the threats.  Figure 5-1 illustrates the approach for security assessment performed as 
part of phase 2 activities. 
 
 
Figure 5-1  Approach for Security Assessment 
NW Vulnerability Assessment Security 
Perimeters 
Risk  Severity 
Assessment 
Threat Vector 
Identification 
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 S
ce
n
ar
io
s 
HAP 
Cellular 
SO-OFDMA  
Satellite 
R
e
co
m
m
e
n
d
at
io
n
 
NASA/CR—2015-218842 82
 
 
The initial task starts with the identification of the security perimeters of networks. In the context 
of the aeronautical network, a security perimeter is considered as a boundary between a regulated 
network and an unregulated network. A perimeter could be a device or a network entity in the 
regulated domain that is visible to the attackers outside the regulated domain. Some of the 
examples of network perimeters are radios, gateways, applications, etc., which are accessible to 
the external world. The scope of this assessment is limited only to the architectures discussed in 
phase 1 reports and considered in section 4.  
 
The next step is to identify the threat vectors such as mechanisms, paths and tools used by the 
intruders to attack the perimeters and gain access into the network and its critical information. 
Hence, in this task, all possible attacks to the networks are captured.  
 
COCR safety assessment [REF-COCR] identified the top level operational hazards that may arise 
during the use of datalink services such as: 1) Loss of Service and 2) Loss of Data Integrity. Loss 
of Service is attributed to the network failure that inhibits communications between two 
aeronautical systems. Threats such as Denial of Service (DOS), jamming, flooding of messages, 
etc., may cause loss of communications in the NAS environment. Loss of Data Integrity refers to 
corrupted messages, wrongly delivered messages, late or missing messages and out-of-sequence 
messages that are delivered undetected. As most of the communication protocols are equipped 
with robust error-detection algorithms such as, 64/128-bit Cyclic Redundancy Checks, the 
probability of an accidentally corrupted message, passing through all layers of communication 
protocols undetected, is very remote. However, the attacks like man-in-middle, masquerading, etc., 
may cause intentional damage to the data integrity of the systems. This assessment mainly focuses 
on such intentional threats to datalink services, as most of the non-intentional interferences are 
covered in the earlier technology assessment reports published in phase 1 reports. See Task 2 report 
[TASK2RPT]. 
 
Table 5-1 provides the COCR assessment of hazard severity categorization for Loss of Service 
and Loss of Data Integrity for various datalink services and the safety objectives needed for risk 
free operations (COCR ATS Phase 2). Figure 5-2 provides a standardized hazard severity
 categorization per COCR. 
Table 5-1 COCR Operational Safety Assessment and Safety Objectives for Datalink Services 
Service Category 
Loss of Service  
Hazardously Misleading 
Information 
Severity 
Class 
Safety Objective Severity Safety Objective 
Data Communications 
Management Services (DCM) 
4 Probable 3 Remote 
Clearance/Instruction Service 
(CIS) 
3 Remote 2 Extremely Remote 
Flight Information Service (FIS)  4 Probable 2 Extremely Remote 
Advisory Services (AVS) 3 Remote 2 Extremely Remote 
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 Service Category 
Loss of Service  
Hazardously Misleading 
Information 
Severity 
Class 
Safety Objective Severity Safety Objective 
Flight Position/Intent/ Preference 
Service (FPS) 
3 Remote 2 Extremely Remote 
Emergency Information Service 
(EIS)  
4 Probable 3 Remote 
Delegated Separation Service 
(DSS) 
3 Remote 2 Extremely Remote 
Miscellaneous Services (MCS)  1 
Extremely 
Improbable 
1 
Extremely 
Improbable 
 
 
 
The severity levels of the hazards are different for various datalink services. For example, the 
hazard severity level of “Loss of Service” for “Data Management Service (DCM)” is “Minor”, 
while it is “Catastrophic” for “Miscellaneous Service (MCS)”. MCS comprises services such as 
“Autoexec” for controlling aircraft remotely from ground through datalink. Hence the 
requirements of MCS are more stringent than that of DCM. The safety objectives represent the 
degree of tolerance applicable to each class of hazard. Hazards of class 4 (Minor/Probable) 
category can occur more frequently than that of class 3 (Major/Remote) category, class 3 
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Figure 5-2  COCR Hazard Categorization 
 
 
(Major/Remote) can occur more frequently than class 2 (Hazardous/Extremely Remote) and so on. 
Hence, if MCS service is deployed over a datalink, the loss of service should be “extremely 
improbable”, but for DCM service “loss of service” can be “probable”.  
 
For the purpose of network vulnerability assessment, risks of various threats are assessed based 
on: 1) Threat Impact and 2) Required Capabilities to effect threats. Threat Impact is rated based 
on the potential damage that would be caused to NAS data exchange environment if the threat 
materializes. The score is given as a percentage of the estimated loss of communications to the 
overall NAS network infrastructure. For instance, if NAS extends over an area of 10 million square 
kilometers and if a threat causes outage over 1 million square kilometers, the Threat Impact score 
is 10%.  The score for Required Capabilities is estimated based on the availability of technical and 
financial capabilities needed to cause the threat. If the required capabilities to implement a threat 
are high, then the chances for carrying out such attacks are unlikely and vice versa.   
 
Finally the hazard score for a threat is calculated by multiplying “Threat Impact” and “Required 
Capabilities” as shown below. 
 
𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =   𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
Based on hazard probability score, the level for a hazard is classified into five categories as 
provided in Table 5-2 
Table 5-2 Safety Hazard Level Classification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The estimated hazard probability levels of various threats identified in a network are compared against the 
against the safety objectives of different datalink services as shown in  
Table 5-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hazard Score Probability Level 
<0.25% Extremely Improbable 
0.25% to 1% Extremely Remote 
1%-10% Remote 
10% - 25% Probable 
Above 25% Frequent 
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 Table 5-3 Format of Threat Assessment for a Network 
 
 
If a hazard probability level of a threat is higher than the safety objective needed for a datalink 
service, then the network may not be suitable to handle such datalink services and if it is the only 
network deployed in NAS, there could a possibility of safety hazards impacting NAS operations. 
For example, if the safety objective of MCS service is 1 (extremely improbable) and if there are 
threats in a network that have hazard levels at “Remote” or “Probable”, then that network alone 
cannot be deployed for MCS service. Thus the table gives an overall idea about the possible threats 
that can impact network safety and the suitability of the network to handle various datalink 
services.  
 
The vulnerability assessment is done for the three network architectures identified in Phase -1 of 
the project namely, Cellular, Satellite and broad band Very High Frequency (VHF) networks. The 
susceptibility of various network architectures to support the required level of robustness for 
performing safety critical operations are compared and prioritized. Finally, the recommendations 
are made to mitigate the high priority threats and to improve the overall operations of the networks.  
 
5.2. SCOPE OF ASSESSMENT 
In the earlier days, the only possible mode of data transfer to an aircraft was through physical 
media such as, floppy diskettes or magnetic tapes and aeronautical-specific air/ground datalinks in 
closed systems dedicated to aeronautical-specific data transfer only.  Hence, the aircraft’s security 
perimeter was confined to the physical boundaries of its closed datalink systems. However, in the 
recent years, with the deployment of new communication technologies and internet, the security 
perimeters have started expanding limitlessly, covering the entire globe virtually. Hence it 
becomes necessary to identify security perimeters at all levels to safeguard the aeronautical 
network against all threats. Figure 5-3 provides the overall context of security perimeters that are 
possible in NAS data exchange environment.   
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As shown in Figure 5-3, some of the security perimeters identified at various layers are provided 
below. 
 Physical access to avionics  
 Radios, Ground stations, Base stations, Satellite Ground stations  etc,  
 ATN routers/Gateways, ACARS Gateways, NextGen IP routers, Authenticators, VPN 
servers and other network devices that are accessible to the external world.  
 All application servers and end nodes that communicate with ground peers.  
 Proxy servers, DNS servers, Mail Servers and other servers in DMZ zones 
 Cabin entertainment systems, passenger laptops, Tablets, mobile and virtually any device 
that communicates with the internet are potential security perimeters.  
  
The scope of this assessment is limited only to the Air/Ground networks identified in Phase 1. 
Hence the assessment is performed only for RF Platform layer and Networking layer as identified 
in Figure 5-4.  
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Figure 5-3  Context of Security Assessment 
  
 
Considering, the overall NAS communication environment as provided in Figure 5-4, various 
network segments identified in the architecture are given below: 
 Aircraft network supporting both safety critical applications and non-safety critical 
services. 
  Air/Ground network providing connectivity to aircraft to reach ground network. 
 Air-to-Air network that interconnects aircraft 
 Ground-to-Ground backbone network that offers connectivity to ANSPs, Airline Operation 
Centers, ground sensors and other aeronautical services providers.   
 Various Ground networks supporting ATC, AOC operations and other aeronautical 
services. 
The assessment is done only for Cellular, HAP, Satellite and SO-OFDMA networks in the context 
of the architectures as defined in Phase 1 Task 3 Report [REF-TASK3RPT]. 
 
5.3. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT NETWORK 
The aeronautical network is expected to have multiple domains as shown in Figure 5-5. A domain 
represents a logical network entity, managed under a single administrative control or policy, but 
at physical level, a domain may span over multiple private/public networks and internet. 
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Figure 5-4  NAS Data Communication Environment 
 Figure 5-5  Network Domains 
Some of the domains identified in Figure 5-5 are, 
 Backbone network domain – managed by telecommunications service providers 
 ANSP domain – managed by CAA and other Air Navigation Service Providers 
 Mobile Service Provider (MSP) domain – managed by Air/Ground network service 
providers 
 Airline Domain – Airline Private Network  
 SWIM – Semi-regulatory network managed by SWIM service providers.  
 Aircraft Autonomous Domain – airborne network.  
 Cabin network domain 
 
The assumptions considered in this analysis are: 
 Air/Ground networks may provide layer 2 connectivity between aircraft and ground 
regulated network, with the network level traffic abstracted from the access network 
domains. Network level connection establishment between safety network domains may 
be handled transparent to MSP network. 
 Multiple MSPs may exist in the future and the MSPs may deploy their services through 
public network infrastructure.   
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  Airborne network segments/devices may require simultaneous connectivity to multiple 
ground network domains such as ANSP, Airlines, SWIM services, etc. 
 Airborne network will have appropriate security framework and the policies that govern 
both ingress and egress traffic in various domains.  
 Inter/Intra domain routing protocol or any other similar routing mechanism will be 
deployed across the domains through secured control channels.  
 Passenger traffic will be completely isolated from the avionics traffic so that the avionics 
network is invisible to the cabin network supporting passenger services.  
 VPN/VLANs or similar security mechanisms may exist to establish secured connectivity 
through internets to the safety network on ground. The traffic within VPNs may not be 
visible to the entities in the public network. 
These assumptions are common and applicable to all air/ground networks considered in this 
analysis.  
 
5.4. ARCHITECTURE OPTION 1 – CELLULAR NETWORK 
In this architecture, cellular network is used as an access network to connect aircraft with the 
ground side aeronautical network. The ground side network is a regulated network, while the 
access network is a public commercial network. Figure 5-6 shows a typical architecture of cellular 
network and the possible threat vectors that can act on it.  
 
 
Figure 5-6  Security Threats to Cellular Network 
 
In the future, commercial mobile service providers may offer air/ground service to aircraft in 
addition to offering services to their existing cell phone subscribers.  As discussed in the Phase 1 
Task3 report [TASK3RPT], the towers used for aeronautical communications may undergo minor 
modifications to accommodate communications with aircraft flying at high altitudes and with great 
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speeds. Other than this front end interface, all other portions of the network may remain the same 
between aircraft and cell phone users. Hence, beyond base stations, the data traffic from aircraft 
may pass through the same public network to reach the ground side aeronautical network. This 
exposes aircraft traffic to various threats and attacks similar to the ones present in the world of 
internet today. Of course, HAP-based cell towers are not shared with commercial cell phone users. 
 
5.4.1. Threat Analysis 
Various threats to the Cellular network are identified in Figure 5-6.  The threats possible at RF 
level, Layer 2 access network and through public internet are discussed in this section.  
 
5.4.1.1. JAMMING 
Jamming refers to an intentional transmission of strong noise in order to disrupt the legitimate 
signal and degrade signal-to-noise ratio of the communication channel. There are commercial cell 
phone jammers available in the market for blocking mobile phone operations in the restricted areas. 
The range of jamming for such devices depends upon the strength of the noise generated by them. 
Generally, these commercial jammers may have shorter range impacting only a few cell phone 
users in a small area. Hence, practically, these jammers may not have any significant influence 
over aircraft communications, as aircraft fly at high altitudes and use high power for their 
communications, compared to the handheld devices, but there is a possibility to build high powered 
jammers using base station hardware. These jammers may affect a few aircraft in a range 
equivalent to that of a base station, however, only for a short time, as the current technology in 
subscriber stations enable them to scan continuously for adjacent base stations and logon to one as 
soon as its signals are clear and available. In the future, cellular networks may have technologies 
to handle jamming in a better way. So, in case of jamming, the interruption to aircraft 
communication is expected to be  near-term problem. Considering these factors, loss of 
communication due to jamming is estimated around 70% of a single cell operation out of an 
estimated total of 200 cells in the NAS and the availability of capabilities to build such high 
powered jammer is foreseen as 90% considering the timeframe of 2060.  
 
Hazard Level for “Loss of Communication” due to jamming in a cellular network is concluded as 
“Extremely Remote” (Hazard score: 0.32%). Jamming may not be able to cause “Loss of Data 
Integrity”. Hence the hazard level for “Loss of Data Integrity” is concluded as “Extremely 
Improbable”. 
 
5.4.1.2. SCRAMBLING  
Scrambling is a technique in which jamming is done selectively on specific durations of 
communication to collapse the control flow between base stations and subscriber units.  
Scramblers may have implementations to understand the frame structure and send high powered 
short pulses to knock of specific portions of control frames or user frames that would cause 
maximum damage to the communication.  Because of the short pulse transmission, jam-detection 
systems find these devices difficult to locate compared to the jammers that transmit noise 
continuously.  Moreover scramblers consume lesser power than jammers owing to their 
intermittent transmission patterns. Hence scramblers could be very effective in causing outage in 
a cellular network. However, the implementation of a scrambler would require considerable 
amount of knowledge about the communication technology used in the cellular networks. 
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Nevertheless, since the cellular technology is a commercial technology and the “system on chip” 
concepts are more prevalent in the telecom industry, it may be possible to build scramblers with 
moderate efforts and funding.   
 
Assuming a scrambler can inhibit a base station operation completely, the loss of communication 
is estimated to be 0.5% in NAS region (1 out of 200 cells in NAS) and the availability of required 
capabilities is estimated around 50% considering the amount efforts required to build a scrambler 
from the COTs hardware. Hence, the estimated hazard level for scrambling is “Extremely 
Remote”.  (Hazard score: 0.25%).  Like jammers, scramblers are also expected not to cause any 
damage to data integrity, considering robust error-check protections available in higher layers and 
hence, the loss of data integrity is “Extremely Improbable”.   
 
5.4.1.3. IMPERSONATING AIRCRAFT 
In this attack, a hacker may use a commercial modem with fake aircraft credentials to gain 
access into the ground network and modify critical data to cause damage to NAS operations. 
However, mobile networks implement robust authentication mechanisms/algorithms based on 
digital certificates which are very difficult to break through. Hence gaining illegal access into the 
network may not be possible, unless the actual aircraft credentials are obtained.  (Threats related 
to key management issues are discussed separately in section 5.4.1.5). But it is possible for a 
masquerading station to send continuous messages flooding the network and causing denial of 
service (DOS) to other genuine aircraft in the cell. Hence, Loss of communication using this 
technique is estimated around 10% in a cell which amounts to 0.05% considering the entire NAS 
region.  The availability of capabilities required to cause such a threat is estimated around 90% 
(without aircraft credentials).  Hence the hazard score for Loss of Service is estimated around 
0.045% and its level is “Extremely Improbable”.   
 
Even considering the possibility of gaining access to the ground network, NAS may have 
sufficient policy implementations for data access restricting an aircraft’s visibility to NAS’s 
critical data. At the maximum, the hacker may be able to send wrong information about the 
aircraft being masqueraded, but the hacker may not be able to modify any other data existing in 
the NAS network. Hence the extent of Loss of Data Integrity is estimated around 20% within a 
cell and the availability of required capabilities is estimated around 10% considering the 
difficulty in accessing aircraft credentials. Hence, Loss of Data Integrity score is 0.01% and its 
level is “Extremely Improbable”.   
 
5.4.1.4. ROGUE BASE STATION 
Rogue base stations may be used by miscreants to fake the legitimate base station in a region and 
gain access into aircraft networks. A rogue base station (BS) may listen to the identities and 
credentials of genuine base station and use them in its broadcast with higher signal power so that 
aircraft in that region are attracted towards the fake base station.  The aircraft trying to logon to 
the fake base station may be vulnerable to attacks, as the hacker may gain access to aircraft network 
data. But most of the mobile networks use mutual authentication procedure during logon in which 
both the base station and the subscriber station (SS) authenticates each other before establishing 
connectivity.  Since the fake base station is just replaying the credentials of an actual base station, 
it will not have the private secret keys or the unshared secrets required for authenticating itself 
with the SS. In the future, it can be assumed that mutual authentication would be mandatory in all 
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 mobile networks during link establishment or handover procedures and hence it can be safely 
assumed that a rogue BS may not be able to break into the aircraft network.  But the rogue base 
stations may cause a temporary denial of service, as it may cause multiple unsuccessful logon 
attempts at aircraft subscribers.  However, as discussed earlier, an SS will look for alternate base 
stations after maximum logon attempts.  
 
Hence a rogue BS may cause marginal loss to communications within a cell, with an approximate 
figure of 10% damage to a cell’s communication. The capabilities availability is estimated around 
80%. The overall loss of communication to NAS environment is calculated as a hazard score of  
0.04% which is “Extremely Improbable”.  Unless the rogue BS has access to the credentials of a 
legitimate BS, it may not be able to cause any data integrity issue in the network. Even in extreme 
cases, where it has access to legitimate BS credentials, the extent of impact to data integrity would 
be limited to a few aircraft within a cell. Hence, the loss of data integrity is estimated around 0.5% 
(1 out of 200 cells) and the availability of such capability is estimated around 1% considering 
robust credential management infrastructure. The overall loss of data integrity to NAS is estimated 
as 0.005% and “Extremely Improbable”.   
 
5.4.1.5. KEY MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
The mobile networks use certificates that contain information about shared public keys along with 
cryptographic suites for data security. Future NAS environment may use multiple such certificates 
for various purposes like, authentication of different user categories like aircraft, airlines, ATC 
and other service providers, VPN security, application security, selective authorization for 
different regions, etc. Hence the industry may develop a robust framework for issuing and 
managing these certificates. The NASA data exchange architectures discussed in Phase 1 Reports 
assume a common authentication framework in the ground side regulated network to authorize 
aircraft to use the networks. The front end access networks do not perform authentication by 
themselves, but pass the logon credentials to a common authenticator located in the regulated 
network at the back end. Based on the decision from the common authenticator, the access 
networks either allow or reject logon requests from aircraft. Such a centralized mechanism would 
help to avoid variations in the security procedures deployed across access networks compromising 
the security doctrines laid out for aeronautical applications. 
 
The management of such centralized infrastructure for issuing keys, transferring private secrets 
securely to the network entities, management of the certificate validities and signing authorities, 
etc., requires greater level of safety precautions. Any illegal access to the key management 
infrastructure may permit miscreants to have access or to modify any level of critical data in NAS, 
and thereby causing catastrophic damage to the overall operations of NAS. The extent of damage 
to NAS operations is estimated around 80%.  However it is presumed that the centralized key 
management infrastructure would be well protected and it would be highly impossible to break 
into the system. Hence the capability available for such an act is estimated around 0.1%. Since the 
key loss may cause both Loss of Communication and Loss of Data Integrity, the final hazard core 
of 0.008%, which is “Extremely Improbable”. 
 
It is also theoretically possible that the aeronautical security framework may evolve independently 
without including public access networks within their scope of control. In such cases, aircraft may 
have to use public network credentials to logon to the front end public network and then use the 
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credentials corresponding to the aeronautical network to log into NAS infrastructure. If there are 
multiple access networks deployed in the system, aircraft may need to contain that many number 
of certificates corresponding to each service provider and manage them accordingly. However 
such implementations are not presumed to be deployed for safety critical services, as the 
aeronautical security framework is expected to include access networks’ safety within its scope of 
control. Hence, such architecture is not considered in this analysis.  
 
5.4.1.6. MAN-IN-MIDDLE 
Man-in-Middle threat considers the scenario where a hacker is present inside the cellular network. 
The hacker may attack network elements such as routers, firewalls, authenticators or network 
managers in order to bring down the network. He may also intercept the messages flowing through 
the network, modify them or divert them to wrong destinations to create confusion in the 
communication.  Since cellular network is a commercial network, there are good chances for 
commercial network infrastructure being managed by multiple smaller sub organizations. This 
increases the possibility for an intruder to get into the network from these organizations. Moreover, 
even a common security breach in such public networks may impact aeronautical communications 
though the target of the attacker may not be the aeronautical communications. However, the 
aeronautical messages are expected to be encrypted and secured when they pass through public 
networks using VPN or any other security mechanisms. Hence the hacker may not be able to 
intercept and tamper the aeronautical messages, but he can cause denial of service by dropping the 
packets illegally.  
 
Considering the motivation of a hacker to cause outage in the entire network, the estimated worst 
case impact that would impact the aeronautical communications before the affected network is 
brought back to control is considered as 20% and the availability of capabilities to cause such 
impact is estimated around 2% considering the difficulty in getting into the network and gain 
access to its critical resource, but insignificant impact to data integrity is anticipated. Hence the 
hazard level for Loss of Communication is “Extremely Remote” (0.4%) and Loss of Data Integrity 
is “Extremely Improbable”. 
 
5.4.1.7. BLACK HAT HACKER 
As shown in Figure 5-6, the cellular network is connected to the Internet. Hence, any random black 
hat hacker from the Internet community may try to attack the cellular network. If the attacker gains 
access to the cellular network gateway, the hacker may try to hack into aeronautical network and 
cause interruption to its communications.  Generally this type of attack is similar to the attacks 
being carried out on enterprise networks.  There are commercial solutions available in the market 
to handle such attacks. However, it may not be possible to eliminate such attacks on cellular 
networks completely as they are exposed to the Internet. Hence the aeronautical network may need 
to deploy sufficient tools, software and processes to monitor such attacks and to take corrective 
actions.  
 
Assuming sufficient preventive mechanisms are deployed in the network, the expected loss of 
communication and loss of data integrity to aeronautical communications due to such attacks in 
the cellular network are considered negligible. Hence the hazard levels are estimated as 
“Extremely Improbable” for both “Loss of Communications” and Loss of Data Integrity”.    
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 5.4.2. Risk Assessment  
Table 5-4 and  
Table 5-5 contain consolidation of the threats analyzed in the above sections.  
The overall risks associated with the cellular networks to handle various datalink services are 
consolidated in Table 5-6 and Table 5-7. 
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Table 5-4 Hazard Assessment for Loss of Communications in Cellular Network 
 
 
Threat Vector 
Description 
Estimated Loss of Bandwidth 
Access to Required 
Capabilities 
Loss of 
Communication 
Score Remarks  Score Remarks Score Level 
Jamming  
A strong noise transmitted to affect the 
legitimate signal to cause denial of service to 
aircraft in that region  
0.35% 
70% of the cell affected 
due to Jamming. 200 cells 
in NAS 
90.00% 
Cellular Jammers 
are commercially 
Available 
0.32% 
Extremely 
Remote 
Scrambling  
Selective jamming of a specific frames / parts 
of a frame Knowledge of the frame structure 
known to scrambler  
0.50% 
1 cell affected. 200 cells 
per NAS 
50.00% 
May be difficult to 
build. But COTS 
HW can be used.   
0.25% 
Extremely 
Remote 
Impersonating 
Aircraft (AC)  
Hacker uses a legal Mobile Device with AC 
credential to impersonate AC and gain illegal 
access to the network.  
0.05% 
Hacker causes Denial of 
Service At least to 10% of 
aircraft in a cell  
10.00% 
Difficult to get AC 
credentials 
0.01% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Rogue BS  
The ground station or Base station faked by a 
Rogue Station. Rogue Station listens to BS ID 
and other credentials and uses them in its 
broadcast with higher power so that Mobiles 
Stations are attracted towards it.  
0.05% 
10% reduction in the 
bandwidth. Mutual 
Authentication will inhibit 
AC logging into BS. DOS 
is possible.  
70.00% 
BS credentials 
difficult to get. 
Score for BS 
without credentials.  
0.04% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Key Mgmt 
issues  
 Loopholes in key or credential management 
infrastructure leading to security breach on a 
large scale.  
80.00% 
Major issue. May impact 
the entire NAS.  
1.00% 
Very difficult to 
manipulate 
credentials 
0.80% 
Extremely 
Remote 
Man in the 
Middle 
Hacker is inside the cellular network and 
attacks network element such as 
authenticators, routers, network managers, 
etc., to divert the messages or corrupt the data 
or cause DOS  
20.00% 
This can be a major issue. 
The Hacker may bring 
down the entire cellular 
network. 
2.00% 
Assumed to be 
difficult for Hacker 
to be present inside 
cellular network 
0.40% 
Extremely 
Remote 
Black Hat 
Hacker 
Since cellular network is a commercial 
network it has access to internet. Hence any 
random hacker from internet anywhere may 
try to attack the gateways to ground side 
network.  
2.00% 
Estimate impact is 2% to 
AC communication.  This 
is similar to enterprise 
network hacking.  
5.00% 
Similar to enterprise 
network 
0.10% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
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Table 5-5 Hazard Assessment for Loss of Data Integrity in Cellular Networks 
Threat 
Vector 
Description 
Estimated Impact to Data Integrity 
Access to Required 
Capabilities 
Safety Hazard 
Score Remarks Score Remarks Score Level 
Jamming  
A strong noise transmitted to affect the 
legitimate signal to cause denial of service to 
aircraft in that region  
0.01% 
CRC checks at every layer 
are very robust against data 
corruption 
90.00% 
Cellular Jammers 
are commercially 
Available 
0.0045% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Scrambling  
Selective jamming of a specific frames / parts 
of a frame Knowledge of the frame structure 
known to scrambler  
0.01% 
CRC checks at every layer 
is very robust against 
corrupted data 
50.00% 
May be difficult to 
build. But COTS 
HW can be used.   
0.0025% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Impersonating 
AC  
Hacker uses a legal Mobile Device with AC 
credential to impersonate AC and gain illegal 
access to the network.  
0.10% 
Masqueraded AC may 
send wrong information 
but cannot modify critical 
NAS data. 20% of AC data 
within to a cell  
10.00% 
Difficult to get AC 
credentials 
0.01% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Rogue BS  
The ground station or Base station faked by a 
Rogue Station. Rogue Station listens to BS ID 
and other credentials and uses them in its 
broadcast with higher power so that Mobiles 
Stations are attracted towards it.  
0.50% 
Masqueraded BS may send 
wrong information but may 
not be able to modify 
critical NAS data. 100% of 
AC data within a cell  
1.00% 
BS credentials 
difficult to get. 
Score for BS with 
credentials.  
0.01% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Key Mgmt 
issues  
 Loopholes in Key or credential management 
infrastructure leading to security breach on a 
large scale.  
80.00% 
Major issue. May impact 
entire NAS.  
0.10% 
Very difficult to 
manipulate 
credentials 
0.08% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Man in the 
middle 
Hacker is inside the cellular network and 
attacks network element such as 
authenticators, routers, network managers, 
etc., to divert the messages, corrupt the data or 
cause denial of service to all Aircraft.  
2.00% 
May corrupt 10% of 
Cellular Network 
information (5 service 
providers assumed)  
0.20% 
Assumed to be 
difficult for Hacker 
to be present inside 
cellular network 
0.0040% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Black Hat 
Hacker 
Since cellular network is a commercial 
network it has access to internet. Hence any 
random hacker from internet anywhere may 
try to attack the gateways to ground side 
network.  
2.00% 
10% of a network 
population 
0.50% 
Similar to enterprise 
network 
0.01% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
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 Table 5-6 Risk Assessment for Loss of Communication in Cellular Network 
Service Category 
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 Hazard Level  
 
Safety Objective 
Extremely 
Remote 
Extremely 
Remote 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Remote 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Data Communications 
Management Services 
(DCM) 
Probable 
No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat 
Clearance/Instruction 
Service (CIS) 
Remote 
No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat 
Flight Information Service 
(FIS)  
Probable 
No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat 
Advisory Services (AVS) Remote No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat 
Flight Position/Intent/ 
Preference Service (FPS) 
Remote 
No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat 
Emergency Information 
Service ( EIS)  
Probable 
No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat 
Delegated Separation 
Service (DSS) 
Remote 
No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat 
Miscellaneous Services 
(MCS)  
Extremely 
Improbable Threat Threat No Threat Threat No Threat No Threat No Threat 
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 Table 5-7 Risk Assessment for Loss of Data Integrity in Cellular Network 
Service Category 
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Hazard Level  
 
Safety Objective 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Data Communications 
Management Services 
(DCM) 
Remote 
No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact 
Clearance/Instruction 
Service (CIS) 
Extremely 
Remote No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact 
Flight Information Service 
(FIS)  
Extremely 
Remote No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact 
Advisory Services (AVS) 
Extremely 
Remote No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact 
Flight Position/Intent/ 
Preference Service (FPS) 
Extremely 
Remote 
No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact 
Emergency Information 
Service ( EIS)  
Remote 
No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact 
Delegated Separation 
Service (DSS) 
Extremely 
Remote No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact 
Miscellaneous Services 
(MCS)  
Extremely 
Improbable 
No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact 
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 Some of the conclusions of this assessment are given below.  
 RF jamming and man-in-middle attacks are the major threats to cellular networks to cause 
loss of communication to critical datalink services. However the impact of jamming may 
not be severe owing to multi-carrier broad spectrum communication. The future cellular 
networks are expected to develop jamming proof mechanisms to minimize such 
vulnerabilities. 
 The following services can be deployed over cellular networks without major issues. 
o Datalink Communication Management  (DCM ) 
o Flight Information Service (FIS)  
o Emergency Information services (EIS ) 
o Clearance Instruction Service (CIS)  
o Advisory Service (AVS) 
o Flight Position/Intent/Preference Service (FPS) 
o Delegated Separation Service (DSS) 
 MCS services like Autoexec applications that are used to control aircraft remotely from 
ground using datalinks, may require higher level of network robustness and hence they are 
vulnerable to most of the threat vectors identified for cellular networks. Hence, the cellular 
network alone may not be able to support such datalink services. 
 
5.5. ARCHITECTURE OPTION 2 – SATELLITE NETWORK 
The architecture option 2 based on satellite networks is shown in Figure 5-7. The major 
components of a satellite network are: 1) GEO satellites that orbit around the earth at an altitude 
of approximately 35,786 Km above the sea level, 2) earth feeder stations to provide connectivity 
between satellites and ground stations and 3) aircraft modems to provide communication between 
satellites and aircraft. Beyond Ground Earth Stations, the network may use telecom infrastructure 
or the Internet to connect to the ground side aeronautical network or any other enterprise network. 
The satellite network is expected to provide network connectivity to both safety critical datalink 
applications and passenger applications.  
 
NASA/CR—2015-218842 100
 Figure 5-7  Security Threats to Satellite Network 
Future GEO stationary satellites may use Ka band predominantly for both forward (satellite-to-
aircraft) and return links (aircraft-to-satellite).  The NAS region may have 75 to 100 spot beams 
spanning over an area of around 133,000 square kilometers. The US region may be supported by 
a pair of Ground Earth Stations for redundancy purposes, while the entire world may have three 
pairs of Earth Stations. Therefore, the entire aircraft data traffic over NAS region would be 
consolidated through a pair of feeder links towards the ground network. As the satellites are located 
at high altitudes, their communications would require phenomenal transmission power and focused 
directional beams. Such high power is required to compensate for the signal attenuation due to 
huge path loss over the long distance. Normally, the transmission power of feeder links will be at 
least ten times greater than that of spot beams.  Typical path loss in Ka band for Geo satellite 
communication would be around 215 dB. Ka band also suffers from weather conditions that impact 
signal transmissions further.  
 
5.5.1. Threat Analysis 
Figure 5-7 shows possible major threats to satellite networks such as, signal jamming in feeder 
links and user links, man-in-middle attacks in the ground portion of satellite network and black hat 
hacker attacks from the Internet. Jamming threat is analyzed in detail in the following subsections, 
while man-in-middle and black hat hacker attacks are similar to the ones explained in section 5.4. 
 
5.5.1.1. JAMMING 
GEO satellites may be viewed as difficult systems to jam, as they are placed at very high altitudes. 
Simple ground based jammers with omni-directional antennas will never be able to interrupt the 
signals at GEO satellites, owing to tremendous path loss. Jammers would require millions of watts 
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 of noise to reach the satellites, compensating path loss and other miscellaneous losses during their 
propagation. Practically, it is impossible to achieve such a high transmission power. However, 
satellites expose more wireless links to jammers such as, feeder uplinks/downlinks and user 
uplinks/downlinks, providing more vulnerable points for attacks. Moreover, technologies like, 
directional antennas, Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) high power sources, etc., are expected to 
become commercially available in the 2060 timeframe and hence, the attackers would be capable 
of using such technologies in the future to develop sophisticated devices for jamming satellite 
systems. Some of the jamming techniques that could be deployed against satellite networks are 
explained below.  
 
1. Full Barrage 
In this attack, random noise is generated across the entire transmission spectrum to 
degrade satellite link performances. These jamming devices can be easily 
implemented, but the power requirements of such devices would be extremely high.  
 
2. Partial Jamming 
This technique uses power optimally to generate noise in a limited portion of the 
operational spectrum. Hence, partial jamming may cause more degradation to a 
communication link performance compared to full barrage jammers.   
 
3.  Single Tone: 
Single tone jamming can be very effective against systems that use single carrier 
frequency for their transmissions, but the advanced satellite systems are expected 
to be based on multiple carrier frequencies and use spread spectrum for their 
communications. Hence, the impact of such jammers to modern satellite systems 
would be very negligible.  
 
4. Pulsed Multi-Tone 
In pulsed multi-tone jamming, random short pulses with high power and small duty 
cycle are generated across the entire operating spectrum to jam the signals in the 
communication link. This techniques uses power very optimally. Hence it can be 
one of the most effective techniques to cause large impact to satellite 
communications using less power.  
 
5. Follower 
In this technique, the jammer understands signals, underlying communication 
technologies, frequency hopping, and other anti-jamming techniques implemented 
in the transmitter to jam its signals. Hence the follower can be very effective, even 
against devices that have anti-jamming techniques implemented. However, these 
kinds of systems would be very difficult to implement, as high technical capabilities 
are required to develop them.   
 
A satellite network has at least three network devices that are exposed to jamming attacks. They 
are receivers at satellite, aircraft and ground earth stations. The following subsections explain the 
potential jamming attacks possible on these devices.  
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5.5.1.1.1. Threats to Receivers at Satellites 
The footprint of a GEO satellite is very large, as it covers over 35% of total earth’s surface. 
Therefore, geometrically, GEO satellites can be easily targeted by an attacker, as he would be able 
to jam the main lob of the transmitted signals even from a region located outside US boundaries. 
However, the power required to jam these signals at satellites would be immensely high due to the 
propagation loss of around 215 dB to the signal. Without directional antennas, even to create a 
noise power of -150 dBm/Hz at satellite receivers, the amount of transmission power required on 
ground level would be equivalent to 70dBm/Hz.  If a bandwidth of 1 GHz is considered, the total 
power requirement would be 160 dBm (more than a billion kilowatt!!). Hence, it may not be 
possible to affect signals at satellites without using directional antennas.   
 
As shown in Figure 5-8, a jammer may choose to attack a feeder link or a user link. To attack a 
feeder link, the jammer would require transmitters with very high power and large directional 
antennas, similar to the ones used in ground earth stations, to focus noise transmissions towards 
GEO satellites accurately. Hence, the required equipment capabilities are very high and unless 
funded by government agencies or huge organizations, acquiring such technical capabilities would 
be impossible. Hence it is concluded that jamming feeder uplink signals would be very difficult.  
 
 
Figure 5-8  Jamming at Satellites 
 
For user link jamming, equipment similar to aircraft modems could be deployed. Such equipment 
may be easier to acquire, but its impact to overall communications would be marginal.   
 
Table 5-8 summarizes different jamming techniques and their impact to receivers at satellites.  
Shared Satellite 
Network 
Jammer 
Jammer 
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Jamming 
Technique 
Description 
% of Loss 
of 
Bandwidth 
% of Loss 
of Data 
Integrity 
Remarks 
Full 
Barrage 
Noise generated in the entire 
communication band to 
interrupt the signal receptions 
0.01% 0.0001% 
It is practically impossible to 
generate huge power to jam  
satellites, as they  are located at 
very high altitude 
Partial 
Spectrum 
 Attacker chooses a part of 
operational spectrum to jam.  
 
 
0.50% 0.0001% 
If directional antennas are used 
and feeder links are targeted, it 
may cause very minimal 
degradation to communications. 
Assumption 1% of the spectrum 
targeted and 50% effectiveness 
Single Tone 
A single carrier frequency is 
targeted and corrupted.  
 
0.10% 0.0001% 
Most of the satellite system 
would use multi carrier 
communication. Hence the 
impact is considered to be very 
less.  
Pulsed 
Multi Tone 
High strength pulses spread 
across the operational spectrum 
transmitted. Uses power in an 
effective way. 
10% 0.0001% 
 May cause considerable amount 
of degradation if feeder link is 
affected. Assumption is based 
on the usage of directional 
antennas and high powered 
transmitters.  
Follower 
Equipage similar to ground 
stations used. Follower can 
understand the signal, 
technology, anti-jamming 
mechanism and follows 
transmitters and its frequency 
hops in order to spoil the 
reception 
20% 0.0001% 
Can be very effective, but, very 
complex to implement. 20% 
degradation assumed 
considering the usage of 
equipment levels similar to 
Ground Earth Stations.  
 
 
 
5.5.1.1.2. Threats to aircraft receivers 
The possible scenarios of jamming aircraft modems are provided in Figure 5-9. Aircraft receivers 
can be jammed either from ground or from UAVs. 
 
Table 5-8 Impact of Jamming on Receivers at Satellites 
Impact on Receivers at Satellites 
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Figure 5-9  Jamming at Aircraft 
In ground based jamming, a strong noise is sent from ground towards aircraft to impact the 
reception of downlink signal from satellites. Generally, the antennas of satellite modems are 
installed on the top of aircraft’s fuselage and these antennas are directional and steered towards 
satellites. Hence, the aircraft body itself will act as a huge barrier for the ground based jammers. 
Therefore, the impact of ground based jammers on aircraft modems would be very minimal.  
 
However, jammers hosted in UAVs flying at altitudes higher than that of aircraft will be able to 
affect satellite downlink signals at aircraft receivers. The strength of the transmitted signals from 
satellites would be weak at aircraft modems considering the huge path loss during their 
propagation from GEO orbits. Hence it would be possible to jam these signals from UAVs, even 
with considerably low noise power. For example, if a satellite transmitter’s EIRP power is around 
1000 watts (60dBm) at its transmitter antenna, considering the path loss of 213 dB and other 
miscellaneous losses amounting to 12 dB, the signal power at the receiver antenna of an aircraft 
will be around -165 dBm. UAVs flying at an altitude of 30 Km above the sea level would require 
only 1 dBm (1.25 milliwatts) transmit power to generate noise equal to the signal strength at 
aircraft receivers. The path loss from the UAV would be only 151 dB, considering UAV altitude 
of 30 to 40 Km above sea level. Hence an UAV, equipped with a jammer, even with 10 watts 
would be able to jam communications between satellites and aircraft phenomenally. UAV based 
jammers are estimated to impact aircraft in a region equivalent to 50% of a single spot beam 
footprint.  
 
Table 5-9 summarizes different jamming techniques and their impact to receivers at aircraft. 
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Table 5-9 Impact of Jamming on Receivers at Aircraft 
Impact on Receivers at Aircraft 
Jamming 
Technique 
Description 
% of Loss 
of 
Bandwidth 
% of Loss 
of Data 
Integrity 
Remarks 
Full 
Barrage 
Noise generated in the entire 
communication band to 
interrupt the signal 
receptions 
 
 
0.2500% 0.0001% 
 Ground based jammers may not 
impact aircraft, as the antennas are 
isolated from jammers by the body 
of the aircraft.. UAVs deployed may 
be able to impact up to 50% of a 
spot beam area with 50% loss of 
BW to ACs. For airport region the 
number of AC impacted could be 
high. 
Partial 
Spectrum 
 Attacker chooses a part of 
operational spectrum to jam.  
0.2500% 0.0001% 
Attacks based on UAVs possible. 
Impact would be similar to Full 
Barrage 
Single 
Tone 
A single carrier frequency is 
targeted and corrupted.  
 
0.05% 0.0001% 
Most of the satellite system would 
use multi carrier communication. 
Hence the impact is considered to be 
very less. 1% of one spot beam is 
assumed to be impacted 
Pulsed 
Multi Tone 
High strength pulses spread 
across the operational 
spectrum transmitted. Uses 
power in an effective way. 
0.400% 0.0001% 
 UAV based jamming may have 
similar impact. 80% loss of BW to 
ACs within 50% of spot beam area 
assumed to be impacted in the 
Airport regions 
Follower 
Equipage similar to ground 
stations used. Follower can 
understand the signal  
technology, anti jamming 
mechanism and follows 
transmitters and its 
frequency hops in order to 
spoil the reception 
0.4500% 0.0001% 
Can be very effective, but, very 
complex to implement.  Worst case 
scenario of 90% loss of 
communications to 50% of AC 
within a spot beam footprint 
assumed.  
 
5.5.1.1.3. Threats to Earth Station  
The earth stations have large dish antennas with high directionality. Hence it may not be possible 
to jam these antennas from a ground based jammers. The possibility of ground based jammers 
getting physically closer to the dish antenna and injecting noise within its solid angle of 
reception may be very difficult. However, UAVs flying at altitudes around 20 Km to 30 Km 
should be able to accomplish this without much of a geometrical problem.  
 
Figure 5-10 shows a scenario of an UAV based jamming of an earth station. As discussed earlier 
UAVs with moderate jamming power and directional antennas should be capable of jamming 
earth stations. The feeder link contains the consolidated data traffic from all aircraft.  The GEO 
satellite system may have a pair of Earth Stations working in redundant mode to handle the entire 
NAS region traffic. Hence the feeder link attack may cause serious impact to NAS operations. 
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Figure 5-10  Jamming at Earth Station 
 
Table 5-10 summarizes different jamming techniques at ground earth stations. 
Table 5-10 Impact of Jamming on Receivers at Ground Earth Stations 
Impact on Receivers at Ground Earth Stations 
Jamming 
Technique 
Description 
% of Loss of 
Bandwidth 
% of Loss 
of Data 
Integrity 
Remarks 
Full 
Barrage 
Noise generated in the entire 
communication band to 
interrupt the signal receptions 
1.00% 0.0001% 
Ground based Jammers 
may not be effective. 
UAVs equipped with 
jammers may cause 
damage. 1% impact to 
feeder link assumed 
Partial 
Spectrum 
 Attacker chooses a part of 
operational spectrum to jam.  
5.00% 0.0001% 
Power can be utilized more 
optimally. Considering 
damage to 10% of the 
spectrum with 50% 
efficiency.  
Single Tone 
A single carrier frequency is 
targeted and corrupted.  
0.10% 0.0001% 
Most of the satellite system 
would use multi carrier 
communication. Hence the 
impact is considered to be 
very less.  
Pulsed 
Multi Tone 
High strength pulses spread 
across the operational 
spectrum transmitted. Uses 
power in an effective way. 
50% 0.0001% 
 May cause considerable 
amount of degradation to 
feeder links. 50% damage 
to a feeder link assumed 
Shared Satellite 
Network 
UAV 
Jammer 
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 Impact on Receivers at Ground Earth Stations 
Jamming 
Technique 
Description 
% of Loss of 
Bandwidth 
% of Loss 
of Data 
Integrity 
Remarks 
Follower 
Equipage similar to ground 
stations may be used. 
Follower can understand the 
signal , technology, anti 
jamming mechanism and 
follows transmitters and its 
frequency hops in order to 
spoil the reception 
75% 0.0001% 
Can be very effective, but, 
very complex to 
implement. 75% damage 
assumed 
 
5.5.2. Capability Assessment for Jamming 
UAV technologies are expected to mature over decades, acquiring capabilities to support long 
uninterrupted flight hours. Some of the internet companies show major interests to offer network 
access in remote areas of the world using cost effective UAV based solutions. Considerable 
amount of advancements are also happening in fuel cell technologies in increasing the capacity of 
fuel cells and reducing their form factors. Such fuel cells could power UAVs and onboard 
electronics in future. The technology advancements in metamaterials may yield lightweight, 
electronically steerable directional antenna that may not have moving parts or large dishes. These 
directional antennas could be easily hosted over UAVs.  Hence considering the 2060 timeframe, 
jammers may not have difficulties in building jamming devices based on UAV platforms.  
 
A rough estimate on the availability of technology capabilities for both UAV based and ground 
based jamming of satellite networks is provided in Table 5-11.  
 
Table 5-11 Capability Assessment for Satellite Network Jamming 
Electronics Availability 
Full Barrage Partial 
Single 
Tone 
Pulsed Multi 
tone 
Follower 
20% 80% 100% 75% 10% 
UAV Platform 
Availability 
30% 6.00% 24.00% 30.00% 22.50% 3.00% 
Ground Based  
Platform 
Availability 
50% 10.00% 40.00% 50.00% 37.50% 5.00% 
Platform 
Availability 
40% 8.00% 32.00% 40.00% 30.00% 4.00% 
 
 
5.5.3. Risk Assessment 
This section consolidates safety hazard assessments for Loss of Communications and Loss of Data 
Integrity in Table 5-12 and Table 5-13  and overall risk assessments for supporting various datalink 
services in Table 5-14 and Table 5-15. 
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Table 5-12 Hazard Assessment for Loss of Communication in Satellite Networks 
Jamming 
Techniques 
Description 
Access to 
Required 
Capabilities 
% Loss of Bandwidth Hazard 
Satellite 
Receiver 
AC Receiver 
GES 
Receiver 
Score Level 
Full Barrage 
Noise generated in the entire 
communication band to 
interrupt the signal 
receptions 
10% 0.01% 0.25% 1.00% 0.13% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Partial Spectrum 
 Attacker chooses a part of 
operational spectrum to jam.  
40% 0.50% 0.25% 5.00% 2.30% Remote 
Single Tone 
A single carrier frequency is 
targeted and corrupted.  
50% 0.10% 0.05% 0.10% 0.13% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Pulsed Multi Tone 
High strength pulses spread 
across the operational 
spectrum transmitted. Uses 
power in an effective way. 
37% 10% 0.40% 50% 22.35% Probable 
Follower 
Equipage similar to ground 
stations used. Follower can 
understand the signal , 
technology, anti jamming 
mechanism and follows 
transmitters and its frequency 
hops in order to spoil the 
reception 
5% 20% 0.45% 75% 4.77% Remote 
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 Table 5-13 Hazard Assessment for Loss of Data Integrity in Satellite Networks 
Jamming 
Techniques 
Description 
Access to 
Required 
Capabilities 
Loss of Data 
Integrity 
Hazard 
Score Level 
Full Barrage 
Noise generated in the entire 
communication band to interrupt 
the signal receptions 
10% 0.00010% 0.00001% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Partial Spectrum 
 Attacker chooses a part of 
operational spectrum to jam.  
40% 0.00010% 0.00004% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Single Tone 
A single carrier frequency is 
targeted and corrupted.  
50% 0.00010% 0.00005% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Pulsed Multi Tone 
High strength pulses spread 
across the operational spectrum 
transmitted. Uses power in an 
effective way. 
37% 0.00010% 0.00004% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Follower 
 
 
 
 
Equipage similar to ground 
stations used. Follower can 
understand the signal , 
technology, anti jamming 
mechanism and follows 
transmitters and its frequency 
hops in order to spoil the 
reception 
5% 0.00010% 0.00001% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
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Table 5-14 Risk Assessment on Loss of Communications in satellite Networks 
Service Category 
Loss of 
Communications 
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Safety Hazard 
 
Safety Target 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Remote Extremely 
Improbable 
Probable Remote 
Data Communications 
Management Services (DCM) 
Probable Ok OK OK OK OK 
Clearance/Instruction Service 
(CIS) 
Remote OK OK OK Threat OK 
Flight Information Service 
(FIS)  
Probable OK OK OK OK OK 
Advisory Services (AVS) Remote OK OK OK Threat OK 
Flight Position/Intent/ 
Preference Service (FPS) 
Remote OK OK OK Threat OK 
Emergency Information 
Service ( EIS)  
Probable OK OK OK OK OK 
Delegated Separation 
Service(DSS) 
Remote OK OK OK Threat OK 
Miscellaneous Services(MCS)  
Extremely 
Improbable 
OK Threat OK Threat Threat 
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 Table 5-15 Risk Assessment on Loss of Data Integrity in satellite Networks  
 
Service Category 
Loss of 
Communications 
F
u
ll
 B
a
rr
a
g
e
 
P
a
rt
ia
l 
S
p
ec
tr
u
m
 
S
in
g
le
 T
o
n
e
 
P
u
ls
ed
 M
u
lt
i 
T
o
n
e
 
F
o
ll
o
w
er
 
Safety Hazard  
 
Safety Target 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Data Communications 
Management Services (DCM) 
Probable Ok Ok Ok Ok Ok 
Clearance/Instruction Service 
(CIS) 
Remote OK OK OK OK OK 
Flight Information Service (FIS)  Probable OK OK OK OK OK 
Advisory Services (AVS) Remote OK OK OK OK OK 
Flight Position/Intent/ 
Preference Service (FPS) 
Remote OK OK OK OK OK 
Emergency Information Service 
( EIS)  
Probable OK OK OK OK OK 
Delegated Separation 
Service(DSS) 
Remote OK OK OK OK OK 
Miscellaneous Services(MCS)  
Extremely 
Improbable 
OK OK OK OK OK 
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 Some of the conclusions of the assessments are given below.  
 By design, the entire air-ground data is consolidated through feeder links to reach ground 
stations in satellite and downstream networks. Hence any impact to feeder links may cause 
severe performance degradation over a wide area.    
 The advancements in technologies such as UAVs, fuel cells and lightweight directional 
antennas may help miscreants to design airborne jammers that can cause serious damage 
to feeder link performances.  
 Hence, the assessment concludes that, unless the feeder link is safeguarded from UAV 
based jamming attacks, the satellite network may not be safe for datalink services such as 
Clearance/Instruction Service (CIS), Advisory Services (AVS), Flight Position/Intent/ 
Preference Service (FPS), Delegated Separation Service (DSS) and Miscellaneous Services 
(MCS). 
 
5.6. ARCHITECTURE OPTION 3 – SO-OFDMA NETWORK  
As per the concept definition of SO-OFDMA network in Phase 1 of the project, the network does 
not have its own security framework at the Physical (PHY) and Link layers. The packets are 
broadcasted in clear text at the SO-OFDMA level. As per the model, if the data messages are to 
be secured, they have to be protected by the higher layers, either at higher MAC level or at network 
layer level. Hence, this architecture exposes SO-OFDMA link control messages and the broadcast 
messages that originate at SO-OFDMA level to cyber attacks. Figure 5-11 shows SO-OFDMA 
network architecture and its vulnerabilities to various attacks.  
 
 
 
  
Figure 5-11  Security Threats to SO-OFDMA network 
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 . 
In the SO-OFDMA architecture the base stations do not control or coordinate network functions, 
but act as mere data nodes connecting aircraft to the ground network. The ground node may be 
connected to aeronautical ground network as well as to the internet for accessing SWIM services. 
Hence this architecture exposes the network to a host of attacks similar to the ones explained in 
section 5.4 for cellular networks.  
 
5.6.1. Threat Analysis 
The types of threats possible in an SO-OFDMA network are: 
 Jamming 
 Scrambling (Selective Jamming)  
 Impersonating AC 
 Impersonating Ground Node 
 Key Management Issue 
 Black Hat Hacker Attack 
 
Please refer Section 5.4 for details about these threats as these attacks are similar to the ones 
explained there. 
 
5.6.2. Risk Assessment 
Safety hazard assessments for SO-OFDMA network is provided in Table 5-16 and Table 5-17  
and the overall risk assessments of Loss of Communications and Loss of Data Integrity in 
supporting various datalink services are provided in Table 5-18 and Table 5-19.  
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Table 5-16 Hazard Assessment on Loss of communications in SO-OFDMA Networks  
Threat Vector Description 
Estimated Loss of Communication Access to Required Capabilities Safety Hazard 
Score Remarks Score Remarks Loss of Communications 
Jamming 
A strong noise transmitted to affect 
the legitimate signal to cause denial 
of service to aircraft in that region  
0.25% 
Assuming 20% of the pseudo cell 
communication impacted by 
continuous jamming. Creating 
continuous jamming noise will require 
high amount power.  The cell range is 
larger than commercial mobile towers.  
90.00% 
Generic commercial 
cell phone jammers 
may be deployed  
0.23% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Scrambling 
Selective jamming of a specific 
frames / parts of a frame 
Knowledge of the frame structure 
known to scrambler  
0.50% 
The entire cell operations can  be 
brought down by selectively knocking 
off control part of the frame  
50.00% 
May require additional 
engineering efforts.  
0.25% 
Extremely 
Remote 
Impersonating 
AC 
Hacker uses a SO-OFDMA modem 
with AC Id to impersonate AC and 
broadcast wrong AC positions and 
IDs to confuse the network.  
0.40% 
Broadcast traffic may be severely 
impacted. Flooding AC Ids and 
positions may confuse the network 
50.00% 
SO-OFDMA modem 
can be modified to 
send wrong 
information 
0.20% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Impersonating BS 
The ground station or Base station 
faked by a Rogue Station/Aircraft. 
Rogue Station uses legitimate Base 
station ID in its routing broadcast 
so that all aircraft in the pseudo cell 
and adjacent pseudo cells are 
attracted towards it.  
12.00% 
The entire routing information may be 
modified in the region covering 
multiple cells. (Assuming 30 cells 
impacted by wrong info. The impact is 
on Air Ground communications. Air to 
Air may remain unaffected)  
50.00% 
BS credentials difficult 
to get. Score for BS 
with credentials.  
6.00% Remote 
Key Mgmt issues 
 Loopholes in Key or credential 
management infrastructure leading 
to security breach on a large scale.  
50.00% Major issue. May impact entire NAS.  0.10% 
Very difficult to 
manipulate credentials 
0.05% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Black Hat Hacker 
SO-OFDMA may use cellular 
network for ground connectivity. 
Since cellular network is a public 
network any random hacker from 
internet anywhere may try to attack 
the gateways to ground side 
network.  
2.00% 10% of a network population 0.50% 
Similar to enterprise 
network 
0.01% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
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Table 5-17 Hazard Assessment on Loss of Data Integrity in SO-OFDMA Networks  
Threat Vector Description 
Estimated Loss of Data Integrity Access to Required Capabilities Safety Hazard 
Score Remarks Score Remarks Loss of Data Integrity 
Jamming 
A strong noise transmitted to affect the 
legitimate signal to cause denial of 
service to aircraft in that region  
0.01% 
Jamming may not impact 
data integrity owing to 
integrity algorithms  
90.00% 
Generic commercial cell 
phone jammers may be 
deployed  
0.00% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Scrambling 
Selective jamming of a specific frames / 
parts of a frame Knowledge of the frame 
structure known to scrambler  
0.01% 
Same as Jamming. May not 
impact integrity much 
50.00% 
SO-OFDMA modem can 
be modified to impact the 
control frames May require 
additional engineering 
efforts.  
0.00% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Impersonating AC 
Hacker uses a SO-OFDMA modem with 
AC Id to impersonate AC and broadcast 
wrong AC positions and IDs to confuse 
the network.  
0.50% 
As the broadcasts are sent as 
clear text, Surveillance 
information may get 
severely impacted in the cell 
range. (1 cell out of 20 cells 
assumed) 
50.00% 
SO-OFDMA modem can 
be modified to send wrong 
information 
0.25% 
Extremely 
Remote 
Impersonating BS 
The ground station or Base station faked 
by a Rogue Station/Aircraft. Rogue 
Station uses legitimate Base station ID 
in its routing broadcast so that all 
aircraft in the pseudo cell and adjacent 
pseudo cells are attracted towards it.  
12.00% 
Surveillance information in 
multiple cells may be 
impacted causing confusion 
in the region. (8-% of 30 
cells out of 200 cells 
impacted ) 
50.00% 
SO-OFDMA modem can 
be modified to send wrong 
information 
6.00% Remote 
Key Mgmt issues 
 Loopholes in Key or credential 
management infrastructure leading to 
security breach on a large scale.  
50.00% 
Major issue. May impact 
entire NAS.  
0.10% 
Very difficult to 
manipulate credentials 
0.05% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Black Hat Hacker 
SO-OFDMA may use cellular network 
for ground connectivity. Since cellular 
network is a commercial network it has 
access to internet. Hence any random 
hacker from internet anywhere may try 
to attack the gateways to ground side 
network.  
2.00% 
10% of a network 
population 
0.50% 
Similar to enterprise 
network 
0.01% 
Extremely 
Improbable 
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Table 5-18 Risk Assessment on Loss of communications in SO-OFDMA Networks  
Service Category 
Loss of 
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Safety Hazard 
 
Safety Objective 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Remote 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Remote Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Data Communications Management 
Services (DCM) 
Probable No Threat No Threat No Threat 
No 
Threat 
No Threat No Threat 
Clearance/Instruction Service (CIS) Remote No Threat No Threat No Threat 
No 
Threat 
No Threat No Threat 
Flight Information Service (FIS)  Probable No Threat No Threat No Threat 
No 
Threat 
No Threat No Threat 
Advisory Services (AVS) Remote No Threat No Threat No Threat 
No 
Threat 
No Threat No Threat 
Flight Position/Intent/ Preference 
Service (FPS) 
Remote No Threat No Threat No Threat 
No 
Threat 
No Threat No Threat 
Emergency Information Service (EIS)  Probable No Threat No Threat No Threat 
No 
Threat 
No Threat No Threat 
Delegated Separation Service (DSS) Remote No Threat No Threat No Threat 
No 
Threat 
No Threat No Threat 
Miscellaneous Services (MCS)  
Extremely 
Improbable 
No Threat Threat No Threat Threat No Threat No Threat 
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Table 5-19 Risk Assessment on Loss of Data Integrity in SO-OFDMA Networks  
Service Category 
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Safety Hazard 
 
Safety Objective 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Remote 
Remote Extremely 
Improbable 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Data Communications 
Management Services 
(DCM) 
Remote No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact 
Clearance/Instruction 
Service (CIS) 
Extremely Remote No Impact No Impact No Impact Threat No Impact No Impact 
Flight Information 
Service (FIS)  
Extremely Remote No Impact No Impact No Impact Threat No Impact No Impact 
Advisory Services (AVS) Extremely Remote No Impact No Impact No Impact Threat No Impact No Impact 
Flight Position/Intent/ 
Preference Service (FPS) 
Extremely Remote No Impact No Impact No Impact Threat No Impact No Impact 
Emergency Information 
Service (EIS)  
Remote No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact No Impact 
Delegated Separation 
Service (DSS) 
Extremely Remote No Impact No Impact No Impact Threat No Impact No Impact 
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 Miscellaneous Services 
(MCS)  
Extremely Improbable No Impact No Impact Threat Threat No Impact No Impact 
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The conclusions of the SO-OFDMA security assessment are listed below:  
 At the current level of definition, SO-OFDMA network may be able to satisfy the 
requirements of Data Communication Management Service (DCM) and Emergency 
Information Service (EIS) only. All other datalink services demand higher level of 
robustness from the network.  
 Lack of security features at link and physical layer is a major concern for SO-OFDMA 
network to support safety critical datalink applications.  
 Link layer broadcast in clear text communication makes the network vulnerable to 
masquerading attacks that may impact data integrity. It may not be possible to support 
surveillance applications requiring air-to-air broadcast such as ADS-B, if there are integrity 
issues. 
 SO-OFDMA being defined as an ad hoc network that works without a central network 
control node, the network is immune to single point failures, as experienced by the centrally 
controlled networks. However, the addition of security features at physical and link layers 
would be required to improve the robustness of the network comprehensively.     
 
5.7.   MITIGATION TECHNIQUES 
The security assessments done so far, on the three network architecture options, reveal that none 
of the networks would be able to support all requirements of future safety critical datalink 
services completely. The services like A-Exec involve  controlling aircraft from ground remotely 
and hence they require a very high robust network.  Some of the concerns about the network 
architectures are listed below.  
 Most of the traditional networks are based on the architectures that have central node to 
control network operations. Hence jamming these control nodes may cause network 
outages in the regions serviced by those nodes. 
 Generally in communication networks, the initial control messages for link establishment, 
ranging, etc., are sent in clear text which is vulnerable to attacks. 
 Absence of a common security framework across networks in NAS environment to 
implement common policies, cryptographies and keys, required by NextGen safety critical 
applications, may be viewed as a serious limitation over a period of time. 
 NextGen Datalink applications may become more sensitive even to loss of communications 
in the future. 
 
Considering the above limitations, some mitigations techniques are identified in the following 
sections and the approach to incorporate them in NAS environment is also explained. 
 
5.7.1. Decentralized network 
The main purpose of a decentralized network is to remove the dependency on ground stations to 
control network operations and thereby avoiding single point failures in the network. Aircraft 
flying over a region should be able to form a network in an ad hoc manner and support both air-
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 to-air and air/ground communications without the need of a control node. Figure 5-12 illustrates 
a concept to implement ad hoc network over the NAS region. This proposal extends some of the 
concepts from the SO-OFDMA architecture.  
 
The overall NAS space is be divided into cells and capsules. Capsule size is determined based on 
separation minima definition for aircraft in a region so that a capsule can hold only one aircraft at 
any point of time. The frequency spectrum is divided into multiple carrier frequencies. Space Time 
Frequency multiplexing scheme can be followed to allocate resources to a capsule for various 
timeslots. Every capsule is allocated with a schedule of carrier frequency and time slot combination 
that varies dynamically with time. Such resource allocation plan is standardized and loaded into 
aircraft modems. Depending upon the aircraft position, corresponding capsule can be identified by 
the modem and the allocated carrier frequencies for various time slots can be derived from the 
resource plan and utilized accordingly for its transmissions. Thus, the need for a central network 
node to coordinate resource allocations can be eliminated.  
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Figure 5-12 Space Time Frequency Resource Allocation Scheme
 
 
5.7.2. Allocation of Network resources 
The ad hoc network environment for NAS explained in section 5.7.1 would require a mechanism 
to configure aircraft with the pre-allocated network resource plan. Figure 5-13 shows such a 
mechanism for providing resource allocation plans to aircraft.  
 
 
 
 
A common resource allocator manages the overall resource schedule for the NAS region. The 
resource schedule has a mapping of capsules to timeslots and carrier frequencies. The resource 
allocator will periodically configure all ground systems with this information through a secured 
communication link. Aircraft will receive NAS resource allocation plan, only if they are cleared 
for flying.  When an aircraft files a flight plan with ATC, the network resource plan corresponding 
to its time window of flight can be configured into the aircraft on its flight plan approval. Thus the 
system ensures that only the authorized nodes get the resource allocation information of NAS. The 
resource allocator can periodically change the resource allocation schedule for the NAS region to 
improve security.  The network configurations are transferred to aircraft securely as per the 
mechanism defined in section 5.7.5. 
 
5.7.3. Configurations of Security Parameters 
In addition to the resource allocations, security plan can also be configured to the aircraft during 
flight plan filing phase as shown Figure 5-14.  
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Figure 5-13  AC Resource Allocation Mechanism 
The security plan may include cryptographic algorithms and keys that are to be used in each cell 
(if not capsule) for various traffic like broadcasts, unicasts, network packets, Layer 2 packets, 
etc., depending upon the security policies in place. Aircraft can use the appropriate security 
policy for its transmission or reception.  Aircraft and other network nodes are expected to 
support a set of pre-approved security algorithms and the security plan is arrived by selecting a 
combination of security algorithm from the pre-approved list for various traffics. The security 
plan for a region will be refreshed periodically. 
 
5.7.4. Configurable Radios 
Considering 2060 time frame, the availability of software defined radios and capabilities to 
support multiple waveforms in a single radio box would be common, as illustrated in Figure 
5-15.  
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Figure 5-14  Security Plan configuration 
 Figure 5-15  Radio Parameter Configuration 
 
Hence the radio parameters can also be defined for every cell and configured into the aircraft and 
other network nodes using the same or similar framework explained in section 5.7.3. 
 
5.7.5. Network Configuration Management 
Since the entire network operations depend upon the network configurations, a robust 
configuration management procedure is required to transfer network parameters to aircraft. 
Figure 5-16 illustrates the network configuration management scheme.  
 
 
 
Figure 5-16  Network Configuration Management 
As per this mechanism, an aircraft files the flight plan with the ATC. ATC on approving the flight 
plan passes the flight information to the Network Resource Manager. The Network Resource 
Manager maintains complete information about resource allocation plan, security plan and radio 
Cell1 : Waveform Template m 
Cell2 : Waveform Template n 
   …………………. 
Cell K: Waveform Template x 
Flight Plan 
ATC 
Trusted Link 
ATC 
Approval 
NW 
configurations 
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 configuration plan for the NAS region. These details are configured into the aircraft as indicated 
in the flight plan. The information exchanges between aircraft, ATC and Network Resource 
Manager would happen through secured datalinks. The trust between the three parties could be 
established by digital certificates signed by common certificate authority servicing the NAS region 
for other datalink services. The network manager periodically refreshes the resource allocation and 
configuration plans. In addition to updating aircraft, the ground nodes also have similar mechanism 
to acquire the network configuration information from the network manager. FAA or any other 
agency appointed by FAA may provide such service in NAS region.   
 
 
 
 
 
5.7.6. Safety Considerations 
Figure 5-17 shows the extent of safety considerations addressed in approach discussed so far.  
 
Figure 5-17  Safety Considerations 
 Waveform designs are configured for every cell. Unless this information is known to the 
intruder, he will never be able to decode the waveforms and extract data out of it. Hence 
the network becomes resistant to eavesdrops at physical layer. 
 The carrier frequencies are allocated for every capsule–timeslot combination. The carrier 
frequencies are spread across the entire aeronautical spectrum used for communication. 
Unless such allocation scheme is available to the jammer, the jammer will not be able to 
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follow the carrier signals to jam it or decode control information. Hence selective jamming 
techniques may not be effective in such networks.  
 The security framework ensures that the messages are protected at MAC and higher layers.  
 In absence of a centralized network control, every node in the network operates 
independently of each of each other. Hence the network is immune to single point failures.  
 
Hence such a network would be very robust and immune to most of the threats.    
 
5.7.7. Strategy for Cellular Network  
As discussed earlier, some minor modifications would be required in cellular networks to support 
air-ground communications. Increased transmission power to support long range communications, 
strategies to handle higher Doppler shifts because of higher aircraft speeds, antenna designs to 
support   emission towards aircraft, etc., are some of the changes anticipated in the cellular network 
designs. Therefore, the base stations are expected to be modified to support air-ground 
communications as shown in Figure 5-18.  
 
 
Figure 5-18  Cellular Network 
Hence, while redesigning the base stations for aeronautical purposes, the security risk mitigation 
techniques identified in the sections above could be implemented at the same time. Beyond base 
stations, the network would be common for both commercial and aeronautical data traffic. There 
are no changes expected in the network nodes such as message switches or gateways that are 
present in the cellular network beyond base stations.    
 
5.7.8. Strategy for Satellite Network  
As per the assessment, the major concern for the satellite network is the attack on its feeder links 
using airborne platforms. UAV based jammers with nominal noise power would be able to jam the 
feeder links at ground earth stations. Hence the strategy for the satellite network is to eliminate the 
feeder links completely for the satellite networks. See Figure 5-19. 
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Figure 5-19  Satellite Network without Feeder Links 
In this proposal, the satellites have only user links for both aircraft and ground systems. ATC 
centers  and airline operations centers may have the user terminals similar to aircraft modems 
installed in their premises.  The satellites have onboard routing/switching capability. Satellites will 
establish direct point to point connections between the user terminals for their communications 
based on their requests. Bandwidth allocations will depend upon the number connections 
established by the terminals. For example: Aircraft may require one or more connections to 
communicate with ATC or airline centers, while ATC centers might require multiple connections 
to communicate with all aircraft within its control.  The satellite network should be capable of 
supporting such dynamic bandwidth aggregation depending upon the connection requirements. 
The satellite control link may make use of user terminal connections for communicating with 
satellite control systems. Thus the feeder link can be completely eliminated in this design and the 
satellite network becomes almost immune to all types of attacks discussed so far.  
 
5.7.9. Jammer Localization 
By implementing the strategies discussed above, the networks may become more robust and 
immune to attacks that would cause network outages. But still jammers would be able to cause 
minor disturbances to the network causing marginal degradation in network performances. Hence, 
it is also important to identify the jamming incidents, locate jammers and stop them to limit the 
duration of disturbances to the network. Figure 5-20 illustrates such a technique to locate jammers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATC1  Airline 
ATC2 
Safety Critical NW Domain
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It should be possible to locate the jammers roughly by tracking the noise power continuously along 
the aircraft flight trajectory and applying multilateration technique to determine the approximate 
location of the jammer. Analysis of the jammer localization technique was not within scope of this 
project, but a further study on this area is highly recommended.  
 
5.7.10. Hacker monitoring 
Generally, the networks would be connected to the Internet for accessing some services or to 
provide website/email connectivity to passengers. Hence the network becomes exposed to black 
hat hacker attacks. It should be noted that black hat hacker attacks from the Internet can never be 
avoided completely, but it should be possible to locate the hacker threats and alert network 
administrators for corrective actions.  The corrective actions may include shutting down certain 
interfaces, blocking some traffic, masking some network domains, etc. 
 
As shown in Figure 5-21, traffic monitors can be included in the networks in strategic locations 
to look for patterns of hacker attacks in the network. In case of a hacker attack, the hacker would 
be generating data traffic in a particular pattern, such as continuous login messages, etc. Traffic 
monitors would look for such patterns and identify the potential threats to the network and alert 
the centrally located NAS network monitor. Such a network monitoring framework and tools 
could be considered for deployment in the NAS network. 
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Figure 5-20  Multilateration Technique to Locate Jammers 
  
5.8. SUMMARY OF SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
Security assessments were carried out with the objective of identifying the vulnerabilities of 
candidate technologies and architectures to intentional safety threats, assessing safety hazards to 
datalink services and recommending mitigation strategies to improve overall safety aspects of the 
NAS environment. The candidate technologies down-selected from phase 1 tasks were considered 
for the assessment. Future Cellular, GEO Satellite and SO-OFDMA technologies were considered 
for the assessment. The assessment was carried out in three stages, namely, Threat Identification, 
Hazard Estimation and Risk Assessment. Finally, mitigation techniques were identified and the 
strategies to implement them in NAS environment were recommended.  
 
Some of the observations of this assessment are listed below: 
 Cellular networks should be able to handle most of the data link services except the 
applications like Autoexec that would be used to control aircraft remotely from ground 
using datalinks. Such services may require very high network robustness. The architectures 
with base stations controlling network operations are vulnerable to network outages when 
the base stations are targeted by the attackers. RF jamming and man-in-middle attacks are 
the major concerns for Cellular Networks.  
 Satellite networks are generally immune to most of the attacks, but in the 2060 timeframe, 
the attacks based on UAV platforms may become more common and such attacks on feeder 
links at ground earth stations may cause a serious impact in the NAS region. Unless 
protected from such feeder link attacks, the satellite network may not be safe for datalink 
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Figure 5-21  Hacker Monitoring 
 services such as Clearance/Instruction Service (CIS), Advisory Services (AVS), Flight 
Position/Intent/ Preference Service (FPS), Delegated Separation Service (DSS) and 
Miscellaneous Services (MCS). 
 SO-OFDMA concept in its current level definition does not support security mechanism at 
the PHY and Link levels. This makes SO-OFDMA network highly vulnerable to many 
attacks. The network is susceptible to data integrity issues because of the absence of 
protection for broadcast messages. Unless security features are incorporated in the network, 
the network may not be able to support most of the datalink applications. Assessment 
revealed that SO-OFDMA network may be able to satisfy the requirements of Data 
Communication Management Service (DCM) and Emergency Information Service (EIS) 
only. Hence additional security features is highly recommended.   
 
Satellite and Cellular networks suffer from the central node based architecture that controls 
network operations, while SO-OFDMA network is immune to such single point failures, but, it 
lacks other security features that are available in other networks. Hence, mitigation objectives were 
identified by combining the merits of all networks. Some of the mitigation strategies recommended 
are decentralizing network, pre-allocated network resources, configurable radios, configurable 
security parameters, position based resource allocation scheme and Jammer/Hacker location 
strategies.  
  
NASA/CR—2015-218842 130
  
6.   CONCLUSIONS 
This section summarizes the results of the operational and security assessments of the best 
alternative technologies.  It provides recommendations for future work beyond this project to 
further analyze and develop the technologies and architectures with the goal of defining 
requirements and approach for proof-of-concept activities. 
 
6.1. SUMMARY 
This report provided the results of operational and security assessments of the best technology 
alternatives.  The best alternative technologies were selected based on analyses performed in 
previous analysis and assessment tasks in the project.   The best alternative technologies selected 
include next generation 5G+ cellular, Ku/Ka band SATCOM and SO-OFDMA.  FSO was 
identified as a supplementary technology for high throughput point-to-point links.  In this Task 6, 
the subject of this report, the best alternative technologies and architectures are analyzed in 
operational and security assessments in providing air/ground and air-to-air communications for 
ATM applications in the 2060 timeframe.     
 
The results of the best alternatives assessment reinforce the conclusion of the previous project 
analysis tasks that the three remaining technology and architecture candidates together provide a 
suitable hybrid solution.  They generally meet latency and data throughput performance 
requirements of ATM applications in the 2060 timeframe.  Security was analyzed in terms of the 
susceptibilities inherent in the nature of the technologies.  Potential security protections were 
analyzed for mitigation of the security risks presented by the threats.  Security measures can be 
put in place to mitigate the risks but not completely eliminate the risks.  A defense in depth will 
be a good approach to mitigate risks. Summaries of the operational and security assessments are 
provided below. 
 
Summary of Operational Assessment 
The operational assessment consisted of an operational view analysis and simulation modeling 
analysis.  In the operational view analysis, a concept of operations of communication services 
supporting ATM application services was developed.  It identified information flows of the 
communication services for the following types of data traffic: critical safety services - ATS and 
AOC; non-critical services - AAC and SWIM; and passenger traffic - APC.  The concept of 
operations assumed that these data traffic types, including APC, will share common links in future 
broadband air/ground communication systems in the 2060 timeframe.  Air-to-air communication 
systems were assumed to be dedicated to ATS, AOC and AAC traffic only.   
 
Communication scenarios were analyzed in context of the architectures using the best alternative 
technologies for air/ground and air-to-air communications.  The architectures included ground-
based and HAP-based 5G+ cellular architecture (architecture option 1), Ku/Ka SATCOM 
architecture (architecture option 2) and SO-OFDMA architecture (architecture option 3).  The 
hybrid architecture is a combination of the three architectures and thus an analysis of the hybrid 
architecture was covered by the analyses of the three architectures. 
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The operational view analysis results included the data traffic throughputs or bandwidth predicted 
for the 2060 timeframe for the data traffic types (ATS, AOC, AAC, SWIM and APC) in each 
airspace domain and flight phase (pre-departure, arrival and taxi in APT domain; departure and 
arrival in TMA; operations in ENR, OPR and AOA).  The data traffic was analyzed across various 
aircraft types, including ATR, microjets, BGA, UAS and military aircraft flying civilian routes 
under CAA rules.  The single-aircraft data flow results for each of these aircraft types were used 
for input to the simulation modeling analysis.   
 
The next phase of the operational assessment used modeling and simulation to further assess the 
best alternative technologies.  Starting with the latency, data bandwidth (per-aircraft data traffic 
estimates provided by the operational view analysis) and priority requirements of the data traffic 
types, the architectures were modeled and analyzed, which included computer-based modeling.  
Data packet loss and scalability performance were also analyzed. Aircraft traffic information was 
taken from current ADSI data and extrapolated for the 2060 timeframe. The simulation and 
analysis produced performance results to assess if and how well the technologies met the 
requirements.  The technologies were modeled and analyzed in context of the three architectures.   
 
The modeling and simulation part of the operational assessment utilized a combination of 
modeling of the single-system architectures, which included computer-based modeling of the 
systems, and a traffic and network simulation covering the CONUS.  The traffic and network 
simulation, the Air Traffic Simulation Model Tool, applied the models of the three best alternative 
architectures to a planned CONUS-wide network for air/ground and air-to-air communications.  
The Microsoft Windows® based tool is a NAS network simulation and visualization tool to 
generate performance statistics for analysis and evaluation.  It is a highly configurable tool and 
provides a GUI for setup, operation and report generation.      
 
A summary of the modeling and simulation results are provided below.  
- Ground-based Cellular Network Results 
Latency requirements of ATS, AOC, AAC, SWIM and APC data types were met for high-density 
aircraft traffic (up to 400 aircraft per 2 degree by 2 degree cell).  However, APC, having the lowest 
priority for transmission and much greater traffic volume, experienced significantly more latency 
at 400 aircraft per cell and significant packet loss starting at 50 aircraft per cell.  There was no 
packet loss experienced by ATS, AOC, AAC and SWIM up to 400 aircraft per cell.  To cover the 
CONUS, 360 cells (ground base stations) were needed. 
 
- HAP-based Cellular Network Results 
Results were similar to the results of the ground-based cellular network.  A single HAP cell is able 
to support a greater number of aircraft and thus fewer HAP cells are needed to cover the CONUS 
in comparison to the coverage of ground-based cells.  However, a higher link capacity is required 
for the aircraft-to-HAP link to support the greater number of aircraft in the cell (4 degree by 4 
degree cell).  This link represents a potential bottleneck in traffic flow.  To cover the CONUS, 100 
cells (HAP base stations) were needed. 
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 Latency was significantly higher due to the inherent propagation delays in satellite 
communications.  SATCOM is not suitable for latency critical real-time applications.  SATCOM 
supported ATS, AOC and AAC with up to 300 aircraft per spot beam (4 degree by 4 degree spot 
beam).  Packet loss was experienced by SWIM and APC starting at 5 aircraft per spot beam.   The 
potential bottleneck in the SATCOM system is the satellite-to-ground gateway link.  To cover the 
CONUS, 100 spot beams from a satellite were needed.    
 
- Aircraft-to-Aircraft Communications Network Results 
The simulation results showed generally good air-to-air and air/ground coverage across the 
CONUS, based on the aircraft flight schedules, routes and aircraft density represented by the ASDI 
data used in the simulation.   There were instances of disconnected aircraft (from the ground) 
during times when the aircraft did not have a complete path to a ground station.  This occurs in 
sections of lightly traveled routes such as routes between the east and the northwest over areas 
such as Montana.  A disconnected occurrence was also indicated as such when the number of hops 
between an aircraft to a ground station exceeded a maximum number of hops, which was 
configurable in the simulation.  An aircraft RF range of 120 nm was represented as a mobile node 
with a range circle with 2 degree radius.  The ground stations were placed at major airports and 21 
selected airports provided the coverage for the CONUS.   
 
Summary of Security Assessment 
The security assessment considered security in context of the architectures and defined a security 
perimeter boundary to properly set the context of the security analysis of the technologies.  The 
security perimeter included the physical and link layers and the access network layer.  However, 
potential hackers (black hat hackers) operating on the ground-based networks further back from 
the aircraft/ground network in the overall end-to-end network topology were also considered as 
potential threats in the analysis.  The following threats were identified and analyzed: jamming, 
scrambling, aircraft impersonation, rogue (fake) base station, key management breaches, attacks 
from man-in-the-middle hackers and attacks from black hat hackers.  These threats were 
numerically analyzed on the extent of impact they would have on data integrity and loss of 
communications (percentage of system degraded or disrupted by the attack) and the required 
capabilities to effect the attacks (percentage estimate of likelihood the attack can be done given 
cost and complexity to do it).  The product of the impact and likelihood of each threat to data 
integrity and communications was assigned a hazard level classification.  The hazard level of each 
threat was compared against the safety objective of each ATM service to determine the level of 
security risk.  A hazard level that is greater than the safety objective indicates a security risk.  The 
safety objectives of the ATM application services were defined using the same set of 
classifications and were based on COCR   requirements.  Technical mitigations of the security 
risks were identified and analyzed.   
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- Satellite Network Results 
 A summary of the security assessment results are provided below.  
- Cellular Network Results 
The assessment of cellular networks showed that all data communication services can be supported 
without major security issues with the exception of very safety critical, future services such as the 
Autoexec service, which will require more robust security to protect it against threats. A service 
such as Autoexec is susceptible to jamming, scrambling and rogue base station threats.  
- Satellite Network Results 
Feeder links (satellite-to-ground station) were found to be susceptible to attack.  Emerging and 
more prevalent UAVs were found to be a good platform from which to jam the downlinks in the 
feeder link.   To mitigate this risk, the feeder link could be eliminated in lieu of user links between 
satellite and user terminals on the premises of ground-based users. 
- Aircraft-to-Aircraft Communication Network Results 
The self-organized aircraft-to-aircraft network, which is in the conceptual phase of development, 
was recognized as lacking security mechanisms at this point in its development.  Without security 
mechanisms, it is susceptible to attacks such as jamming and impersonation.  An aircraft-to-aircraft 
network uses non-centralized control as an ad hoc network, which provides some immunity to 
single point failures that can be experienced by centrally controlled networks. 
 
Application of the self-organized cell concept and the concept of the decentralized network with 
appropriate security measures and key management were proposed to mitigate risks.  Aircraft 
would form an ad hoc network to use space, time and frequency domain separation to allocate 
resources and provide security in a way to avoid the impact of attacks on single control points.   
 
Other mitigation strategies include jammer localization and hacker monitoring, which is based on 
the observation that jammers and hackers are typically localized.  By localizing the jammer and 
hackers through monitoring preventive measures can be implemented effectively. 
 
6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations for further work are provided below.  Further analysis, modeling and simulation 
are needed to define the requirements and approach for proof-of-concept activities to build and 
test systems to validate the requirements.  Validated requirements can subsequently be used to help 
develop standards needed for implementations.  The essential recommendations for future study 
are: 
 Detailed analysis of the impact of low-altitude UAS, specifically in urban areas, on future 
NAS communications.  The analysis should include harmonization strategies for UAS 
command and control links with traditional ATC communications as well as general 
integration of UAS information for situational awareness of the pilots and controllers. 
 Develop high fidelity simulation models of the proposed architectures to perform tradeoff 
analyses and operational scenario-based simulations.  In addition, by integrating these 
simulation models with other pre-existing NASA models, higher fidelity system models 
can be developed to aid future system design. 
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  One of the key challenges for applying FSO to aeronautical communications is the 
acquisition and tracking of aircraft moving at very high relative speeds.  Therefore, a future 
study should undertake this challenge to develop technical approach and system design for 
aircraft acquisition and tracking to support FSO communications. 
 Security analysis presented in this paper provides a high level assessment of the security 
threats, risks and their potential mitigation approaches.  A future study should specifically 
expand this analysis to fully address the security vulnerabilities of the proposed 
architectures and develop mitigation approaches. 
 RF spectrum is a very limited resource and its demand is increasing exponentially with 
time. Therefore, a future study should analyze the availability of effective spectrum for 
aeronautical communications and develop a technical approach for reuse and dynamic, on 
demand, allocation of spectrum. 
 The aviation network of the future needs to be very dynamic with multiple air/ground 
connectivity options supporting simultaneous traffic flows with varied quality of service 
requirements and ad-hoc, self-configuring air-to-air networks.  To maintain robust data 
flows and to assure low latency and jitter, future aeronautical networks must support 
sophisticated routing algorithms that can converge very quickly and impose very little 
system overhead.  It is essential to research and design this routing algorithm soon such 
that it would be ready for standardization within the next ten years.  This research should 
include management of multiple links for seamless inter-technology handovers and 
leverage currently evolving IP mobility standards. 
 Similar to the routing challenges, aircraft architecture may also need to be investigated to 
facilitate such a dynamic network operation while ensuring security of the flight critical 
services and safety of flight.  
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